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 Abstract 
Breast screening is a large and important public health program that attracts controversy and 
disagreement.  While there are many supporters for breast screening, there are others, 
including people with expertise and experience in breast screening, who disagree with at least 
some of the common breast screening policies and practices.  Disagreement persists despite a 
large evidence base around breast screening.  I sought to examine how opinions were formed 
amongst people who have been influential in developing breast screening policy and practice 
in Australia, and the role of values in their reasoning.  I used an empirical ethics approach, 
combining empirical study with theoretical analysis .  For my empirical research I 
interviewed Australian “experts”: individuals with expertise and influence in breast 
screening, including participants from a range of professional roles and experience related to 
breast screening.  I questioned these experts about their views on breast screening with a 
particular interest in determining how these views were formed.  I found that participants 
draw on values as well as evidence when talking and reasoning about breast screening.  The 
group expressed a range of interpretations and priority levels for each value.  I explored 
several aspects of breast screening in depth to examine these findings in more detail, focusing 
in turn on the topics of overdiagnosis, communication with consumers, and socially 
embedded concepts in breast screening.  In each of these subjects I found that experts’ 
disagreements were based, at least in part, upon differences in the way they understood and 
prioritised certain important values.  Experts did not always reflect on the role of values in 
shaping their views on breast screening, and did not necessarily recognise differences in how 
any given value was conceptualised.  I drew upon these findings to consider decision making 
in breast screening policy and practice and explore ways of managing values based conflict in 
 iii 
 breast screening.  In the Discussion I suggest that there be explicit acknowledgement of the 
role of values in shaping views about breast screening, and that values should be openly 
discussed and debated.  I provide practical guidance about formats that such discussions 
might take.  I conclude that values play an important but often unrecognised role in shaping 
breast screening policy and practice, and propose that there be regular review of such values 
and the ways in which they relate to breast screening, in order to deliver breast screening in 
the most ethically sound manner. 
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cancerous cells have not spread out of the breast lobule.  LCIS may eventually progress to 
become invasive cancer in a minority of women.  It is also regarded as an indicator that a 
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 Preface and thesis overview 
This thesis describes an empirical ethics study of the views of Australians with experience at 
working in a breast screening related field, and who exerted an influence on breast screening 
policy and/or practice.  My interest in ethics within breast cancer screening was stimulated by 
my clinical practice as a trainee breast radiologist/physician in an NHS breast screening unit 
in the United Kingdom.  I noticed mixed attitudes towards breast screening amongst my 
clinical colleagues, some of them being very supportive of the program, and others being 
sceptical of one or more aspects of the work.  Both groups appeared to have the best interests 
of their patients in mind and both cited evidence to support their views.  At the same time I 
was undertaking a Masters Degree in Bioethics, and I began to wonder about the connection 
between my colleagues’ stance on breast screening and their individual views about what was 
important in medicine, and in life more generally.  It appeared to me that disagreements in 
breast screening might not only be about the evidence, as the published literature had led me 
to believe, but might be at least partly about values and ethical commitments, implicit or 
explicit, such as whether an individual was more concerned about delivering (breast 
screening related) benefit, or avoiding (breast screening related) harm. 
 
A couple of years after this I had the opportunity to participate in a large NHMRC funded 
project exploring the ethical issues in cancer screening in Australia.  I chose to focus on the 
breast screening arm of that study, while others concentrated on cervical and prostate 
screening.  While my broad research area of ethics in breast cancer screening was shaped by 
the overarching project goals, I led the development of my specific research questions and 
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 selection of study methods.  I pursued an empirical ethics approach, aiming to combine 
empirical data about this topic with theoretical analysis. 
 
Organisation of thesis  
This thesis is arranged into nine chapters, several of which have been published, are in press, 
or have been submitted for publication and are undergoing review.  Each chapter contains its 
own reference list.  Supplementary material accompanying published papers is included at 
the end of the relevant chapter.  Other supplementary material is included in the Appendices. 
 
In Chapter 1 I present an historical overview of breast screening.  I begin in the late 19th 
century, and discuss the changing model of diseases such as breast cancer, previously thought 
of as local manifestations of a systemic disease but increasingly understood to be local 
diseases with the potential for progressive spread and dissemination.  I proceed to describe 
the impact of these new ideas on management of breast cancer, including the concept of early 
diagnosis and its extension into screening.  During the second half of the 20th century, 
technological advancements made breast screening by mammography possible, and research 
suggested that it would reduce population breast cancer mortality.  Breast screening became 
widespread throughout the developed world, with Australia introducing a government-funded 
program in 1991.  Over the last 25 years, reviews of the evidence have suggested that the 
breast cancer mortality reduction attributable to breast screening might be less than 
previously thought.  Recent improvements in treatment might also mean that the window for 
breast screening to have an effect is smaller.  There has been increasing interest in possible 
harms associated with breast screening, including false positive diagnoses and overdiagnosis.  
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 As a result of all this, there has been public speculation among some breast screening experts 
about the net benefit of breast screening, although it remains popular with many women and 
healthcare professionals. 
 
In Chapter 2 I discuss social and ethical issues relevant to breast cancer screening.  I note 
that as breast screening has become an important public health intervention, its policies and 
practices have influenced, and been influenced by, social factors and deeply held values.  I 
describe the interaction between breast screening and societal attitudes towards the breast and 
breast cancer.  I discuss changing ideas about health and risk aversion, as well as relevant 
biomedical paradigms.  Breast screening is associated with a strong advocacy movement, 
political interest and substantial commercial potential; these factors have impacted upon its 
development and are likely to have an ongoing influence on its future.  The ethical issues that 
are particularly relevant to breast screening include several important principles drawn from 
healthcare ethics literature. In the second half of this chapter I describe and explain these 
principles with particular attention to the breast screening context.  I cover familiar principles 
such as: maximising benefits (within resource constraints), minimising harms, respecting 
autonomy, and just distribution of benefits and burdens.  I also write about less widely 
discussed concepts including: honesty, transparency, procedural justice, reciprocity, and 
solidarity.  This chapter is currently in press within a scholarly book. 
 
In Chapter 3 I provide a formal review of the broad empirical literature that has explored the 
role of values in shaping views about breast screening amongst health professionals and the 
public.  I describe how most empirical studies have investigated the views of women, with a 
few focusing on the views of primary healthcare practitioners, and none specifically looking 
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 at the views of individuals who influence or develop breast screening policies and practices.  
Within these studies, researchers have tended to focus on the influence of health beliefs about 
breast cancer, the benefits of breast screening, and personal breast cancer susceptibility.  
Some researchers have explored the impact of a woman’s psychological responses to breast 
cancer or breast screening on their views about screening.  Other researchers have considered 
the role of values in shaping the views of a woman or practitioner in relation to breast 
screening.  I conclude this chapter by reflecting on the lack of research into the views of 
influential experts: the people likely to influence breast screening policy and practice.  Thus, 
although expert guidance and guidelines have a significant impact upon women’s breast 
screening opportunities, there is limited understanding about how these individuals formulate 
their views, including a lack of knowledge about the role of ethical considerations.  The 
empirical research project described in the remainder of this thesis addresses this gap 
in the literature. 
 
In Chapter 4 I describe the evolution and practice of my research aims and methods.  I 
discuss my commitments to empirical study and, following on from Chapter 3, to exploring 
the views of breast screening experts.  I note my particular interest in the role of ethical 
considerations in experts’ thinking, and in the wider context of decision making for breast 
screening policy and practice.  I go on to describe my methodology, explaining the emerging 
discipline of empirical ethics that combines empirical research with theoretical analysis, and 
then discuss the particular empirical and theoretical approaches that I used in my study.  I 
provide a detailed overview of my methods, including selection and sampling of participants, 
collection and analysis of data.  I have placed supporting material in related Appendices. I 
describe how my study unfolded, including the selection of individual topics for deeper 
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 analysis. I provide information about research ethics and conclude with a description of my 
subsequent interactions with study participants. 
 
Chapter 5 contains the first published paper derived from my empirical research.  In this 
paper I describe my findings concerning the ethical and epistemological values that breast 
screening experts expressed when talking about breast screening.  I also note the variation in 
how experts conceptualised values, and in how they prioritised values that were perceived to 
be in conflict with each other.  I describe some of the decision-making difficulties that might 
result from these variations.  I conclude this paper with a recommendation that explicit 
discussions about values should be a regular part of breast screening review and evaluation, 
in order to improve understanding between those who hold opposing positions, develop 
agreements on important aspects of screening, and make ethically sound decisions about 
policy and practice. 
 
Chapter 6 contains the second published paper from my empirical work.  In this paper I 
focus on the topic of overdiagnosis in breast screening and describe the different ways that 
experts discussed and framed this concept.  I apply framing theory to my analysis, a 
particularly useful tool to illustrate the variation amongst experts’ thinking about multiple 
aspects of overdiagnosis in breast screening, including:  what the problem actually is, likely 
causes and preferred solutions, and moral judgements about the issue.  Some of the frames 
used by experts were starkly different to one another.  Drawing on the empirical evidence 
reported in this paper, I conclude my report with the suggestion that explicit consideration of 
the identified frames might be a useful tool for experts and others who are trying to engage 
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 with the topic of overdiagnosis in breast screening, and might promote understanding 
between those with differing views. 
 
Chapter 7 contains the third published paper relating to my empirical studies.  This paper 
explores the ways that experts viewed the topic of communication with breast screening 
consumers.  I describe how experts held differing opinions on two important topics: the 
extent to which potential breast screening consumers should be guided to participate in 
screening, and the depth of information about overdiagnosis that should be provided to 
women.  Combining these findings, I present the range of experts’ views about consumer 
communication, describing them in turn as: “Be screened”, “Be screened and here’s why”, 
and “Screening is available, please consider whether it’s right for you”.  In the remainder of 
this paper I explore the ethical values underpinning experts’ reasoning behind their views on 
this specific topic, and, as with the more general paper in Chapter 5, note differences in the 
ways that experts conceive of and prioritise ethical values.  I finish by providing a possible 
template for how discussions about values might be structured, and reiterating my suggestion 
that explicit discussion about values should be a regular feature of decision making for breast 
screening policy and practice. 
 
In Chapter 8 I include the fourth published paper that draws directly on my empirical results.  
In this paper I discuss socially embedded concepts, and consider their relevance to breast 
screening.  I suggest that breast screening has characteristics of both clinical medicine and 
public health, and discuss the implications of this in terms of ethical reasoning about policy 
and practice.  I describe my empirical findings regarding the ways in which Australian breast 
screening experts use socially embedded concepts when talking about breast screening.  
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 Drawing on both my empirical work and on theoretical arguments, I conclude that socially 
embedded concepts are relevant to breast screening and should be incorporated in ethical 
analyses of policy and practice. 
 
Chapter 9 contains a discussion of the overall thesis and my final conclusions.  In this 
chapter I revisit my initial observation that apparently well-meaning experts exhibit varying 
views about breast screening, and I review the different ways that others have explained and 
tried to address this situation.  A commonly reported explanation is that differing opinions 
derive from readings and interpretations of the evidence, and I note the diverse range of 
suggestions about how evidence should be better conducted, communicated or interpreted in 
order to deliver a message that is more consistent with the epistemological values of the 
author or authors.  A second explanation is that experts’ views are influenced by their values, 
including particular ways of balancing or prioritising values.  Ways to manage variance in 
how people think about values range from suggestions that values should be somehow 
removed from decision-making (which should, somewhat implausibly, instead rely solely on 
evidence) to exhortations for explicit debate about contentious values, typically in the context 
of a specific breast screening related topic such as communication with consumers.  I 
compare and contrast these ideas with my own findings as described in this thesis.  While 
agreeing that ethical considerations are an important part of experts’ views about breast 
screening, I suggest that rather than discussing just one or two values, better understanding 
and management of experts’ disagreements might be gained from a much more substantial 
engagement with ethics research, theory and practice.  I repeat my recommendations to 
educate experts about the language and concepts in ethics, and to explicitly include 
discussions about values in breast screening reviews, evaluations, and decision-making 
 xxxi 
 processes.  I expand upon my previously described models of how to structure these 
discussions.  I close by recommending research into how, and to what extent, the ethical 
values of the public should be included in decisions for breast screening policy and practice. 
 
Ethics approval for the empirical arm of this study was gained from the Cancer Institute of 
New South Wales Population and Health Services Research Ethics Committee 
[HREC/12/CIPHS/46] and the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee 
[#15245]. 
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Chapter 1: A history of breast screening 
1.1 Chapter introduction 
There are several topics that provide important background to the research I discuss in this 
thesis.  These topics include: the history of breast screening by mammography; social and 
ethical considerations relevant to breast screening; the normal breast; the pathology of breast 
cancer; and current Australian breast screening practices.  This chapter outlines the history of 
breast screening using a biomedical focus, and with a particular spotlight on the Australian 
context.  It is intended to provide context for my empirical study, illuminating the medical 
and technological background that may have influenced the experts I interviewed.  Social 
considerations are described in Chapter 2, along with an introduction to relevant ethical 
issues.  Background information about the normal breast, breast cancer pathology, and breast 
screening practices is provided in Appendices 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  The literature 
searching process used for this chapter and for Chapter 2 is described in Appendix 4. 
 
1.2 Historical background – the challenges of breast cancer 
Breast cancer has been recognised and recorded as a pathological entity for many millennia, 
appearing in records as far back as ancient Egypt in 2500-3000 B.C.1,2  From these early 
days, physicians noted that breast cancer would typically declare itself as a breast mass, 
increasing in size and becoming ulcerated, painful and malodorous.  Symptoms of 
widespread bodily involvement tended to develop later in the disease and death typically 
occurred within three to four years of the patient noticing the mass.  There were infrequent 
stories of long-term survival (see Appendix 2 for more detail on breast cancer pathology).  
Throughout ancient and more modern times, the recommended management for breast 
cancers has included systemic therapies, such as attention to diet and rest, as well as 
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treatment of local disease by cautery, caustic medicines or surgery.  Such regimes might 
temporarily improve a woman’s sprits and alleviate her local symptoms but it was widely 
thought that breast cancer was incurable.1-3 
 
By the 1700s, ideas about sickness and disease were beginning to change.  After centuries of 
accepting that ill-health was predominantly due to a systemic, or whole-of-body problem, a 
new theory was put forward, suggesting that some diseases, such as cancer, might begin as a 
local problem.1,2  The implication of this was that early local control might sometimes be 
more effective that systemic treatment.  Surgical removal of the breast tumour, along with 
any obviously diseased tissue in the axilla, became a more common treatment for breast 
cancer, and seemed to delay breast cancer death in some women.1-5  The introduction of 
anaesthesia in 1846 and aseptic surgical techniques in the 1860s facilitated improvements in 
surgical experience and technique.  Some surgeons began to advise routine removal of the 
entire breast, and others also advocated for regular excision of axillary glands: there was hope 
that such treatments might prevent local recurrence altogether, and, if the localised theories 
about the origin of breast cancer were correct, could result in a complete cure.  In 1894, the 
American surgeon, William Halsted, reported on his treatment successes with an even more 
extensive operation, something that he recommended for all women with breast cancer.6  His 
technique, variously called a “compete operation”, “Halsted mastectomy” or “radical 
mastectomy”, included removal of the entire breast together with the underlying muscles 
Pectoralis minor and Pectoralis major and the axillary lymph nodes.2(p7),7  It left many 
women with severe disfigurement and restricted use of the arm, but nevertheless there was 
widespread enthusiasm for his methods, and optimism that surgery could, if thorough 
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enough, effect a total cure.1  From the turn of the 20th century, radical mastectomies became 
increasingly recommended as the routine treatment for breast cancer.4 
 
1.3 The promise of early detection 
Although the outlook for most women with breast cancer remained poor, those who 
presented and were treated for smaller tumours did appear to have better surgical outcomes.  
It seemed that the best chance of treatment was not only to remove all the local tissues and 
lymphatics that could be harbouring cancerous cells, but to do so early in the apparently 
relentless growth pattern of the disease, before cancerous cells spread beyond the immediate 
area.  There were recommendations that surgical removal of local tissues should be 
performed as soon as possible after presentation, and from the early 1900s, women were 
encouraged to seek prompt medical attention for breast lumps.  Taking this idea even further, 
women were advised to regularly self-check their breasts and doctors were encouraged to 
screen asymptomatic women using physical examination, in an attempt to find tiny masses 
that had not yet declared themselves to the patient.1, 8  Screening by physical examination 
certainly did reveal breast lumps in some asymptomatic women, and those women were 
noted to live longer after diagnosis than women whose breast cancers were diagnosed after 
symptomatic presentation.9  The improved survival time may have been affected by lead time 
bias but nevertheless enthusiasm for screening increased, and soon progressed to include 
technological interventions. 
 
Breast x-rays were already being used sporadically to assist with the differential diagnosis of 
breast lumps, particularly where clinical signs were inconclusive.10, 11  The ability of x-rays to 
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identify impalpable breast lesions was recognised as early as 1913.12, 13  Though there was 
international enthusiasm for breast x-rays in the diagnostic and screening setting, their use 
was initially limited by the inherent technical differences and challenges associated with 
radiography of soft tissues compared to bone.  The lack of a well defined, standardised 
technique and dedicated equipment meant that breast x-rays produced unreliable results and 
were difficult to interpret.14, 15  Nevertheless, by the middle of the twentieth century, various 
centres throughout Australia, United States, Britain and Europe were using breast x-rays as a 
screening tool and collaborating with other enthusiasts about techniques and technological 
variables including positioning, breast compression, target-film distance, exposure time, and 
film type in an effort to improve x-ray quality.10, 14 
 
There were pockets of vocal opposition to the current management strategies of radical 
surgery and early diagnosis:  after decades of radical surgery and “do not delay” 
campaigning,1(p144) the population breast cancer mortality rate was relatively unchanged.16  In 
1951, American surgeon, Ian MacDonald, suggested that many cancers may run a largely 
predetermined course, and that the ability of treatment to affect this was limited, an idea 
termed “predeterminism”.17(p450)  According to this model the good prognosis of women with 
small, localised tumours was at least partly due to inherently slow growth pattern of many of 
these cancers rather than the extent or timing of the surgery.  Conversely, the poor prognosis 
of women with extensive disease might often be due to the natural, rapid progression of their 
disease rather than to inadequate or delayed surgical clearance.18  According to this 
interpretation, radical surgery might be unnecessarily disabling, and screening was not only 
largely ineffective for many women but somewhat problematic, as it might lead to 
exploratory surgery for benign masses, and distracted people from research into new, more 
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effective treatments.1, 19  There was particular concern about allegedly excessive public 
anxiety arising from promotion of the message that early diagnosis is vital for the 
management of breast cancer.  This general state of high public anxiety was described by the 
American surgeon, George “Barney” Crile, Jr (1955, cited by Aronowitz1(p187)) as 
“cancerphobia”. 
 
The idea of predeterminism was only adopted by a minority of professionals.1  Mainstream 
medical and public opinion remained focused on the pursuit of earlier and earlier diagnoses 
on the premise that would be an effective way of addressing the significant mortality rate of 
this “most frightening disease of women”.8, 14(p1104)  In America it was estimated that more 
than one in 20 women would be diagnosed with breast cancer, about half would die within 
five years, and most would be dead by 15 years.16, 20, 21  The apparent success of cervical 
screening by the Papanicolaou test in reducing cervical cancer mortality was often discussed, 
and stimulated efforts to find ways of controlling breast and other cancers.8  By the 1960s 
observational studies of screening by breast x-ray10-12 and thermography22, 23 were being 
undertaken to investigate the potential value of these modalities as breast cancer screening 
tools.  The technical difficulties of creating reproducible and reliable x-rays (increasingly 
known as mammograms) at an affordable cost and acceptable radiation dose were being 
successfully addressed.10, 13, 15, 24 
 
1.4 Screening by mammography - evidence of benefit from early trials  
In the early 1960s, researchers at the National Cancer Institute (NCI) in the United States of 
America, a government cancer research and training organisation, were interested in 
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definitively studying the impact of early diagnosis by screening on breast cancer mortality.1  
A plan was developed to conduct a randomised controlled trial to explore this question.  The 
initial proposal was for a study of screening by mammography using a slight modification of 
a standardised technique recently described by American radiologist Robert Egan.  The 
protocol was later modified to include screening by physical examination, after recognising 
that while mammography was particularly good for screening large breasted women, in 
whom screening by physical examination could be unsuccessful, it might miss clinically 
palpable tumours in others.9, 25  The trial was run through the New York health maintenance 
organisation, Health Insurance Plan (HIP), recruiting HIP patient volunteers and using HIP 
staff.  It began in 1963, with 62,000 asymptomatic women aged 40-64 years.  According to 
the trial’s radiologist, Phillip Strax, (1967, reported by Kunkler26p249 ) the lower age limit was 
chosen to avoid inadvertent radiation damage to an unborn fetus since “there were very few 
women who had children after that age.”  The intervention cohort was offered annual 
screening for four years and 65% attended at least one screening session; the control group 
received usual care, with no breast screening.1, 16 
 
The HIP trial suggested promising results after just four years of data:27 for women who were 
over 50 years of age at the time of the initial screen there were fewer breast cancer deaths in 
the intervention cohort than in the control group. The researchers advised that longer follow-
up was needed to confirm whether or not the apparent mortality benefit was persistent but 
overall they expressed “cautious optimism”27p1785 about the future of breast screening.  They 
perspicaciously suggested that efforts should be made to accelerate mammography capacity 
and capability, in order to cope with what might become a high public demand for breast 
screening.27  The American response was immediately enthusiastic: in 1973 the NCI 
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collaborated with cancer advocacy organisation, the American Cancer Society (ACS), to fund 
a five year project offering annual breast screening by physical examination, mammography 
and thermography in multiple centres across the country, targeting women between 35-74 
years.  These 27 Breast Cancer Detection Demonstration Projects (BCDDP) were designed to 
demonstrate the feasibility of mass population breast cancer screening and publicise the 
benefits to lay and medical communities.1  They were hugely popular with the public, despite 
awareness in the scientific community about the possible health dangers of radiation 
exposure from medical x-rays.1, 28-30  Concerns about the high radiation dosages and 
carcinogenic potential of mammography, particularly for younger women were raised at the 
onset of the BCDDP in the early 1970s, and within a few years women under 50 years of age 
were only allowed to participate if they were deemed to be at high risk of developing breast 
cancer.  The interpretation of risk was variable, with some centres considering most women 
(i.e. up to 80%) under 50 years to be eligible for participation.1 
 
The international medical community continued to debate the usefulness of mammographic 
screening and sought to gather further evidence.31  While there was general support and 
widespread public advocacy for the concept of early diagnosis, some of the medical 
community were fully aware that apparent improvements in survival amongst patients 
diagnosed through cancer screening may well be due to lead time and/or length time bias (see 
List of special terms and abbreviations).28, 32  Others were apprehensive that screening by 
mammography or thermography may not add much, or anything, to the existing strategies of 
clinical and self-examination, and furthermore, could be problematic.  The particular 
concerns were that: [1] mammography could potentially cause harm through radiation;33, 34 
[2] mammography and thermography may be insufficiently specific, thus delivering harms 
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through false positives; and [3] thermography may be insufficiently sensitive, thus delivering 
harm through delayed presentation after a misleadingly reassuring false negative result.28, 35  
Many who were enthusiastic about mammographic screening were at least partly motivated 
by frustration at the persistently high breast cancer mortality and morbidity rates.36  Breast 
cancer death in younger women was a particularly visible concern: although breast cancer 
mortality rises with age, there are few other diseases that kill younger women, and in high 
income countries such as Australia, breast cancer was (and remains) one of the leading causes 
of death in this cohort.5, 34, 37  The mainstay of treatment was radical mastectomy with or 
without radiotherapy, with significant side effects.  Newer modalities such as chemotherapy 
and hormonal manipulation were being investigated and particularly championed by 
clinicians such as the American surgeon Bernard Fisher, who claimed their superiority in 
what he thought of as a systemic disease.2  Fisher’s breast cancer model was that many 
cancers spread throughout the body very early in the disease, long before clinical or 
radiological detection was possible.  This implied that systemic therapy was needed alongside 
surgery, thus treating tiny metastases as well as the primary tumour.6, 38 However this was not 
the mainstream disease model for breast cancer and the value of systemic treatments was 
uncertain.  As late as the 1980s, many thought the impact of chemotherapy on breast cancer 
was limited, with some claiming that they could do little more than palliate.39, 40  There was 
considerable interest in avoiding the morbidity of a radical mastectomy, and an eagerness to 
find breast cancers at a time when they were small and node-negative, and thus more 
amenable to the much less disabling “simple” mastectomy, which preserved underlying 
muscles.41, 42  It was hoped that mammographic screening might be useful in this regard.34  
 9 
Chapter 1: A history of breast screening 
In the wake of the promising early results from the HIP study, additional breast cancer 
screening studies were instigated throughout Europe during the 1970s to provide further 
evidence about mammographic screening.43  Technical changes to reduce radiation doses and 
improve breast image quality were also explored.  X-ray equipment that was specifically 
designed for the soft tissues of the breast became commercially available.  These so-called 
“mammography units” contained several important differences from general x-ray units that 
were largely used to view bony tissues, including: different target metals in the x-ray tube, 
resulting in x-rays with properties more suitable to the soft tissues of the breast; built-in 
breast compression devices that improved image quality; and the introduction of new 
photographic and film technologies.10  In 1985, Swedish radiologist Lazlo Tabar and 
colleagues published a short but highly influential report of the early results from their “Two 
County” randomised controlled trial (RCT), also referred to as the Kopparberg and 
Ostergotland trials.44  They concluded that offering breast screening by mammography alone 
(i.e. without clinical examination) could produce a 30% reduction in the population breast 
cancer mortality rate.  Their data corresponded with results from the HIP trial and from 
recently reported observational case-control studies in the Netherlands45, 46 and Italy.7, 47  The 
possibility that the results might have been compromised by error40 or by extreme length bias 
from the diagnosis of “biologically localised breast cancer”48p868 was acknowledged in the 
academic literature, but it was widely believed that any such errors or biases, if present, were 
insignificant.55, 61, 62  Most people were optimistic that, finally, population breast cancer 
mortality and morbidity could be significantly reduced.  The next step was to work out the 
details of screening protocols that would suit local populations, health systems, and 
economies.49 
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1.5 The introduction of organised breast cancer screening by mammography 
in Australia 
At the time of the widely publicised Swedish RCT on the benefits of mammographic 
screening, breast cancer was a significant disease in Australia: 
“Cancer of the breast is the most frequent cancer in Australian women.  Over 5000 
women develop it and nearly 2000 women die of it, each year.  Approximately one in 
16 women will develop breast cancer during her lifetime, and one in 24 women will 
die of it.  It causes the loss of some 32,000 women-years of life annually, 14,000 of 
which would have been lived before the age of 70 years.  As a cause of the loss of 
years of life before 70 years of age in women, it is exceeded only by congenital 
malformations and other perinatal conditions, traffic accidents, and coronary heart 
disease.”50p86 
 
The most promising avenue for reducing breast cancer deaths appeared to be the early 
detection of disease by mammographic screening.  It was already clear from the trials that 
screening could have a beneficial effect on mortality, and towards the end of the 1980s, the 
addition of chemotherapy and hormonal agents to surgery for early breast cancer was finally 
looking like it might improve things even further.7, 39  The pressing issue in Australia was 
how to translate the new evidence on screening into actual benefit for Australian women, and 
how to do so in the most cost-effective manner possible.51  
Breast cancer screening by mammography had been occurring sporadically in Australia since 
the 1960s. For example, between 1961-1963, Sydney radiologist Marjorie Dalgarno had 
carried out 1300 mammograms on asymptomatic women attending the gynaecological cancer 
detection clinic at the Rachel Forster Hospital.  The purpose of the investigations had been to 
identify impalpable tumours as well as build up knowledge and skills in the diagnostic 
setting: improving understanding about the normal range of mammographic appearances and 
developing a standardised technique.14  In 1971, enthused by the HIP study, another Sydney-
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based screening centre, Medicheck, began offering screening mammograms to “apparently 
well” women aged 25 years and over, referred by their doctors.52p287  Nearly 12,000 women 
were screened between 1971-1975.  A diagnostic breast clinic at The Wesley Hospital in 
Brisbane opened in 1982, and alongside diagnostic work it provided mammographic 
screening for asymptomatic, high-risk women referred by their doctors.53  There were 
pockets of vocal support for breast screening, notably a Working Group convened in 1984 by 
the Australian Commonwealth Government’s peak medical research funding body, the 
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC).  They advised that 
mammography was not only an accurate and safe method for early diagnosis of breast cancer, 
but that early diagnosis was effective in reducing breast cancer mortality.54  
Further developments in breast screening in Australia were precipitated by the 1985 
publication of Tabar’s widely anticipated report on the Swedish Two County trial44 and by 
the subsequent Forrest report in 1986 that proposed the introduction of screening 
mammography in Britain.55, 56  Dedicated mammography screening services were introduced 
in selected centres throughout Australia, funded by state governments and private investors.51, 
57  They used varying operational parameters, with differences in factors such as: 
recommended screening interval; starting age; finishing age; number of mammography views 
per breast; and whether or not clinical examination was included.  In 1987, the 
Commonwealth Government began investigating the feasibility and cost of a nation-wide 
mammography screening program by providing guidance and financial support for a research 
component at existing and new state based programs.  This included the collection of cost 
and performance data and exploration of recruitment strategies at each centre.51, 56  A second 
Swedish trial reported favourable mortality benefit from breast screening58 and there was 
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general medical and political support for the “opportunity to modify the fact that more than 
2000 Australian women die from breast cancer each year”.59p76  Funding for a national 
screening program was announced in 1990.60  
The National Program for the Early Detection of Breast Cancer officially began in 1991, 
taking several years to become fully operational (and changing its name to BreastScreen 
Australia in 1996).  National guidance was provided through the National Advisory 
Committee for the Early Detection of Breast Cancer, and a National Co-ordination Unit had 
responsibility for overall management and evaluation of the Program.  Each state and 
territory had its own State Co-ordination Unit (SCU), to oversee the delivery and monitoring 
of local breast screening services across a network of screening units and associated 
assessment centres.  The program offered biennial breast cancer screening by mammography 
to all women from the age of 40 years, with particular emphasis on recruiting women aged 
from 50 to 69 years.60 
 
Screening providers were funded by public money via a combination of state and federal 
government budgets, and all screening and follow-up services were free of charge for 
women.  This lack of an economic barrier was specifically intended to provide all women 
with an equal opportunity to attend screening.  It was recognised however, that an 
unregulated program of free breast screening might be problematic: it appeared that 
(opportunistic) cervical screening was being over-used by those with the least need for it, 
resulting in excessive financial costs and adverse health effects with little or no additional 
benefit.  The new breast screening program therefore was organised with a defined screening 
interval, providing greater cost-efficiency and minimising harm.61, 63 
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 Another strategy to ensure equality of opportunity to attend screening was the use of mobile 
screening vans to provide screening services to women living in rural and remote areas.  The 
new program also aimed to work towards equality of outcome (in the form of screening 
attendance rates) across different sub-groups defined by age, marital status, socio-economic 
status, language and ethnicity.  An early national benchmark was that recruitment of 
Indigenous women and women from non-English speaking backgrounds should be at least 
50% of the rate of the general population.64  These aims were implemented by producing a 
variety of promotional materials that matched the cultural and linguistic needs of all eligible 
women, and by specifically monitoring the screening attendance of different population sub-
groups.60 
 
The new program aimed to find a suitable balance between delivering the benefits and 
avoiding the harms of breast screening by implementing national policies on false negative 
and false positive rates.  In any screening program, these two test outcomes affect the 
delivery of benefits and avoiding of harms respectively, but they affect each other in such a 
way that minimising the false negative rate (in order to deliver maximal benefits) can result 
in an excessive false positive rate (and considerable harm).  The new breast screening 
program approached this issue directly, deciding to guide the benefit:harm ratio by allocating 
national performance targets for false positive and false negative rates.  Screening units and 
individual radiologists involved in the screening program were regularly monitored for 
compliance, and educational strategies were put in place to remediate as required.60, 61 
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Financial costs also had to be balanced against benefits and harms when making decisions 
about how and when to screen.  Annual, two-view mammography was likely to identify more 
breast cancers in the population than biennial or triennial, single-view mammography, but 
also lead to greater radiation exposure for women, and result in higher financial costs.  The 
final recommendation of biennial, two-view mammography was a compromise protocol.51, 61 
 
The selection of the screening age range also required decision-makers to balance a number 
of important public health concepts.  On the one hand, screening appeared to be popular 
amongst women, including younger women, and as such there could be an argument that free 
access should be provided for women of all ages.  On the other hand, the evidence about 
population mortality benefit for women under 50 years of age was limited, and likely to be 
lower than the benefit for older women because of the reduced breast cancer incidence in 
younger women.  In addition, screening related harms (false positive and false negative 
results) would be more common in younger women due to the limitations of mammography 
for a pre-menopausal breast.  Finally, because the benefit:harm ratio was lower for younger 
women than for older women, the program’s financial cost-efficiency would be lower if 
screening were made available to young women.  The final protocol gave free access to 
breast screening for all women over the age of 40 years, but particularly targeted and 
promoted screening to women aged between 50 and 69 years.51, 61 
 
Personal privacy was another issue for policy makers, and this came into conflict with their 
interest in delivering health benefits. In order to achieve the predicted breast cancer mortality 
reduction the program needed a high participation rate.  Personalised letters of invitation and 
regular reminder letters were determined to be the most effective recruitment strategy, but 
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this required information to identify and contact the relevant population.  Electoral rolls 
contained the relevant age, gender and contact data, but these records had been collected 
specifically for election purposes and there was some discomfort about using them for other 
reasons.  The matter was largely resolved in favour of delivering benefits: utilising electoral 
information to send personal invitations, although breast screening units only had access to 
data about women in the target age range (50-69 years).60 
 
1.6 Breast screening: the last 25 years 
Since the introduction of organised breast screening into Australia, there have been several 
additions to the evidence base for breast screening.  During the 1990s the RCTs that had 
commenced in the wake of the HIP trial began delivering their results.  None of them 
suggested the same level of benefit that the HIP and the Two County trials had reported, 
although most reported results with similar trends.65-67  The exception was a Canadian group, 
who reported that screening by mammography resulted in more diagnoses of breast cancer 
but no change in breast cancer mortality compared with physical examination for women 
between 50-59 years, and no perceptible breast cancer mortality reduction associated with 
combined mammographic and clinical breast screening for women aged 40-49 years.68, 69  
The results of these studies did not reduce enthusiasm for screening by mammography:  there 
was widespread criticism of the Canadian study methods70, 71 and much confidence that 
improved mammographic technology would deliver even more mortality benefit.  
Researchers began to perform systematic reviews and meta-analyses on the breast screening 
RCTs, pooling study numbers with the aim of improving knowledge and reaching greater 
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certainty of results.  Depending on which of the studies were included, a variety of claims 
about the impact of mammography screening on breast cancer mortality were made.  For 
example, in 1993, a published review of the Swedish studies suggested there would be a 24% 
breast cancer mortality reduction in a population invited to mammography screening, with 
29% in women aged 50-69 years.72  In 2000, a controversial Danish review of all the RCTs to 
date claimed that many of the studies should be excluded because of apparently inadequate 
methodological quality, and concluded there was “no reliable evidence that screening 
decreases breast cancer mortality”.73p133  The most recent review was published in 2013 by a 
group of independent experts who had never published on breast screening, in an effort to at 
least be seen to provide an “objective … assessment of the evidence”.74p2208  This group 
calculated a population breast cancer mortality benefit of 20% amongst women invited to 
participate in mammography screening, although noted that “a great deal of uncertainty 
surrounds this estimate”.74p2207  
There has been even more controversy over the evidence relating specifically to the amount 
of breast screening mortality benefit for the cohort of women less than 50 years of age. The 
early RCT and observational trials had reported that the observed breast cancer mortality 
reduction associated with mammographic screening was only significant in women who were 
50 years or older at the time of initial screen.27, 44-46  Various theories to explain this were put 
forward, including: [1] the possibility of a more rapid cancer growth pattern in younger 
women, meaning less opportunity for mammography to find asymptomatic cancer75 (see 
Appendix 2 on breast cancer pathology); [2] lower mammographic sensitivity in younger 
(pre-menopausal) women due to increased radiographic density; that is, the increased amount 
of hormone-sensitive glandular and stromal tissues radiographically obscures any 
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abnormalities42 (see Appendix 3 on the breast screening process); and [3] smaller absolute 
numbers of cancers in younger women, meaning that trials were insufficiently powered to 
find any significant benefit (this latter argument generally included an explicit or implicit 
suggestion that a mortality benefit was, in fact, present).51, 54  
Differing responses to the evidence about younger women led to international variation in 
screening protocols.  For example, the UK breast screening program was set up to only be 
accessible for women who had turned 50 years.55  The Australian program targeted women 
from the age of 50 years, but allowed women from the age of 40 years to access screening 
upon request. Advice issued by government and non-government bodies in the USA has 
varied over the last 25 years; suggestions that screening might not be beneficial for women 
under 50 years have been met with enormous public outcry and political intervention (see 
Chapter 3 for more detail on this). Despite recent updates to trial data, the evidence remains 
limited and the debate is ongoing.76-79  Many believe that any breast cancer mortality benefit 
will, at best, be small.80 
 
The previously mentioned Danish group who performed the highly controversial meta-
analysis of breast screening trials went on to suggest that screening by mammography is not 
justifiable, because the harms are likely to outweigh the (limited) benefits.73, 81 This triggered 
renewed interest in the harms of screening, including false positives and overdiagnosis (see 
the List of special terms and abbreviations).  An American group made the obvious, but 
previously little discussed, observation that some breast screening protocols and practices 
made it likely that a woman would experience at least one false positive in her lifetime.82  
Other researchers began to study the topic of overdiagnosis in more depth.  It had already 
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been realised that screening mammography resulted in a huge increase in diagnoses of in situ 
cancers, with incidence figures jumping by up to 500%.83, 84  Although the natural course of 
carcinoma in situ was unclear,85 it was thought that more than two thirds would never 
become clinically significant,86-88 and therefore fit the definition of overdiagnosis (see 
Appendix 2 for notes on breast cancer pathology).  As it was unclear which would progress 
and which would not, most women with in situ cancers were – and still are - recommended to 
have surgical treatment, often mastectomy if widespread.83  More recently, epidemiological 
evidence has begun to accumulate to suggest that some invasive cancers diagnosed through 
screening mammography are also indolent (destined to grow slowly, if at all) and therefore 
similarly falling into the category of overdiagnosis.  Again, it is not possible to determine 
overdiagnosis in any individual breast cancer patient.  Attempts to quantify the extent of 
overdiagnosis of invasive cancer have delivered huge variation in results, ranging from 0 to 
over 50% of cases.  This wide variation is attributed to one or more of different 
methodologies, different screening parameters, and different populations.89, 90  Chapter 2 
contains more information on overdiagnosis.  Appendix 5 contains further detail on current 
controversies around interpretation of the evidence relating to breast screening. 
 
Changing ideas about the benefits and harms of breast screening, together with an 
appreciation of improved treatment efficacy, have led to a recommendation from the Swiss 
Medical Board, an independent health technology review board, that breast screening be 
discontinued in their country.91  In other countries, those sceptical of breast screening 
efficacy have made more incremental changes, concentrating on ensuring that women are 
aware that the benefits and harms of breast screening may be closely balanced.92, 93  At the 
same time, mainstream medical opinion continues to remain enthusiastic about early 
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diagnosis by breast screening: increasing life expectancy has resulted in extensions to the 
upper age recommendations for mammographic screening, and more sensitive screening 
modalities such as MRI and tomography are being used and trialled respectively.  It seems 
likely that there will be ongoing debate and discussion about breast screening for some time 
to come.  
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2.1 Chapter Introduction  
This chapter provides background material on social issues relating to breast cancer 
screening.  It also includes introductory material on relevant ethical issues, summarising and 
analysing the existing literature.  Detail about how I searched the literature is provided in 
Appendix 4.  In later chapters I will present my original empirical research about these 
ethical issues. 
 
This chapter contains the following publication in press: 
 
Parker L, Carter S.  Social and ethical considerations in breast cancer screening.  In: 
Houssami N, Miglioretti D, editors.  Breast Cancer Screening: The Scientific 
Evidence.  USA: Elsevier. In press 2016. 
 
The manuscript and reference list are formatted as per the publishers’ specifications, and 
hence do not correspond to the formatting in the rest of this thesis.
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Abstract 
In this chapter we discuss social and ethical dimensions of breast screening.  Breast screening 
has influenced, and been influenced by:  attitudes towards the breast and breast cancer; 
increasing emphasis on responsibility and risk in healthcare; and prevailing biomedical 
approaches to early detection of cancer, technological innovation, and evidence based 
medicine. Commercial and advocacy interests, and the political nature of breast screening 
have shaped its social character.  Ethical considerations in breast screening include:  
maximising benefit (within resource constraints); minimising harm; delivering more benefits 
than harms; respecting autonomy; maintaining honesty, transparency, and just decision-
making; respecting privacy; distributing benefits and burdens fairly; and valuing reciprocity 
and solidarity.  We discuss these, and consider ethical challenges, including disputes over 
evidence of benefit and harm, and balancing conflicting ethical principles. Attending to social 
and ethical aspects of screening will assist policymakers and practitioners to proceed in a 
justifiable and legitimate way.  
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Introduction 
In this chapter we consider the social and ethical dimensions of breast screening. Breast 
screening is grounded in science, but it is also part of society. Like any large scale public 
health program, breast screening exists in a two-way relationship with the society in which it 
is located, being subject to the values and conventions of that society,(1, 2) but also 
influencing future social attitudes, values and practices.(3) We will look at the many ways in 
which social structures and conventions, and moral and ethical thinking, interact with breast 
screening policies and practices. Our discussion is in two main sections.  First we consider 
social aspects of breast screening: social attitudes and ideas that influence or are influenced 
by breast screening.  Secondly we examine ethical aspects: considerations about right and 
wrong with regard to breast screening.  
Social aspects of breast screening 
Social norms and structures interact with breast screening in many ways.  They may act as 
facilitators or barriers to the implementation of and public participation in breast screening, 
and may themselves be influenced by breast screening policies and practices.  Below we 
discuss key aspects of the interactions between society and breast screening, focusing on 
those that have been most studied and discussed in academic and lay literature. 
 
Social attitudes towards breasts and breast cancer 
Breast screening is influenced by more general social norms and values regarding the breast 
itself. Because the breast is associated with sexuality and motherhood,(4) disease and 
treatment of this organ is highly emotive and associated with particular fear and anxiety.(5)  
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Women may feel embarrassed about breast disease, and hesitate to seek medical attention for 
breast symptoms.  Breasts, particularly youthful looking breasts, are a popular topic for the 
media, raising the profile of breast cancer higher than might be expected from its medical 
impact alone and higher than for any other cancer.(6, 7) This media coverage is an important 
source of information for many women (8) but is also skewed towards reporting breast cancer 
in young and conventionally attractive women,(9) despite breast cancer incidence being 
much higher in older women.(8, 10) 
 
Many authors have suggested that both breast screening , and public communication 
encouraging women to participate in screening, have changed the way that breast cancer is 
understood in society, and may also have changed the profile of the disease itself.  Most 
authors agree that the introduction of screening has coincided with a sharp and sustained 
increase in breast cancer incidence and prevalence.  The rise in incidence may be at least 
partly due to overdiagnosis.(10, 11) Similarly the rise in prevalence may be inflated by a 
combination of increased lead time and improved survival as a result of screening, along with 
contemporaneous improvements in treatment.(12-14) The impact of this increase on the 
number of breast cancer patients and survivors has been discussed by many writers, some of 
whom hold potentially conflicting views. It is suggested that breast screening may have:  
1. reduced embarrassment and nihilism about symptomatic disease, thus facilitating 
earlier presentation;(15) 
2. artificially inflated fear of breast cancer death;(16, 17)  
3. artificially inflated belief in breast screening benefits;(16, 18) and  
4. made women vulnerable to overmedicalisation, leading them to demand screening 
and precautionary treatment even when it is unlikely to be beneficial.(19) 
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Some authors are particularly critical of the use of fear in breast cancer or breast screening 
communication. They point to the media presentation of breast cancer as a mysterious, 
increasing, frightening ‘epidemic’, predominantly striking premenopausal white women in 
their prime years. These authors point to the inaccuracy of this depiction, and some suggest it 
has been deliberately engineered as a tool to encourage participation in screening.(9, 10, 20, 
21) 
Summary: social attitudes towards breasts and breast cancer 
• The symbolism of the breast (motherhood and sexuality) means breast cancer is 
highly emotive and breast screening is a popular media story, potentially contributing 
towards attitudes towards breast screening. 
• Screening may affect social attitudes about breast cancer via its contribution towards 
increasing public familiarity with the disease. 
 
Sociology of health and illness 
Breast screening resonated with general cultural and social trends in the second half of the 
20th Century relating to health risks and responsibilities. Many authors note an increasing 
expectation, beginning in the 1970s and 80s, that individuals could, and indeed, should, make 
‘lifestyle choices’ to improve their health.(6, 9, 21) These authors suggest the introduction of 
breast screening has contributed to a ‘personal responsibility’ model of breast cancer, by 
providing an opportunity for women to take individual responsibility for breast health.(6, 22) 
There are two concerns with this model: firstly, the opportunity to participate in breast 
screening may have become a social obligation, with normative repercussions and judgement 
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against those who do not screen, especially if they develop breast cancer.(6, 22, 23)  
Secondly, there is concern that preoccupation with screening may have deflected attention 
from studying other methods of breast cancer control, such as primary prevention.(6, 9, 24, 
25) 
 
Other writers have noted an increasing tendency to subject ourselves to medical attention,(26) 
including widespread general enthusiasm for testing and screening.(27) Relatedly, 
sociologists have extensively documented the increasing risk awareness and risk aversiveness 
that characterises contemporary society. This seems especially pertinent here, as women have 
been shown to be particularly aware of themselves as being at-risk for breast cancer as 
opposed to other conditions,(28) and to overestimate both their risk of dying from breast 
cancer and the protective benefit of mammography.(16, 18) 
 
Summary: sociology of health and illness 
• Breast screening fits with the increasing tendencies of society to place responsibility 
for health upon individuals, and to be aware of and averse to risk, particularly high 
profile risks such as the risk of dying from breast cancer. 
 
Biomedical culture 
Breast screening has arisen in the context of prevailing biomedical paradigms regarding 
cancer growth and control, the use of technology, and evidence-based medicine (EBM).  
Breast screening, as an important practice in preventive health and medicine, has arguably 
contributed to these paradigms. We discuss each of them below. 
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The first example of the relationship between breast screening and biomedical paradigms 
relates to the conceptualisation of breast cancer as a disease. For decades breast cancer has 
been predominantly understood as having a linear growth pattern, progressing from a 
localised focus of abnormal cells or in situ cancer, to invasive and potentially metastatic 
cancer.(5, 29)  This helps to explain the inherent acceptability of breast screening as a policy. 
The most successful methods of control for women without specific genetic abnormalities 
have been assumed to be early detection and intervention and this has contributed greatly to 
the widespread support for breast cancer screening amongst the medical profession.  
Although this paradigm is still dominant, some writers are challenging its hegemony, 
suggesting that some breast cancers may regress (30) or adhere to non-linear growth 
patterns.(31)  It remains to be seen whether these or other theories become more widely 
accepted and influence the future of breast screening. 
 
Breast screening is seen by some writers as an example of the technological imperative in 
action; that is, some propose that screening was adopted in part because both women and 
experts believed in the technology itself.(32)  The implication here is that belief in the 
technology may have been at least as significant a factor in the popularity of breast screening 
as evidence of benefit.(33)  This is particularly discussed in relation to the encouragement of 
women under 50 to participate in breast screening, despite lack of evidence about benefit for 
this age group in early randomised controlled trials (RCTs).(9, 29, 34)  More recent 
developments in breast screening suggest that the technological imperative may be losing 
force as we learn from past experience: newer screening modalities that appear to offer 
increased test sensitivity are being approached with some caution and concern regarding 
overdiagnosis.(35) 
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The rise of EBM has paralleled the production of evidence about breast screening.  Breast 
screening proved to be highly conducive to epidemiological study, and the large amount of 
RCT and other evidence generated around this topic was an important reason for its broad 
acceptance by the biomedical community.  In turn, it may be speculated that the perceived 
success of (evidence-based) mammographic screening programs gave a boost to the EBM 
approach. 
 
Summary: biomedical culture  
• Breast screening has arisen within the context of, and has contributed towards, the 
culture of biomedicine. 
• Breast screening has supported and been supported by approaches to the early 
detection of cancer, technological innovation, and EBM. 
 
Commercial and institutional aspects of breast screening 
Breast screening has become heavily institutionalised in Western society and culture. Many 
writers express concern about commercial interests in this process. They point to a range of 
actors including pharmaceutical companies, equipment manufacturers, professional medical 
organisations, and corporate donors who are doubtless motivated strongly by the desire to 
prevent women from dying of breast cancer, but have additional commercial interests.(9, 24, 
36) 
 
Breast cancer advocacy is one notable institution related to breast screening. Breast cancer 
advocacy groups are large, powerful and highly visible social institutions with recognisable 
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symbols (pink ribbons) and traditions, such as the Komen Foundation Race for the Cure.(15)  
The high profile of breast cancer advocacy means that breast cancer consumer voices are 
taken seriously as a legitimate form of public opinion and power. Many breast cancer 
advocacy groups believe strongly in early detection by screening (37) and campaign for 
screening resources and services.(6) Some authors suggest that the symbolic significance of 
the breast previously discussed makes it easier to raise funds for breast cancer causes 
(including breast screening) than for some other conditions,(9, 24) helping to explain the 
relatively strong funding base and profile for breast cancer advocacy. 
 
Summary: commercial and institutional aspects 
• Key stakeholders may have commercial interests that influence their participation in 
breast screening. 
• Breast cancer advocacy is powerful and bolsters support for breast screening. 
 
The political nature of breast screening 
Many authors have ascribed the political popularity of breast screening partly to its easily 
quantifiable outcomes, which can be readily presented as success stories, but more 
importantly to its role as a ‘women’s issue’ that will attract votes.(25, 38, 39)  Breast 
screening is seen as a ‘safe and non-controversial’ women’s issue, unlike, for example, 
abortion or domestic violence. This is illustrated by the willingness of women in political life 
to be candid about their breast cancer experiences (think here of Betty Ford or Happy 
Rockefeller).(32)  By contrast, when Janette Howard, wife of the then Prime Minister of 
Australia, was diagnosed with cervical cancer her disease was not made public.(40)  
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The lively advocacy environment surrounding breast screening also illustrates its political 
nature (7, 9, 19, 32, 38) and contributes to the frequent politicisation of breast screening. For 
example, when the 1997 Consensus Conference by the US National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) removed its endorsement of routine screening for women aged 40-49 years, suggesting 
instead that it be a personal decision, many advocates organised against the change. Their 
political influence was strong enough to encourage the US Senate to pass a resolution urging 
the NIH to reconsider, and ultimately the NIH re-endorsed routine, annual mammography for 
this age group.(25)  Twelve years later, breast screening again returned to the centre of 
political attention.  In 2009 the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) also 
recommended that screening for younger women (aged 40-49) be an individual choice rather 
than standard practice, provoking immediate and intense condemnation by advocacy and 
clinical leaders.  The US Department of Health and Human Services quickly issued a 
statement to distance itself from the recommendations, stating that federal breast screening 
policy would remain unchanged and assuming that private health insurers would follow their 
lead.  The US federal health insurance program Medicare continues to provide coverage for 
annual breast screening from age 40.(41, 42)  
 
Summary: politics 
• Breast screening tends to be both politically popular and politically contested, which 
influences the design of policy and practice. 
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Ethical issues in breast screening 
Public health, economic, and perhaps legal criteria are commonly cited as guidelines for 
planning or evaluating screening programs.(43, 44)  Explicit inclusion of ethical or moral 
criteria is less common.  Although many of these evaluative criteria include implicit ethical 
principles (such as: maximising benefits; minimising harms; and, more recently, respect for 
autonomy, voiced as requirement for informed consent), a formal ethical approach can 
provide additional value.  First, it can provide depth of analysis, making arguments for why 
principles are important and should be upheld. Second, it draws our attention to additional 
considerations that have not traditionally appeared in screening ethics frameworks.  For 
example, ethicists focused on screening have not only written about why it might be 
important to obtain informed consent for screening,(45-47) but also about the tensions 
between promoting individual health, promoting community health, and respecting 
autonomy.(48)  They have also considered the ethical implications of professional, 
institutional, and consumer tendencies to start and, once started, to continue preventive 
screening programs and to under-recognise the potential for this screening to do more harm 
than good.(47, 49)  
 
The ethics of screening are made more complicated by its location on the boundary between 
clinical and public health practice. Although some of the ethical issues faced by clinical 
medicine versus public health are similar, others are quite different.  Many readers will be 
familiar with the Beauchamp-Childress principles for clinical ethics (respect autonomy, do 
good, avoid harm, seek justice); in recent years authors have proposed alternative sets of 
principles for public health ethics.(50-54)  We will consider both clinical and public health 
principles, beginning with those that are more frequently discussed and debated within breast 
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screening.  Note that some of these principles are more contentious, and so require more 
space to discuss. This is not meant to imply any greater importance, but might suggest these 
issues are deserving of more extensive societal debate.   
 
The public health ethics and screening ethics literatures (45, 51-54) suggest the importance of 
these ethical issues when evaluating breast screening (46-50):  
• Maximise health benefits 
• Minimise harms 
• Deliver more benefits than harms 
• Deliver the most benefit possible within the resources available  
• Respect autonomy 
• Maintain transparency, including communicating honestly  
• Distribute benefits and burdens justly 
• Uphold reciprocal obligations 
• Act in solidarity with others 
 
We will consider each of these in turn.  
 
Maximising health benefits through breast screening  
The goal of improving the health of populations is central to public health practice.  There 
has been considerable debate over the degree to which public health policies should 
deliberately contribute to individual and societal well-being beyond health, an issue we will 
consider later in this chapter. In this section we concentrate specifically on health benefits. In 
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general, a program that delivers greater health benefit can be considered more justifiable, 
primarily because—in many ethical traditions—good consequences have moral value in 
themselves. In addition, delivering these benefits keeps the promises that have been 
implicitly or explicitly made about the program. 
 
Public health is generally characterised as being concerned with health benefits in 
populations rather than primarily focussing on individuals.(55)  In population breast 
screening, for example, a public health perspective would predominantly focus on the degree 
to which screening increases the longevity and quality of life of women on average across a 
population, rather than being concerned with benefit delivered to individual women.  It is 
useful to consider the distinction between benefits to populations and benefits to individuals 
since it is less clear than it may seem, especially for an activity like screening. This is in part 
because benefits to populations are of more than one type.  They include all of the benefits 
experienced by individuals added up (aggregate benefits) but many public health programs 
also provide additional benefits, sometimes called corporate benefits, that occurs at the 
population level only.(56)  For example, vaccination programs deliver aggregate benefits (all 
of the instances of personal protection via immunisation, added up) but also corporate 
benefits (the herd immunity that arises only after a certain proportion of the population is 
vaccinated, and which protects even those who are not vaccinated).  The various aggregate 
and corporate benefits of breast screening are discussed below. 
 
Breast cancer mortality benefits 
Breast cancer screening delivers breast cancer mortality benefit for some age groups.(57)   
The introduction of breast cancer screening into a population has been shown to result in a 
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reduced population breast cancer mortality rate.  This is mainly because some women who 
are screened derive benefit from their participation (the sum of which provides an aggregate 
benefit), although the existence of breast screening may also provide corporate benefits to 
women in general (discussed later in this chapter). 
 
For some public health programs, aggregative population benefit is widely and equally 
distributed amongst most people. For example, in vaccination programs where most children 
participate, the benefit is approximately the same for each child. Not so for the breast cancer 
mortality benefit of screening: most women who attend breast screening receive no breast 
cancer mortality benefit at all, and attending screening will not make any difference to 
whether or not they die of breast cancer.  This is because most women, screened and 
unscreened, will not develop breast cancer.  Of those women, screened and unscreened, who 
do develop breast cancer, many will not die from it if they undergo current treatment regimes. 
Still others, sadly, will die from it regardless of whether or not they attended screening.  It 
has been calculated that less than one in seven women who are screen-diagnosed and treated 
for breast cancer receive mortality benefit from their screening.(58)  Thus the aggregate 
disease-specific benefits of screening clearly exist, but are unequally distributed in the 
population, being derived from a small number of women. 
 
This aggregate benefit, derived from a small number of women, remains the dominant 
driving force behind mammography screening.  Recent attempts to quantify breast cancer 
mortality benefit suggest that screening is less beneficial than was calculated in most of the 
early RCTs, partly because of revised calculations from the original studies,(57, 59) and 
partly because of recent improvements in treatment, which reduces the margin for benefit 
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from interventions such as screening.(14) Writers also express concern that breast cancer 
screening has very little impact on all-cause mortality.(60) 
 
The likelihood of deriving breast cancer mortality benefit from screening may vary between 
women and between populations of women. Individual women at increased risk of dying 
from breast cancer will be more likely to derive benefit from screening, and conversely those 
at decreased risk will be less likely to derive benefit.  The latter group includes young 
women, (since they are much less likely to get breast cancer than older women) and women 
who are more likely to die from other causes (e.g. due to age or significant co-morbidities). 
Similarly, populations of women with a higher incidence of breast cancer will derive more 
absolute mortality benefit from screening, and populations with a lower incidence (e.g. 
communities in many parts of Asia (61)) will derive less benefit. This raises questions 
regarding screening policy, and the extent to which programs should consider themselves 
obliged to focus screening on those sub-populations of women which are most likely to 
experience an (aggregate) mortality benefit. Thus far, within a given population, outside of 
age and (uncommon) genetic markers, most risk factors for breast cancer are modest and thus 
of limited use in stratifying screening.(62)  Recent research on risk factors such as family 
history of breast cancer in first-degree relatives, and personal breast density may alter this.  
Women in their 40s at high risk of breast cancer may have similar benefits and harms from 
breast screening as average risk women aged 50-74, and thus might consider screening at an 
earlier age.(63-65) 
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Breast cancer morbidity benefits 
Breast cancers identified through screening programs tend to be smaller and more amenable 
to breast conserving treatment than cancers that present symptomatically.  This is often 
mentioned as a benefit of breast screening programs but is controversial.  If the breast cancer 
detected was destined to progress and become more difficult to treat, then the woman 
concerned has certainly experienced a morbidity benefit. However some researchers are 
concerned that many small, asymptomatic cancers identified through breast screening are 
indolent – cancers that would never otherwise have come to the attention of the woman.(11, 
66)  If this is so, breast-conserving treatment cannot be counted as a benefit, since no 
treatment was necessary.  This problem of unnecessary diagnosis and management of non-
progressive cancers produces the overdiagnosis in breast screening programs; there is little 
consensus on how common it is.  Overdiagnosis is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter.  In addition, several writers have expressed concern that screening has led to an 
increase, rather than a decrease, in mastectomy rates.  This may be due to the ability of 
screening to detect certain abnormalities in the breast that have an uncertain prognosis, but 
are widely spread throughout the breast and unsuitable for local surgical treatment 
(lumpectomy).(11, 67)  This remains controversial.(68) 
 
Psychological benefits 
Since the majority of women are not destined to develop breast cancer, most women will 
receive a negative screen.  While some argue that the reassurance of a negative screen can 
justifiably be counted as a benefit of screening, others disagree.  Those who object give 
several reasons, including that in some cases the screening result will be wrong (a false 
negative), so screening may sometimes deliver false reassurance.(11)  More generally, 
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though, since it has been consistently shown that both the fear of breast cancer death and the 
expectation of mortality benefit from screening are inflated relative to what the evidence 
would support,(16, 69) it is argued that a woman’s subjectively experienced reassurance from 
a negative screen may be considerably inflated relative to our best estimates of her objective 
risk of developing breast cancer. This distorted perception of risk may have at least in part 
arisen from the communication campaigns of public health communication about breast 
screening.(11)  If this is true, without denying women’s subjective experience of reassurance, 
including it as a benefit of screening is questionable.  In addition, a wrong may be done to 
women if they are implicitly or explicitly misled about the degree to which they are at risk 
and the degree to which participating in screening may prevent their death. 
 
Does breast screening offer corporate benefits?  
Many people consider that a population’s benefits for cancer screening are accrued only as 
aggregate benefits: the sum of benefits experienced by (a few) individuals as a result of 
participating in screening.   Others describe several corporate benefits, added benefits that 
accrue to an entire community as a result of breast screening policies and practices. First, 
screening promotion campaigns have arguably improved public awareness and knowledge 
about breast cancer and, as noted above, this familiarity with disease may facilitate earlier 
presentation amongst women with symptomatic breast disease.(70) Second, operating a 
breast screening program within a population may generate a sense that society cares about 
women, and is willing to support them and provide them with services. (This is considered in 
more detail below.)  Finally, although it is impossible to assert a causal link, the introduction 
of breast screening is widely considered to have catalysed better breast cancer management, 
facilitating an improvement in the co-ordination and operation of breast cancer treatment 
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through better experience, training and monitoring of medical specialists, and the 
introduction of multi-disciplinary team care.(71)  This has meant better outcomes and 
experiences for all women with breast cancer. Note, however, that these latter benefits have, 
to a large extent, already been delivered and are likely to continue, whatever happens to 
screening. Thus they seem relevant for an evaluation of past screening programs, but 
arguably are not relevant to our assessment of how screening should occur in future. This is 
in contrast, for example, to herd immunity, the corporate benefit of vaccination programs, 
which depends entirely on their continuing operation. 
 
Summary: benefits  
• Breast screening delivers breast cancer specific mortality benefits and may deliver all-
cause mortality benefits. 
• Breast screening may deliver morbidity benefits (less aggressive treatments but 
possibly some unnecessary treatments). 
• Consumer reassurance may or may not be a legitimate benefit for many women who 
participate in screening. 
• Introduction of breast screening has stimulated additional, population-wide benefits 
(e.g. improved management) but this may not be a pertinent justification for future 
screening programs. 
 
Avoiding or minimising harms  
Evaluations of public health programs often focus on delivery of benefits. However any 
intervention on an individual or population can also do harm. In clinical medicine, this 
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concept is covered by the principle of non-maleficence: avoiding doing harm associated with 
patient investigation or treatment. While non-maleficence is an ancient and widely-
recognised principle of clinical medicine, the idea that public health policies such as 
screening can do harm is less-well recognised.(47)  It may not be possible to completely 
avoid harms in public health programs, but in general a more ethically justifiable program is 
thought to be one that minimises harms for participants and populations.  
 
Many of the harms discussed below are relevant to any screening program, but here we focus 
on the relevance to breast screening. 
 
Inconveniences and financial costs of participation  
It is well recognised that participation in breast screening incurs inconveniences and 
difficulties such as taking time away from work or child care to attend appointments, 
psychological anxiety, and pain.(72)  Although these are generally perceived as being 
relatively inconsequential, they are persistently cited by consumers as notable aspects of the 
breast screening experience and policy makers should continue to work towards addressing 
such concerns.  In many countries, a screening mammogram and any associated 
investigations also incurs financial costs.(73) 
 
Harms related to the test 
Radiation harms associated with modern mammographic screening are widely recognised to 
be acceptably low for women 40 and older.(74)  The radiation dose is higher for women who 
have dense breasts and for women with very large breasts, thus radiation exposure may be 
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more problematic for pre-menopausal women and large-breasted women, particularly if 
having frequent (e.g. annual) mammographic screening.(75)  Greater radiation exposure 
associated with adding newer tomography screening modalities is currently of concern, and 
research is continuing to address this.(76) 
 
Harms related to test results 
Harms associated with test results include technical faults and false positive results requiring 
recall and repeat testing, and false negative results.  Recall for technical faults or false 
positive screens deliver physical harms of additional mammograms and possibly fine needle 
or core biopsies. In addition to physical harm, these also carry risks of psychological harm 
and, in many countries, extra financial costs.(73)  It has been estimated that the psychological 
distress associated with false positive mammography can last for over three years.(77)  The 
likelihood of a woman receiving a false positive diagnosis during a lifetime of screening 
varies greatly with the location and parameters of the screening program.  It also accumulates 
such that a regularly-screened woman’s risk of having a false positive in her lifetime is much 
higher than her risk of having a false positive as a result of a single test.(78-81)  False 
negative results are much less common but may also cause harm through false reassurance 
and delayed presentation of symptomatic disease.(82) 
 
Harms arising from the limitations of screening 
Overdiagnosis and overdetection of invasive and in situ cancers are also harms of breast 
screening.  At present indolent cancers cannot be distinguished from progressive, potentially 
lethal cancers, so once breast cancer is detected, almost all women are treated.  Treatment is 
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generally unpleasant and may be financially burdensome for the individual (for example, in 
the United States, even those with health insurance suffer considerable “financial toxicity” 
after a cancer diagnosis due to the rising costs of patient co-payments for cancer treatment 
(83)).  Very occasionally treatment will result in patient death.  Thus, at a population level, 
breast screening may be associated with unnecessary morbidity and mortality due to 
overdiagnosis.  Despite intensive research there is currently no firm consensus on rates of 
overdiagnosis within breast screening.(66, 84, 85) 
 
Breast screening does not always deliver certainty about breast health: sometimes screening 
uncovers lesions in the breast that are unlikely to progress to become cancers themselves, but 
may indicate a generalised increase in the likelihood of breast cancer elsewhere in either 
breast.  This type of result might be seen as a harm because it produces heightened anxiety 
about breast cancer, but may not deliver an expected level of certainty about risk to the 
individual and may require substantial removal of non-cancerous breast tissue (e.g. single or 
double mastectomy) to reduce the woman’s risk and anxiety levels to those of an age-
matched cohort without identified breast disease.(86) 
 
Are harms justifiable? 
There are several important points to consider when evaluating whether or not the harms 
associated with breast screening are justifiable. These include the size of the harm and how 
this should be measured, the extent to which harms can be predicted, whether it is possible to 
minimise harms and if so what other consequences may follow, and finally whether action 
should be taken to minimise harms. We consider each of these points below. 
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How much harm? 
It has proven difficult to gain consensus on the amount of harm associated with breast 
screening. As noted above, despite many years of operation and many studies and meta-
analyses, there remains substantial variation in calculations of cumulative false positive and 
overdiagnosis rates.  At least some of the variation may be real: it may be that different 
screening protocols and different populations produce different amounts of population harm.  
Some of the variation may be methodological: differences in overdiagnosis calculations may 
contribute to the considerable disparity between estimates.(84, 85, 87) Writers have urged 
breast screening experts to reach consensus about how to measure overdiagnosis in order to 
make progress on this controversial topic.(88) 
 
Anticipating harms 
Some harms, particularly false positives and false negatives, are well anticipated prior to the 
implementation of organised screening, and programs only go ahead if and when it is 
possible to minimise these harms.  Other harms are less well anticipated.  For example, the 
possible harms associated with ionising radiation were unknown when mammographic 
screening was initially introduced sporadically in the 1950s and then widely implemented 
through several states in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s in the Breast Cancer Detection and 
Demonstration Projects.(32)  (Since that time, mammography units have much improved and 
radiation doses considerably reduced.)  Similarly, while overdiagnosis was occasionally 
discussed prior to widespread breast screening,(89, 90) it was generally assumed this would 
not be a significant problem.  In particular, overdiagnosis of DCIS was not seriously 
considered since DCIS is usually impalpable (asymptomatic) and it was a rare diagnosis prior 
to the onset of screening.  Recently there have been calls for researchers to make a more 
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deliberate effort to anticipate, investigate and report on possible harms associated with 
proposed (and existing) screening programs, (91) particularly in relation to the diagnosis of 
inconsequential disease.(44) 
 
Minimising harms  
When harms are anticipated (or should reasonably be able to be anticipated), ethical 
obligations to avoid harm imply that programs should be designed to not only maximise 
benefits, but also to minimise harms.  In the context of breast screening, this includes close 
attention to quality control, and requires careful and ongoing monitoring of screening 
program procedures, parameters, and outcomes in order to identify and correct technical and 
procedural problems.(92)  Program policies should incorporate activities before and after the 
testing stage, with identifiable standards and quality checks for all steps including recruitment 
and communication, repeat testing, and follow up.  There is some concern that private 
opportunistic screening providers may not engage with the same quality control standards 
and parameters that public, nationally organised providers adhere to.(80, 93)  
Notwithstanding these needs for quality control, the nature of screening means that harms 
cannot be avoided: minimising harms from false positive tests is likely to increase harms 
from false negative tests and vice versa.  Program operators must decide how to balance their 
programs such that the various harms are best minimised. 
 
Summary: harms 
• Breast screening delivers harms to the participating population. 
• There is no consensus on how much harm is delivered by breast screening. 
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• Close attention to quality control is required to minimise harms. 
 
Delivering more benefits than harms 
We have shown above that there are potentially both positive and negative consequences of 
breast screening: benefits and harms. For most people, having benefits outweigh harms is a 
necessary criterion for an ethically justified public health program.  (We would add: 
necessary but not sufficient.  That is, other morally relevant factors such as autonomy, 
transparency, and distributive justice should also be considered, and we discuss these and 
other principles below.)  The process of weighing up benefits against harms is multi-layered.  
It includes, in no particular order: quantitative measurements of benefits and harms (which is 
controversial in breast screening, as discussed above); comparisons between qualitatively 
different benefits and harms; and the relative weightings ascribed to maximising benefits and 
minimising harms. 
 
Comparing qualitatively different benefits and harms  
Benefits and harms may be disparate in nature, making meaningful comparisons difficult.  
How, for example, should we compare population breast cancer mortality reductions against 
(possible) population breast cancer morbidity increases? The logic underpinning endorsed 
public health activities is that they should result in population health benefits that are clearly 
more substantial than the harms, and this has generally been the case with breast screening.  
For example, when organised breast cancer screening was introduced in Australia, the 
benefits from reducing breast cancer deaths was widely accepted to considerably outweigh 
the harms associated with occasional false positive or false negative tests.  Since that time, as 
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discussed above, estimates of screening benefit have decreased and anticipated harms have 
increased, and it is now frequently suggested that the benefits and harms accruing from breast 
screening are closely balanced.(70, 94)  In such a scenario, qualitative differences between 
screening outcomes make comparisons particularly troublesome.  Translating screening 
outcomes into comparable units may have some similarities with the somewhat controversial 
use of QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years) for comparing disease outcomes.  It is not clear 
who might be best placed to make such translations. 
 
Should we prioritise maximising benefits or minimising harms? 
The relative importance ascribed to maximising benefits and minimising harms may vary 
according to context and individual preferences.(95)  In some circumstances, or for some 
people, avoiding harm may be considered a prioritised principle, that can rarely be traded off 
against benefit or any other principle.  Again, where the differences between benefits and 
harms are clearly great, personal preferences about the importance of each principle may not 
significantly affect the outcome of balancing benefits against harms in population-level 
policymaking.  For breast screening, where benefits and harms appear more closely balanced, 
individual differences in prioritising each principle may become more important. 
 
Who should decide whether benefits outweigh harms? 
Many writers think it important to involve citizens in such calculations.  Citizens can be 
involved at policy level and at a personal participation level.  Firstly, deliberative democracy 
methods such as citizens’ juries can be used to determine public perspectives on comparing 
qualitatively different benefits and harms, and on the weightings that should be ascribed to 
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maximising benefits and minimising harms.(96)  The rationale here is that lay people may 
value and trade off the various possible benefits and harms differently to policy makers and 
healthcare professionals.  Secondly, many people suggest that individuals who are 
considering participating in breast screening can and should be more involved in deciding 
whether or not benefits outweigh harms in their particular case, because they are best placed 
to know their own attitudes towards these benefits and harms.(97) Consumer decision making 
is valued here for its usefulness as being the best way of deciding between somewhat similar 
or incomparable outcomes, independent of the intrinsic value of being able to make decisions 
for oneself (see more on this in the next section on respect for autonomy).  This reasoning 
contributes to new breast screening communications with consumers that seek to present both 
benefits and harms and encourage informed choices about screening participation.(98) 
 
Note, however, that obtaining informed consent does not remove responsibility from 
providers to minimise harms,(46) and breast screening policy makers arguably have a duty to 
deliver screening policies that the majority of the target population will accept.  Many 
consider that benefits of screening remain substantial enough to outweigh harms and so 
breast screening should continue unchanged.  Others disagree, and, notwithstanding the use 
of deliberative democratic methods to help ascertain public opinion, many writers are 
suggesting that breast screening programs should be more tailored to individual risk profiles 
in order to facilitate a more favourable balance of benefits and harms.  For example: those at 
higher risk of dying from breast cancer, for whom benefits of screening are likely to be 
greater, should have more screening than those who are at lower risk of dying from breast 
cancer and are therefore less likely to benefit from screening. 
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Summary: delivering more benefits than harms 
• Benefits and harms in breast screening are more closely balanced than previously 
thought. 
• Given the qualitative differences between benefits and harms, and variations in how 
much to prioritise the principles of maximising benefits and minimising harms, it is 
hard to know where, exactly, the balance between breast screening benefits and harms 
lies. 
• Involving citizens at the levels of policy making and individual decision making may 
assist with making this calculation. 
 
Delivering the most benefit possible within the resources available 
Given that resources for healthcare are always finite, resource allocation and the amount of 
benefit received for a given investment is worthy of ethical consideration. In the context of 
breast screening it is relevant to not only explore how much benefit can be delivered while 
minimising harms, but also how to maximise the benefits that matter within a healthcare 
budget. 
 
Population breast screening is an expensive program, even when taking into account 
healthcare savings associated with earlier diagnosis and treatment, and containment of costs 
that might otherwise accrue from unregulated, opportunistic screening.(99, 100)  The high 
cost of breast screening programs doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be funded, but it does mean 
there are opportunity costs to other potential areas of expenditure, and it may be useful to 
consider how breast screening costs compare with other healthcare expenses.  There is 
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controversy over this,(101-103) partly due to lack of consensus over mortality benefit and 
overdiagnosis figures. It is also important to consider ways to keep breast screening as cost-
efficient as possible. Attaining and maintaining a high level of public participation is often 
suggested as being necessary for the purposes of cost-efficiency (93) but this is contestable.  
For many screening programs, the main expenses are the variable (participant related) costs 
associated with actually performing the screens and follow up tests, rather than the fixed (set-
up and infra-structure) costs, and as such, screening can be cost-effective even with low rates 
of participation.(104, 105)  Given this, the common link made from cost-effectiveness to 
participation rates may be less certain than is sometimes suggested. 
 
Summary: the most benefits within resources 
• Cost-effectiveness of breast screening compared to other healthcare expenditure is 
controversial. 
• For cancer screening generally, it is not clear that high participation rates are required 
to achieve cost effectiveness. 
 
Respecting and Supporting Autonomy  
Respecting, or supporting, the autonomy of individual patients, consumers, or citizens is a 
fundamental principle in healthcare ethics. For the purposes of this discussion, we regard an 
autonomous person as one who: sees herself as in being charge of her own life; believes this 
to be appropriate; and has the freedom, opportunity, skills and capacities required to make 
choices, take action, and live in a manner that is consistent with her sense of who she is.(106)  
Being autonomous thus relies not just on the person herself, but also the people, systems and 
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society that surround her. These relationships and systems can either support or diminish her 
autonomy. 
 
Informed decision making in breast screening 
The facilitation of informed decision making in breast screening is an important part of 
supporting and respecting autonomy.  Many writers have expressed concern that breast 
screening communication with consumers should: 1) include evidence-based information 
about risks and benefits; and 2) be designed to inform women in a balanced way rather than 
persuade them to participate.(107, 108) Many countries have recently released or will shortly 
release new information pamphlets.(93, 98)  We mentioned above that facilitating informed 
decision making about breast screening may be more likely to produce beneficial outcomes.  
This may be for several reasons, including: the experience of having one’s autonomy 
supported may increase one’s sense of wellbeing; also, if we believe that we are all best able 
to know our own interests, the choices we make for ourselves may be more likely to be 
beneficial to us.  In this section, however, we present autonomy as something to be valued in 
its own right irrespective of the resulting consequences, and suggest that facilitating informed 
choice has independent value from whether or not it improves the benefit to harm ratio.(109) 
 
How else should we support and respect women’s autonomy in breast screening? 
Providing opportunities for informed decision making is only one part of supporting and 
respecting autonomy.  Other aspects of respecting and supporting autonomy in the breast 
screening context include:  
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• Communication that indicates women have the authority to decide whether or not 
participation is right for them (rather than suggesting that they should not question 
participation, or are in no position to decide);  
• Ensuring that women understand the implications of participating or not participating 
in screening; and  
• Ensuring that women have an opportunity to consider screening in the context of their 
own values and sense of self.(110) 
 
How important is supporting and respecting autonomy? 
Respecting autonomy is considered a very important principle in healthcare ethics.  In the 
Four Principles approach within clinical ethics discussed earlier, respect for autonomy has 
been referred to as the ‘first among equals’.(111)  Writers on public health ethics have 
recently tended to criticise excessive importing of clinical ethics concerns, particularly 
respect for autonomy, into public health contexts, arguing that this potentially overrides 
community-orientated principles such as justice, solidarity and reciprocity which are 
fundamental to public health practice.  Certainly the extensive evidence that individual health 
is heavily influenced by social, as well as personal, factors suggests that it may be misguided 
to conceptualise respect for autonomy as being merely about independence of choice, or to 
prioritise choice above all other considerations.(112) 
 
The principle of respecting autonomy may conflict with other principles discussed here.  For 
example, it may be very hard to engage large numbers of women in informed shared decision 
making for a complex topic like breast screening, especially if they are not well-informed to 
begin with.(16)  Some writers argue that enabling all consumers to make their own, fully 
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informed, choices about screening would be so resource-intensive and challenging that it 
would seriously undermine the cost-effectiveness of screening.(48) Others disagree, arguing 
that informing women about breast screening is not especially difficult (97) or that respecting 
autonomy should be such a high priority that we may be obliged to offer such information 
and support if breast screening is to continue, regardless of cost.  Respecting autonomy may 
also influence the level of benefit delivered by screening.  There has been concern that 
embarking upon an informed consent process for breast screening may worry consumers, and 
reduce public participation in breast screening programs, therefore decreasing the number of 
women who can benefit.(113, 114)  Despite this, varied stakeholders support the principle of 
respecting autonomy strongly enough that there is reasonably widespread international 
support for shared decision making and informed choice in cancer screening.(113-115) 
 
Summary: respecting or supporting autonomy 
• Facilitating informed choice is an important aspect of respecting autonomy in breast 
screening. 
• There is disagreement over whether or not facilitating informed choice might be 
excessively expensive or decrease public participation rates, and over how to balance 
support and respect for autonomy against other ethical principles. 
 
Honesty, transparency and procedural justice 
Ethically justified and legitimate public health decisions and actions will generally have the 
qualities of honesty, integrity and openness.(52,55)  This is relevant to the substance of 
communication, and the process of decision making and implementation.  
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Ethically justified programs will pursue full and honest disclosure of information that might 
be considered relevant for consumer decision making.  Communicating honestly is, in part, a 
way to show respect for individuals and their autonomy as discussed above, but many would 
also regard it as being important in its own right.  That is, many think that governments 
should, as a general rule, be open and up-front when communicating about their policies and 
programs.  Transparency in the full and honest disclosure of how, and by whom, decisions 
and policies are made is also important.  This includes the disclosure of possible vested 
interests amongst policy makers and advisors in order to facilitate accountability and take 
account of possible bias.(52)  Procedural justice is about fairness in decision making: for 
example, ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are included, that decisions are made for 
good reasons, that decisions are open to revision if new evidence or arguments emerge, and 
that the influence of biases and vested interests are minimised in order to ensure decisions are 
made in the best interests of the public.(52,53) 
 
Vested interests in breast screening 
Communication with breast screening consumers is often produced by breast screening 
providers who are required to meet participation targets.  Truthful communication about 
breast screening may be facilitated by changing the key performance indicators for breast 
screening services from rates of consumer participation in screening to rates of consumer 
understanding and participation in shared decision making.(97, 116)  It may also be 
preferable for information to be written by independent experts.(117) 
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Breast screening policy decisions are often heavily influenced by government or independent 
experts who review existing evidence and issue comments or guidelines.  As in any public 
health program, experts may have commercial, political or professional interests in a 
particular outcome that may bias the policy making process.  Debates about vested 
professional interests are a particularly common topic in breast screening.  The breast 
screening evidence is complex and contradictory, and there have been many reviews of the 
multiple breast screening trials and studies that have presented variable conclusions regarding 
the benefits and harms associated with breast screening.  There has been widespread and 
public accusation about vested interests of key expert clinicians and researchers with a long 
history of practice or publication related to breast screening who promote or criticise 
screening.  The declaration of commercial interests is a widely accepted tradition, but some 
writers suggest the principle of transparency also demands that all professional interests 
should be declared (for example, the reputational interests of experts in continuing to defend 
a long-held position).(118)  Some writers advocate that procedural justice requires selecting 
independent experts as advisors or decision makers, excluding practicing clinicians and 
academics who have previously published on the topic.(57, 118) Others suggest that all 
legitimate stakeholders must be involved in decision-making in order to reduce the chance of 
any one vested interest dominating the process.(53) 
 
Summary: honesty, transparency & procedural justice 
• Breast screening communication and decision making may be biased due to vested 
interests, including professional vested interests, in a particular outcome. 
• Honest communications about breast screening may be facilitated by strategies such 
as removing participation targets or using independent experts. 
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• Those with professional vested interests could be asked to declare their interests, or be 
excluded from decision making. 
 
Distributive justice 
Distributive justice is about fairness: fairness of opportunity (e.g. the opportunity for all 
individuals to pursue good health), and fairness of outcome (e.g. everyone in a society 
achieving at least a basic or threshold level of good health). Achieving justice does not 
necessarily mean that everyone is treated equally: more effort may need to be expended on 
some individuals than others in order to attain the same opportunity for, or achievement of, 
good health.  Thus, justice may demand that those with the more limited health opportunities 
or the poorest predicted health outcomes receive priority.(52,53) 
 
Justice in opportunity  
The opportunity for women to attend breast screening remains an important issue.  Several 
barriers to breast screening opportunities have been identified, including geographic, socio-
cultural and financial.(80, 119)  Many programs have sought to remove or ameliorate these 
barriers through actions such as: mobile breast screening services, culture and language-
specific consumer communication strategies, and reduced cost or free screening.  These 
policies may be expensive, and may bring the principle of justice into conflict with other 
principles such as delivering the most benefits within available resources.(80) 
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Justice in health outcomes 
Is breast screening a fair strategy in terms of population health outcomes?  Certainly breast 
screening only benefits a minority of the population, but given that people with breast cancer 
are more likely to have poorer health outcomes, it would seem to be consistent with the 
principle of justice to expend effort on trying to improve this outcome.  Some writers 
disagree: while breast cancer may affect any woman, it is more common amongst those with 
higher socio-economic status – that is, women from the group who are, on average, more 
likely to have good health and opportunities to achieve it.  It has been suggested that the 
breast cancer focus is discriminatory,(37) and a fairer public health system would be one that 
targets the needs of people who have poorer health outcomes – for example, those with 
significant social disadvantages or physical disabilities.  In this view, a more just approach 
might be one that focuses less on early detection of breast cancer, and more on providing 
basic social and health infrastructure for all (for example public transport, a healthy food 
supply, and affordable treatment services) as well as targeted programs to address the needs 
of those groups with the worst health outcomes. Notice, though, that this takes for granted 
that it is reasonable to trade these health-related goods off against one another within a 
limited health budget. It is likely that many high-income countries could afford both breast 
screening and interventions to reduce structural disadvantage if they reduced spending in 
other, arguably less important, policy areas. 
 
Summary: distributive justice 
• Many breast screening programs have policies that aim to give all women fair 
opportunities to attend screening. 
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• Some writers suggest breast screening makes a relatively small contribution towards 
the fairness of distribution of health outcomes. 
 
Reciprocity 
The principle of reciprocity is generally used to refer to concepts such as returning a favour 
that is done to us, sharing in carrying public burdens, and supporting and compensating those 
who carry the heaviest burdens.(120, 121) 
 
Reciprocity, individuals and breast screening 
The principle of reciprocity would suggest that individuals who live in and therefore gain 
health benefits from a society that offers breast screening should be cognisant and supportive 
of these benefits.  In particular, they should not act so as to reduce the opportunity for others 
to receive similar benefits. This may suggest certain limited obligations for women: for 
example, to actively attend, cancel or re-schedule appointments so as not to prevent or delay 
another woman from accessing the service. Whether there is any more substantial reciprocal 
obligation for women is arguable. We discussed possible corporate benefits of breast 
screening programs in a previous section (e.g. improved breast cancer treatment). We argued 
that such benefits, which have already been achieved, are not clearly contingent on women’s 
continued participation. This suggests that individual women should not consider themselves 
obliged to participate in exchange for these existing corporate benefits. Some might suggest 
that the existence of a publically-funded healthcare service is a benefit to all, and that in 
return, citizens should take reasonable care of their health, which includes attending 
screening services when advised to do so.(33)  It is now common in public health generally to 
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emphasise the importance of individual behaviours,(21, 122) often framed in terms of 
individual responsibility and duty. This moral language can suggest some kind of reciprocal 
obligation on individuals. However many would reject this, arguing, for example, that breast 
screening is not a necessary way for a society to demonstrate its commitment to women’s 
health, so women do not have any reciprocal responsibility to participate (or not participate) 
in breast screening in particular. 
 
Reciprocity is also relevant to breast screening as a driving force in screening advocacy. 
Individuals who have been diagnosed with illness through screening may feel they have 
benefited from that program and wish to return the good.  Thus the concept of reciprocity 
may be invoked by screening consumers who seek to “give back” to society through 
involvement in activities related to screening promotion and advocacy. This is a sensitive 
issue, particularly if the positions of those advocates, often resolutely pro-screening,(37) 
seem to ignore more recent evidence about the uncertain balance between benefits and harms 
of screening.(97) Despite this potential to distort the accuracy of communication, it seems 
important to recognise the moral value of these advocates’ desire to reciprocate, as this 
provides a stronger basis from which to engage respectfully. 
 
Reciprocity, the state, healthcare systems and breast screening 
The principle of reciprocity requires that breast screening programs should seek to minimise 
disproportionate burdening of any one individual or group of individuals and should support 
and compensate those who carry burdens, particularly the heaviest burdens.  For example, 
when countries offer organised, publicly funded breast screening, the absence of a financial 
barrier could be seen as a reciprocal exchange to these women for their status as citizens and 
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for their willingness to participate in a service that is unlikely to benefit them personally.  
Screening programs that include free follow-up testing to the point of diagnosis ensure that 
women who receive false positive tests and thus already carry a disproportionately heavy 
burden of screening (associated with inevitably imperfect quality control) are not further 
burdened by financial costs.  Privately operated breast screening, by contrast, may simply 
charge per item. This not only means that women must pay to participate, but also that 
women who receive false positive screening tests due to limitations of mammography pay 
more for their screening event than other women. Part of the discomfort that we may feel 
about this arrangement is likely to be recognition that it contravenes the principle of 
reciprocity. 
 
Summary: reciprocity 
• In a society that offers breast screening, women may be bound by the principle of 
reciprocity to at least consider screening, and to accept or cancel screening 
appointments. 
• Privately funded screening programs may contravene reciprocity by failing to 
ameliorate the disproportionate burdens of screening carried by those who receive 
false positive tests. 
 
Solidarity 
Commitment to solidarity has been implicit in public health since its earliest origins, although 
explicit discussions of solidarity in public health ethics have emerged more recently.(123)  
Solidarity  is ‘pulling together’ towards a common (collective) cause on the understanding 
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that there is mutual respect and obligation between members of a community,(124) and a 
sharing of burdens and threats.(123) There is some overlap between reciprocity and 
solidarity: both are grounded in ideas about mutual obligation and collective interests. 
 
Solidarity expressed by individuals 
Individuals may participate in breast screening for reasons of solidarity – that is, partly to 
contribute towards benefits for others.  Karen Willis (33), for example, has shown 
empirically that women in rural Australia are motivated to visit mobile breast screening vans 
partly to show support for healthcare services that may be needed by others in the future. It is 
possible to recognise the moral value of this expression of solidarity, but question the 
reasoning that underpins it. In many cases, for example, lack of attendance should not 
necessarily threaten the viability or continuation of breast screening. Fine-tuning screening 
according to risk profile may, over time, decrease the perception that participation by low 
risk women is a valuable expression of solidarity with high risk women. 
 
Uses of solidarity by the state (or by organised screening programs) 
Solidarity may be used by the state to justify promotional activities aiming for high breast 
screening participation rates.  That is, while it is recognised that screening will not benefit 
most people, and will be (mildly, moderately or severely) inconvenient or harmful to many 
people, it may be acceptable that screening is promoted in order to maintain a politically and 
economically viable program that delivers large benefits to some. 
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While the concept of solidarity remains a strong driver for public policy, it is not clear how 
much burden many members of a society should be expected to shoulder in order to deliver 
benefit to a few.  Some argue that the amount of societal burden attached to breast screening 
is large and the amount of benefit is small, and it is therefore unreasonable for the state to 
decide that the public should shoulder that burden.  Others argue that the benefits are large 
and the burdens small, and therefore operating a breast screening program is entirely 
justifiable.  It may be useful to explore community ideas about the importance of solidarity in 
the context of breast screening; this could be done, for example, by using a citizens’ jury to 
answer the question of whether or not the state is justified in asking people to shoulder the 
expected burdens of breast screening in order to deliver the predicted level of population 
benefit. 
 
This way of looking at solidarity and breast screening views breast screening as a topic in 
isolation.  An alternative way of looking at solidarity is to look more generally at population 
health or even population well-being.  At this more holistic level we might ask the question 
of how we, as a society, should pull together in order to facilitate well-being in others, and 
consider the impact of a particular policy such as breast screening on the flourishing of the 
community.  This would require a holistic assessment of the extent and distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of breast screening in the context of other possible health-supporting 
programs, and deciding how best to recognise the importance of community interests and act 
for the well-being of each other. 
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Summary: solidarity 
• Individuals may attend, and states may promote, breast screening for reasons of 
solidarity:  while solidarity in itself may have moral value, its use to promote breast 
screening deserves close scrutiny. 
• Prioritising solidarity may require that we consider breast screening in the context of 
the broadest range of possible health-supporting programs and community interests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Breast screening is a large public health program with a significant reach.  It is not a static 
entity, but one that varies with time and place.  The discussion of contemporary social issues 
and ethical principles, and how they are relevant in the context of current and future breast 
screening, adds to and complements biomedical perspectives on this important program.  
Armed with this knowledge and understanding, consumers, providers, researchers, and policy 
makers will be well placed to make an ethical analysis of breast screening: to consider the 
different ways that principles are being traded off against each other, and to contemplate the 
extent to which these trade-offs are ethically justifiable.  They may identify aspects that could 
be altered in order to make breast screening a more ethically sound program.  Just as the 
evidence base for healthcare is constantly being updated, social values and institutions 
change over time.  Given the range of social and ethical issues that we have shown to be 
relevant to breast screening, it seems important to explicitly reconsider these dimensions of 
breast screening programs when evaluating their success and future. As breast screening 
continues to evolve in the 21st Century, we expect that social and ethical considerations will 
be increasingly recognised as critical in policymaking and screening practice.   
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3.1 Chapter introduction 
The central focus of this thesis is the ethical issues relevant to breast cancer screening by 
mammography.  In Chapter 2 I reviewed the largely theoretical literature about social and 
ethical issues affecting mammographic screening.  In this chapter, I review empirical studies 
of the factors that influence people’s attitudes towards and perceptions of breast screening.  I 
assumed that these attitudes and perceptions would directly inform people’s moral evolutions 
of breast screening, and were thus essential to understanding the ethics of mammographic 
screening.  The questions I sought to answer in this review were: 
1. What is the range of reported attitudes towards and perceptions on breast screening by 
mammography? 
2. What influences these attitudes and perceptions? 
3. What is the ethical relevance of these attitudes and perceptions? 
 
3.2 Method 
Search strategy 
Table 3.1 provides an outline of my search (most recently updated in August 2015).  I began 
with database searches on Medline, Embase and Scopus using the MESH terms: “BREAST” 
or “MAMMOGRAPHY” combined with “MASS SCREENING” and then with 
“ATTITUDE” or “PERCEPTION”. I limited my search to articles published since 1990, 
reasoning that breast screening became more widely practiced and normalised around that 
time.  I also restricted my search to papers published in the English language, recognising 
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that this might limit the applicability of my results (see example search string in Appendix 
6). Initial searching identified 2284 titles.  
 
Table 3.1 Outline of search strategy 
1. Medline, Embase & Scopus database search (see terms above) [2284 titles]       
2. Application of inclusion and exclusion criteria, removal of duplicates [154 titles]  
3. Two papers unavailable [152 titles] 
4. Inclusion of new papers identified through backwards and forwards citations, searching of 
reference lists [188 titles]  
 
I applied inclusion and exclusion criteria to my search (as specified below and in Appendix 
6) by reading through all titles identified by the database search, and, if the title was 
insufficiently descriptive, by reading through abstracts.  I included empirical studies and 
reviews published in peer-reviewed academic journals.  I only included research that was 
performed in developed countries with established mammography screening procedures, 
because I was interested in the influences that are current in these settings, which may be 
quite different to influences in settings where programs for breast screening by 
mammography are not yet well established, or where the competing health priorities are very 
different.  In keeping with my focus on mammography screening for women at average risk, I 
excluded studies focusing on special screening programs for those at high risk. I also 
excluded studies that specifically concentrated on repeat attendance or non-attendance at 
breast screening, since I was interested in the broader set of influences, rather than focusing 
on previous experiences.  I only included articles that explored attitudes towards cancer 
screening more generally if they were explicitly relevant to the topic of breast cancer 
screening.  These inclusion and exclusion criteria are described more fully in Appendix 6. 
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After applying these inclusion and exclusion criteria and removing duplicates, I obtained 154 
relevant titles.  I reviewed all abstracts and read through full papers that appeared particularly 
useful for more detailed evaluation.  Two titles were not available in abstract or full paper.  I 
then expanded my search by backwards and forwards citation searching of particularly useful 
or relevant publications; that is, looking (backwards) through the reference list of a 
publication, and looking (forwards) through the papers that cite that publication.  I continued 
until I was no longer finding new information.1-3  This produced an additional 36 papers.  At 
this point I had identified 188 relevant papers. 
 
Quality of identified papers 
The identified papers included both quantitative and qualitative studies.  As others have 
reported, it was difficult to critically compare the methodological quality of such a diverse set 
of papers,4 but my assessment suggested that there were no papers that were clearly 
inadequate in this domain.  For my purposes, issues of methodological quality were relatively 
less important, as my analysis was focused on the range of substantive results, rather than the 
most significant or important influence/s on screening views, and I was not seeking to 
perform a quantitative meta-analysis.  Thus, while I was interested to identify any quality 
concerns related to the reporting within a paper of items such as the study’s aims, methods 
and findings,2 these were treated as data for analysis, as described below, rather than reasons 
to exclude a paper.  I therefore focused on conceptual rigour for examination of quality, and 
included all papers that were, by a generous interpretation, conceptually coherent.4  Appendix 
7 contains a full list of the papers that I included in my review. 
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Extraction and analysis of data 
Using abstracts and, where necessary or useful, full transcripts, I extracted descriptive and 
interpretative information from all papers using a series of categories that were established 
inductively from reading through the papers.  I was interested in what each empirical study 
could contribute towards understanding influences upon people’s views about breast 
screening including: the range of influences studied, the results of each study, and what sorts 
of claims or arguments were made by the study authors on the basis of their results.  I refer to 
this as the “substantive data” of each paper.  I was also interested in more concrete elements 
of each paper, such as underlying theoretical frameworks, aims and methods.  I refer to these 
items as “meta-data”.  I read papers and established categories in an iterative fashion, 
enabling me to crosscheck my developing categories and confirm my reading of findings.2, 3  
The set of categories that I developed for recording meta-data and substantive data from each 
paper is provided in Appendix 8, along with several worked examples of categorised papers. 
 
Many of the papers that I reviewed had an indirect, rather than direct, bearing on my topic.  
That is, for many studies, the focus was on screening-related behaviour rather than expressed 
views – for example, researchers might seek to explore the impact of variables such as a 
woman’s level of fear or perceived breast cancer risk on screening participation.  Others 
might work to examine the relationship between gender or speciality of a primary care 
physician and their screening referral practices.  It seems likely that many of the variables 
being studied in relation to screening behaviour would exert their influence via people’s 
views about screening, and indeed some researchers appeared to implicitly acknowledge this 
by using the participant’s self-reported intended behaviour rather than actual behaviour as the 
end point.  In my review of the research results below, I have specified whether the results 
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were described in relation to actual or intended behaviour.  External influences on screening 
behaviour, such as financial cost or geographic access issues, were also reported on in many 
studies, but are not the focus of this review. 
 
3.3 Results 
188 papers published between 1990 and 2015 were included in my analysis (see Appendix 
7).  My results are reported in sections relating to specified elements of meta-data and 
substantive data.  I begin with describing the location of studied populations and thereafter 
have ordered my findings largely in keeping with a standard empirical study, discussing my 
analyses of aims, methods, results and conclusions within the papers that I reviewed.  I have 
altered the standard reporting order where necessary to maintain a more logical flow.  For 
example, I have included discussion of the various underlying theories used in papers in my 
analysis of methods, rather than as a preliminary to my analysis of aims. 
 
The papers referred to throughout this Results section (which includes Table 3.2) are 
provided as examples relevant to the point being made, and are not intended to be complete 
reference lists of all papers which might justify that point.  The reference list at the end of this 
chapter contains only those papers to which I have specifically referred; the full list is 
provided in Appendix 7. 
 
Location of studied populations 
The substantial majority of identified papers came from studies of people living in North 
America (mainly the USA but also Canada).  The remaining papers derived from research 
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carried out in the following regions (listed in decreasing numerical order of papers): Europe, 
Australia/New Zealand, and South-East Asia (Singapore and South Korea). 
 
Aims of reviewed papers  
Over three quarters (145/188 papers) of the research had been undertaken for the explicit 
purpose of increasing participation in mammography screening in order to reduce population 
breast cancer mortality.  Most of these researchers studied the views and behaviours of 
women, including sub-groups of women who had particularly low screening participation 
rates or high breast cancer mortality rates, seeking information on who attended, who didn’t 
attend, and why, in order to determine how best to deliver effective breast screening 
promotion messages.  Others studied the views and referral patterns of primary care 
practitioners in order to identify those who were failing to encourage patients to attend breast 
screening and should be targeted with educational strategies to enact behaviour change.  
 
A smaller number of studies were performed with a contrasting aim: rather than seeking to 
promote maximum screening participation in order to deliver benefit, some researchers 
sought to encourage thoughtful, individualised, and evidence-based screening decision 
making in order to reduce screening-related harms.  A number of researchers studied 
participants’ knowledge about breast screening, seeking to determine whether or not women 
or practitioners had misconceptions such as overestimation of benefit and underestimation of 
harms.5-8  Others studied women’s decision making processes, exploring the extent to which 
women might screen or intend to screen for reasons other than an expectation of health 
benefit.9  Some researchers studied primary care practitioners’ knowledge and reasoning 
about screening referrals, again checking for misconceptions about benefit and harm, or for 
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the influence of factors apart from individualised expectations of patient health outcomes on 
screening referral patterns.10-12 
 
Finally, a handful of researchers explored the sociological phenomenon that is breast cancer 
screening.  They sought to understand the reasons, including social pressures, which lead 
women to be so enthusiastic about screening.  These researchers did not describe an explicit 
commitment to a particular health or screening agenda.13-15 
 
Methods used in reviewed papers 
Study design 
I identified a mix of study designs in my literature set.  Most papers used quantitative 
methods, such as population surveys with fixed questions and Likert scale answers.  A 
minority used qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews and focus groups, or 
mixed methods.   Several papers were review articles. 
 
Many of the papers used a deductive methodology, beginning with a hypothesis about factors 
that were likely to influence ideas and behaviour related to breast screening, and then 
studying those factors and discussing their relevance and importance in that context.  For 
these papers, the focus of the study (what was being studied) was related to the theoretical 
model that was invoked. Deductive studies often used specific terminology, but as the 
terminology incorporated vernacular words or phrases that were used inconsistently within 
and between published papers, there was a wide variance in meanings.  (See Table 3.2.)  
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The dominant theory used was the Health Belief Model16 (HBM).  This model, or variants 
such as the Precede/Proceed framework, was applied to studies of influences on screening 
behaviour of women and screening referral practices of primary care practitioners17-21.  
Descriptions of the Health Belief Model varied slightly between different researchers.  A 
common depiction was that the HBM portrayed that a woman’s participation in breast 
screening would be heavily influenced by her beliefs or knowledge about breast cancer 
(specifically, “perceived breast cancer severity”, and “perceived breast cancer susceptibility”) 
and breast screening (specifically, “perceived breast screening benefits” and “perceived 
barriers” to screening).  (Terms in inverted commas are described more fully in Table 3.2) 
These beliefs may be modified by factors such as “fear and/or worry”, age, “social values”, 
“cultural values” and experience.   The theory suggests that behaviour (that is, whether or not 
a woman actually participates in screening) will be further influenced by “cues to action” 
such as discussions with, or advice from significant others.  Some researchers also described 
the HBM model as including a dimension of personal belief in one’s ability to participate in 
screening.16, 17, 22, 23  There have been criticisms of the way that the HBM has been used in the 
study of breast screening behaviour.  Yarbrough16(p687) suggests that the HBM is commonly, 
and incorrectly perceived as a “linear” model, with most researchers failing to explore 
interactions between HBM variables.  Tanner-Smith23 disapproves of the loss of predictive 
power that stems from researchers’ imprecise use of HBM terminology, something that was 
also identified in this review.  This is explored more fully in the section on terminology, 
which includes Table 3.2. 
 
A second (smaller) group of papers applied a set of related health behaviour theories to 
women’s breast screening actions.  These theories suggested that screening practices would 
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depend heavily on “attitudes” towards screening together with “normative influences” and, in 
later models at least, perceived levels of control over performing the behaviour. As with the 
HBM, these models also described indirect influences such as “fear and/or worry”, “social 
values”, “cultural factors”, and experience.  Theories used include the Theory of Reasoned 
Action24, 25 (TRA); the Integrative Model of Behavioural Prediction26, 27; the Model of 
Planned Behaviour28; and the attitude-social influence-efficacy28 (ASE) model.  
 
A third (even smaller) group of papers referred to the concept of informed decision-making, 
suggesting that a woman’s views about screening are influenced by her “perceptions of 
benefits” and “harms”, together with her thoughts about the relative importance of these 
possible outcomes.7, 29-31 
 
Finally, a handful of papers used a partially or completely inductive methodology, beginning 
with empirical data about the views of women or primary care practitioners and using this to 
develop new concepts about how people reason with regard to breast screening, sometimes 
informed by an existing theoretical lens, such as a feminist perspective.32 
 
Characteristics of research participants 
I identified two groups of people whose attitudes had been studied in some depth: members 
of the public (166/188 = 88% of the papers) and healthcare practitioners (29/188 = 15% of 
the papers.  Five papers reported on both groups.  Most of the research involving members of 
the public focused on women, but some of the research that looked at attitudes towards 
cancer screening more generally included men in the sample population.  One study 
compared the attitudes of women with the attitudes of men.33  Almost half (80/166 papers) of 
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the research involving women focused on specific sub-groups of women.  Researchers 
described women in these particular sub-groups as though they were different from the 
mainstream in some way; for example, due to a particular ethnicity, socio-economic status, 
age, or level of urbanisation.  Sometimes several of these characteristics were combined; for 
example, one research group recruited women described by the terms “low-income”, “elderly 
(60+)”, “urban” and  “minority” (primarily African-American).34 
 
The research involving healthcare practitioners focused exclusively on clinicians providing 
primary care.  The range of clinicians studied varied depending on the organisation of 
healthcare in the relevant country.  For example, studies from the UK and Canada looked at 
the attitudes of general practitioners (described as family physicians in Canada),35-37 while 
studies from USA included general practitioners, family physicians, obstetrician-
gynaecologists and general internal medicine physicians,20, 38-41 with one study also including 
nurse practitioners.42 Henceforth I use the terms “primary care practitioners” to include these 
groups of study participants. 
 
There were no papers studying the views of people who make or influence breast screening 
policies and practices, such as: prominent clinicians and researchers working in the field; 
senior figures in breast screening administration and policy; and leaders in breast screening 
advocacy.  There are a wide variety of breast screening protocols promulgated by 
government and non-government bodies throughout the countries included in my review, 
protocols that are written or influenced by prominent figures working in one or more of the 
fields mentioned above.  Given that these protocols significantly constrain what women and 
primary care practitioners can do in relation to breast screening, it would seem important to 
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explore the views of these prominent figures and critically analyse the factors that influences 
their views.  The lack of any research into this group was identified as a noteworthy gap in 
the literature. 
 
Terminology used in empirical studies 
There was substantial variation in the terminologies used amongst the different empirical 
studies, as depicted in Table 3.2.  Although many researchers explained their terminology in 
the text of their paper, this was not universal.  Terminology was often used by different 
researchers to describe different concepts.  For example many researchers used the term 
“perceived susceptibility”43 in relation to breast cancer to mean the self-rated likelihood of 
getting breast cancer, but some researchers used the term more specifically, such as by 
detailing a time frame (e.g. ten or eleven years,31 or lifetime44, 45) or by using it to mean 
likelihood of getting breast cancer in comparison to others, such as women of a similar age, 
ethnicity or other women in general.45-47  Other studies used the terminology more broadly, 
incorporating into its meaning one or more additional, related concepts such as self-rated 
likelihood of dying from breast cancer.7, 44 
 
In addition to this, a single concept was described by a variety of terms, sometimes in the 
same paper.  For example, the self-rated likelihood of getting breast cancer was also 
described by the terms “perceived risk”,48, 49  “subjective risk”,29 “perceived vulnerability”,49 
and “perceived probability”.44  Some researchers used new terminology for specific concepts, 
for example “comparative risk” , to describe perceived susceptibility compared to others.48 
(See table overleaf) 
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Table 3.2 Terminology variance: the range of what researchers mean when using specific words or phrases to describe frequently 
studied variablesa 
 
Main definition Alternative definitions Alternative terms for main 
definition 
Notes 
Perceived susceptibility43 (HBMb terminology)  
Self-rated likelihood 
of getting (i.e. being 
diagnosed with) 
breast cancer43 
Sometimes more specific: certain time frame (e.g. 
next 10 years)31; lifetime risk44, 45; relative to 
certain group e.g. peers, own-age peers, women of 
similar ethnic background.29, 45, 47 Sometimes 
described in terms of perceived risk factors.17, 5 
Sometimes bundled up with fear and/or worryc, as 
in: perceived susceptibility = self rated likelihood 
of developing breast cancer and how worried one 
is about it.31 Sometimes includes self-rated 
likelihood of dying from breast cancer.7, 44 
Perceived risk;48 perceived 
vulnerability;49 subjective 
risk;29 perceived probability.44 
Often compared with researcher’s 
perceptions of consumer 
susceptibility, which is described as: 
objective;48 actual;51 factual;52 
accurate;52 calculated;46 
epidemiological;15 clinical.13, 53 
Perceived severity43 (HBM terminology) 
Self-rated likelihood 
of death, pain, 
suffering to result 
from a breast cancer 
diagnosis43 
Perceived severity of treatment and likelihood of 
losing affected breast.17, 50  
Perceived seriousness.54 Not commonly studied; some 
researchers explicitly suggest that 
(self) perceived severity is always 
high;17 not used as a synonym for 
perceived treatment efficacy. 
Perceived benefits6, 55, 56 (HBM terminology) 
Perceived extent to 
which participation 
in screening will: 
reduce one’s 
likelihood of dying 
from breast cancer17, 
31, 55 and/or reduce 
population breast 
cancer mortality6, 29 
Sometimes includes one or more of: reassurance 
that one does not have breast cancer;57-59 increased 
curability of breast cancer.18 Sometimes includes 
perceived likelihood that screening will: detect 
breast cancer if it is present;17, 58, 60 reduce severity 
of required treatment in the event that breast 
cancer is detected;17, 59 be a simple 
process;17contribute to a sense of self control over 
own health;17, 29 reduce anticipated regret;61 fulfil a 
perceived moral obligation.28 
Knowledge of benefits;6 beliefs 
about screening;62 attitudes 
about screening;62 perceived 
usefulness;63 perceived 
screening efficacy;7, 46 
screening effectiveness;18, 44 
appreciation of the value of 
screening;61, 64 predictive value 
of screening;7 advantages;63 
pros.65 
Often compared with researcher’s 
perceptions of benefit, described as: 
realistic;6 accurate;55 calculated;29, 44 
epidemiological.15 Consumer 
perceptions that do not match 
researcher’s perceptions are described 
as: inaccurate;46 not realistic;46 ill 
informed;8 misconceptions;46 
over/underestimates;8, 46 causing 
unwarranted optimism.46  
Table continued overleaf 
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Main definition Alternative definitions Alternative terms for main 
definition 
Notes 
Perceived barriers66 (HBM terminology) 
Instrumental issues 
that might prevent a 
woman who would 
otherwise be keen to 
participate in 
screening from 
doing so e.g. cost; 
time; access; lack of 
awareness.18, 67 
Sometimes includes one or more of: lack of 
physician referral;16, 24 past (negative) experience;24 
degree of concern about expected level of pain 
and/or embarrassment;16, 67 fear of finding breast 
cancer;67, 68 perceived likelihood of breast damage 
due to pressure and/or radiation;25 lack of 
perceived susceptibility;24, 54 low perceived 
screening accuracy68 or effectiveness.63 Sometimes 
includes cultural values [see below] such as 
concerns about breast privacy. 
Constraints.24 May be compared to screening 
facilitators e.g. receiving a 
mammogram appointment time; 
doctor ordering a mammogram.24 
Some overlap with harms. 
Beliefs and/or knowledge60 (HBM terminology) 
“Beliefs” and 
“knowledge” are 
used 
interchangeably.  
They are used as 
alternative terms for 
perceived 
susceptibility46, 48 
and/or perceived 
benefit6, 46. 
Sometimes includes one or more of: perceived 
severity17; breast screening knowledge60; breast 
cancer knowledge17; harms66. 
Cognitive variables;62 
perceptions and knowledge.50 
Frequent overlap between: 
knowledge; breast screening 
knowledge; breast cancer knowledge. 
Breast screening knowledge and/or beliefs50 (this terminology is widely used across different research theories) 
Awareness that 
breast screening 
exists69 and/or 
knowledge about 
screening guidelines 
(e.g. starting age; 
frequency; finishing 
age).19, 63 
Sometimes includes one or more of: how to access 
screening;50 perceived benefits60; harms21; some 
aspects of breast cancer knowledge17. 
Enabling factors;18 breast health 
beliefs;66 general knowledge;51 
behavioural beliefs.24 
Frequent overlap between: 
knowledge; breast screening 
knowledge; breast cancer knowledge. 
Table continued overleaf 
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Main definition Alternative definitions Alternative terms for main 
definition 
Notes 
Breast cancer knowledge and/or beliefs61 (this terminology is widely used across different research theories) 
A set of beliefs 
about breast cancer; 
there is no clear 
main definition that 
denotes which 
beliefs are included 
in the set. 
One or more of: beliefs about natural history of 
breast cancer (e.g. beliefs about causes of breast 
cancer, links between early diagnosis and longer 
survival, awareness of asymptomatic disease, 
awareness of non-progressive disease);61, 69, 70 
perceived susceptibility particularly in terms of 
beliefs about risk factors;21, 61, 62, 71 perceived 
screening efficacy7; perceived severity54; 
perceived treatment efficacy62; breast screening 
knowledge66 
Breast cancer perceptions;63, 70 
health concepts.64 
Often used to refer to beliefs of 
mainstream communities.  Beliefs 
that are common to a specified ethnic 
subgroup are often described as 
traditional and cultural health 
beliefs although there is some 
overlap.  Frequent overlap between: 
knowledge; breast screening 
knowledge; breast cancer knowledge.  
May be compared with researcher’s 
breast cancer knowledge which is 
described as: accurate or correct.8, 46 
Traditional and cultural health beliefs69 (this terminology is widely used across different research theories and also used without reference to 
specific theories) 
The set of beliefs 
about breast cancer 
and health in general 
that are common to 
specified ethnic 
subgroups.69 
One or more of: belief that breast cancer is always 
fatal;69 belief that breast cancer cannot be detected 
if there are no palpable lumps;69 belief that talking 
or thinking about breast cancer might result in ill-
health;72 belief that good health outcomes will 
follow from holistic self-care rather than specific 
interventions such as breast screening.21  May 
include one or more moral values applied to 
screening as described in cultural values.73, 74 
Fatalism;43, 50, 72 traditional 
concepts of health and health 
promotion;64 cultural beliefs 
and traditions;50 cultural beliefs 
and values.74 
Overlaps with breast cancer 
knowledge and cultural factors. 
Table continued overleaf 
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Main definition Alternative definitions Alternative terms for main 
definition 
Notes 
Attitude17 (TRAd terminology; also used without reference to specific theories) 
Perceived balance of 
benefits & harms; 
determined by 
perceived benefits 
and perceived 
harms and the 
woman’s evaluation 
of how positive or 
negative these 
outcomes are for her 
own situation.24, 46 
Screening intentions;31, 46 whether or not screening 
is considered necessary or unnecessary;21 degree to 
which mammography is considered the screening 
method most likely to maximise health outcomes 
(e.g. compared to clinical examination or self 
examination).43 Sometimes includes: perceived 
susceptibility; fear and/or worry24 including 
anticipated regret;28 social values including 
perceived moral obligation to screen.28 
Occasionally used to mean the attitude towards the 
balance of benefits and harms of breast screening 
at a community level.56 Sometimes used 
interchangeably or in conjunction with breast 
screening knowledge, beliefs (e.g. as in “beliefs 
and attitudes towards breast screening”) and may, 
in this context, be a synonym for beliefs.43, 62 
Perception;56 value 
judgement;31, 75 personal 
decision;31 preference.7 
May be considered part of informed 
decision making.7, 46, 55 May be 
described as favourable/unfavourable 
towards screening.46 
Fear and/or worry49 (this terminology is alluded to in HBM, TRA & ASEe and also used without reference to specific theories) 
Concerns focussing 
on one or more of: 
breast cancer (non-
specific);49 process 
of screening 
(specifically in 
relation to harms of: 
embarrassment; 
pain; damage from 
radiation or 
pressure);58 having a 
breast cancer 
diagnosis.31 
Generalised tendencies towards anxiety, 
depression and patterns of emotional regulation.62 
Sometimes grouped with normative influences.62 
Anxiety;62 emotion;48 emotional 
barriers;17 affective construct;31, 
45 psychosocial or socio-
emotional variables (when 
grouped with normative 
influences).62 
Consedine76 suggests that the focus 
and level of fear and/or worry may 
affect their influence on screening 
behaviour.  She argues that one 
reason for conflicting evidence about 
the impact of fear and/or worry is the 
use of non-specific terminology and a 
subsequent inability to effectively 
compare results. She advises future 
researchers to be more specific about 
their focus and to study the impact of 
different levels (e.g. high, medium or 
low) of fear and/or worry. 
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Main definition Alternative definitions Alternative terms for main 
definition 
Notes 
Influences of others 
Perception of views 
of significant others 
(e.g. family, friends, 
primary care 
practitioners) about 
whether or not one 
should get 
screened.18, 24, 26, 58 
May include perceived behaviour of significant 
others – i.e. whether or not significant others get 
screened.26 
Subjective norms (TRA 
terminology);24, 26, 58 normative 
pressures;26 normative beliefs;24 
social norms;27 social network 
patterns;27, 62 social relations;62 
social influences;28 cue to 
action (HBM terminology).18 
Smith-McLallen26 suggests that, in 
practice, subjective norms (also 
described by him as normative 
pressures) include both the perceived 
views of others (so-called injunctive 
norms) and the behaviour of others 
(descriptive norms). He goes on to 
suggest that many researchers only 
study injunctive norms, and this might 
be why subjective norms are often 
found to be of limited influence. He 
advises that researchers should ensure 
that they also study descriptive norms. 
Harms31, 61 (IDMf terminology and also used without reference to specific theories) 
Either or both of two 
grouped outcomes: 
[1] pain, discomfort, 
embarrassment, 
concern about 
damage from 
pressure and/or 
radiation;58, 77 [2] 
false positive 
diagnoses, 
overdiagnosis.75 
Sometimes includes false negative diagnoses.61 
Sometimes refers to the perceived likelihood of 
harms occurring.31 Risks;78 downsides;56 negative consequences;58 limitations;57 cons;65 drawbacks.65 Sometimes 
definitions [1] and [2] are 
described separately, for 
example, [1] = “perceived 
harms” or “minor 
inconveniences”, and [2] = 
“serious harms” or “important 
problems”.65, 75 
Some overlap with perceived 
barriers.17, 25 
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Main definition Alternative definitions Alternative terms for main 
definition 
Notes 
Informed decision making7, 31 (IDM terminology) 
Decision making 
that is determined by 
the woman’s 
response to 
“accurate” (i.e. that 
match researcher’s 
perceptions) 
knowledge about 
likely benefits and 
harms.8, 29 
Sometimes includes one or more of: “accurate” 
perception (i.e. matches researcher’s perception) of 
the woman’s breast cancer susceptibility;44 the 
woman’s careful consideration;75 the woman’s 
participation in decision making to the extent that 
she wishes;31 behavioural implementation.57 
(Truly) informed consent;65 
informed choice.75  
The woman’s decisional response to 
the information may be described as 
her “preference”7 [see attitude above]. 
Cultural values50 (this terminology is alluded to in HBM, TRA, ASE and also used without reference to specific theories) 
One or more of 
various ethical 
values held by a 
woman that affect 
her views about 
screening and 
that are common to 
an identified ethnic 
subgroup.50 
Ethical values may include the degree to which the 
following are considered to be right or wrong, 
largely independent of health outcomes: active 
pursuit of early diagnosis of disease;64 breast 
privacy;50 active protection and promotion of one’s 
own health.50 
Cultural attitudes and 
traditions;32, 50 cultural factors;69 
concerns.25 May be grouped 
together with, and described as 
traditional and cultural health 
beliefs73, 74 or variant of that 
phrase. 
May overlap with traditional and 
cultural health beliefs67 and with 
social values. More commonly 
studied than social values. 
Table continued overleaf 
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Main definition Alternative definitions Alternative terms for main 
definition 
Notes 
Social values15 (this terminology is alluded to in HBM, TRA, ASE and also used without reference to specific theories) 
One or more of 
various ethical 
values held by a 
woman that affect 
her views about 
screening and are 
dominant within 
mainstream 
society.15, 53 
Ethical values may include those described in 
cultural values plus one or more of the degree to 
which a woman considers the following to be right 
or wrong, largely independent of health outcomes: 
taking personal responsibility for health;79, 80 active 
surveillance, regularly attending screening;14 
having knowledge about one’s breast health or 
disease;61 using technology;14, 15 attending 
screening in order to protect services for future 
women;15 attending screening because it is offered 
as a healthcare service;79 (for a government to be) 
providing healthcare choices to citizens.79 
A variety of two-word 
descriptors containing an 
adjective and a noun.  
Adjectives include: socio-
structural; cultural; political; 
ideological; relational; moral; 
psychosocial.  Nouns include: 
factors; reasoning; obligations; 
identities; beliefs; ideas; 
mechanisms.9, 14, 15, 28, 53, 77, 79, 80 
Also: meanings that women 
attach to mammograms;79 lay 
perceptions or considerations or 
concepts of risk,13choice, trust, 
health.14 
Note that there is some overlap of 
terminology with cultural values.53 
NOTE: as with the main text in this chapter, references are provided as examples relevant to the point being made, and are not intended to be complete reference 
lists. Black italics are used when cross-referencing to terms that are described in this table.  HBM = Health Belief Model; TRA = Theory of Reasoned Action; ASE 
= Attitude-Social influence–Efficacy model; IDM = Informed decision making concept. 
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Results reported in reviewed papers 
The views and reasoning of women 
The empirical research studied and described a variety of factors influencing the way that 
women reason about breast screening and come to hold the views that they do.  I have 
collated these factors loosely into three categories: health beliefs, other psychological factors 
and ethical values.  Where I have used specific terminology I use it to mean the “main 
definition” as described in Table 3.2.  I have focused on providing the range of influences 
that researchers consider to be relevant to people’s views on breast screening; I have not 
attempted to estimate the importance or prevalence of one or more defined variables upon 
views or screening behaviour.62, 66, 76  Some researchers studied one or more factors as though 
they were independent variables,24 others described factors as being more or less interrelated 
with each other.16 
 
Women’s health beliefs 
I use this term collectively to refer to any or all of the variables discussed below.  These 
factors were the most frequently studied,62 possibly because many of them are central 
concepts in the HBM, which was widely used. 
 
Perceived susceptibility 
Women who perceived themselves as being highly susceptible to breast cancer were more 
likely to participate or intend to participate in mammography screening than women who 
perceived themselves with low susceptibility (for example17, 31, 48, 49, 58, 62, 68).  This may 
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indicate that women’s views towards mammography are influenced by their perceived risk, 
although many researchers note that since most studies are cross-sectional a cause-and-effect 
relationship cannot be assumed.  Other explanations for the noted relationship may be: 
women who participate in screening develop higher perceptions of vulnerability;45, 49 or 
women who do indeed have higher risk (for example, due to a positive family history of 
breast cancer) are more likely to be encouraged by their primary care practitioner to attend 
screening.49 
 
Perceived severity of breast cancer 
Despite its central position in the HBM, this factor was not as commonly studied as some 
other aspects of knowledge, perhaps because it was not found to be a discriminating factor.  
For example, it may have been that most woman perceived breast cancer to be a severe 
disease.17  When it was studied some researchers found that perceived breast cancer severity 
was positively associated with screening43 and also linked with higher perceived risk.31 
 
Perceived benefits 
The degree to which women believed that breast screening would reduce their own likelihood 
of dying from breast cancer, or reduce population breast cancer mortality, was found by 
many researchers to be associated with the level of screening attendance or intention to 
screen (for example7, 8, 17, 31, 60, 62, 78).  Despite this, at least one researcher noted that some 
women did not think themselves to be influenced by information about mortality benefits.57  
Many researchers found that women were influenced by a perceived benefit that participating 
in screening would deliver reassurance that they do not, at least at present, have breast cancer 
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(for example57-59) or would reduce their need for aggressive treatment if they did have 
cancer.59 
 
Knowledge about breast screening practices and policies 
This was not commonly studied, possibly because it was thought to be relatively obvious, but 
some researchers did find that women were more likely to screen if they had better awareness 
of and knowledge about mammography screening protocols and how to access screening.50 
 
Knowledge about breast cancer 
Aside from the relative lack of research around perceived breast cancer severity, as discussed 
above, the influence of women’s knowledge about breast cancer was widely studied.  For 
example, it was frequently shown that those who believed breast cancer could not exist in the 
absence of a palpable lump were less likely to attend screening than those who believed 
cancer could be present in the absence of symptoms.18, 32, 64, 79  Similarly, women who 
believed that breast cancer was untreatable were less likely to screen than those who believed 
that breast cancer was curable with treatment, particularly if found “early”.17, 18, 50, 62 
 
General health knowledge was also found to influence screening.  For example, women who 
believed that health problems were always unpredictable and simply had to be accepted and 
dealt with were less likely to screen than those who saw health as something that was at least 
partly under one’s control.53, 63, 79  Women who believed that ill-health could be caused by 
negative thoughts, including thoughts about disease, were less likely to screen.64 
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Harms of screening 
Harms were often discussed as grouped elements, as shown in Table 3.2.  Many researchers 
studied harms described in terms of self-rated likelihood of: a woman suffering due to pain, 
discomfort, embarrassment or anticipatory anxiety associated with mammography; and breast 
damage arising from the pressure and/or radiation.  (The descriptor “perceived” was less 
commonly used in relation to harms than benefits, although it would seem to be similarly 
applicable.)  Researchers found that high levels of (perceived) harms of these sort were 
associated with negative views about screening and lower screening participation or referral 
rates.17, 58 
 
A smaller number of researchers studied harms described in terms of self-perceived or 
researcher-perceived rates of false positive results and overdiagnosis.  Most researchers 
studying these kinds of harms were interested in the implications for Informed Decision 
Making (IDM); they found limited influence of these harms on people’s views, unless the 
perceived level of harm was very high.57, 75, 78 
 
I also examined how researchers compared women’s health beliefs with researchers’ beliefs.  
Women’s beliefs were often described as being at variance with what researchers believed 
(where the latter were taken to be correct).  For example, it was frequently shown that 
women’s perceptions of breast screening benefit were higher than the researchers’ 
perceptions,6, 8, 29 and that women’s perceptions of harms were lower.56, 61  Researchers also 
noted predictable patterns of knowledge among different women according to discernable 
factors such as a woman’s culture and experiences.  For example, Chinese women living in 
Australia were less likely to believe that breast cancer could be asymptomatic than women 
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described by the authors as being “white Australian women”,64 and Hispanic women in 
America were more likely to believe that breast cancer is always fatal than so-called “white 
Americans”.50  Women who had friends with cancer, particularly breast cancer, were likely to 
have a higher perceived susceptibility than those without.21, 77 
 
The literature also studied the impact of normative influences, with results suggesting that 
advice from a woman’s primary care practitioner to participate in screening18, 24, 66 or the 
screening practices and attitudes of peers and family17, 18, 24, 27, 58, 81, 82 influence women’s 
screening behaviour.  Researchers noted that it was not clear how these operate – for 
example, it may be that normative pressures change a woman’s knowledge (“my doctor tells 
me to go - so I must be susceptible”, or “my friends go - so screening must be beneficial”).  
Alternatively these pressures may act via relational forces (“I want to belong to this peer 
group so I will think the same way that they do about screening”) or may simply trigger 
behavioural action (“I already felt positive about going to screening, your comment has just 
reminded me to go”).  Women’s knowledge was also found to interact with psychological 
factors; in particular, greater anxiety was associated with higher perceived susceptibility.31, 48 
 
Psychological factors 
Psychological factors outside of the health beliefs discussed above were studied less 
frequently.  Researchers studied the relationship between screening intentions or behaviour, 
and one or both of: psychological responses to breast cancer, and psychological responses to 
breast screening.  Most studies explored responses described as fear, worry or anxiety; a few 
studies looked at other responses, such as apathy, denial, shame, embarrassment or 
anticipated regret.28, 43, 52, 61 
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Women themselves frequently cite the desire for reassurance as a major reason for screening 
or intending to screen,14, 31, 59, 75, 78, 80 but the empirical studies looking at associations 
between psychological factors and screening produced contradictory results.83  This may 
have been at least partly due to a lack of specificity about terminology.58, 76   It was not 
always clear, for example, whether a study was exploring a woman’s anxiety about the 
process of breast screening, the idea of having a breast cancer diagnosis, or about breast 
cancer more generally.  These distinctions are, arguably, relevant, since the former may 
influence a woman to view screening negatively17, 63 while the latter two may influence a 
woman to be more positive about screening.  It was also suggested that the level of emotional 
response may be relevant: in particular, some studies have found that while moderately high 
levels of fear about a breast cancer diagnosis are associated with increased screening or 
screening intentions, extremely high levels of fear have the opposite effect.58, 76 
 
Researchers found an association between psychological responses and social or cultural 
values.  Many studies noted that women belonging to certain cultures were more likely than 
others to have strong emotions of shame or embarrassment about the process of breast 
screening stemming from particular values about exposing their breasts to others (for 
example52, 59).  Similarly, women who believed that their breast appearance did not conform 
to their perceived norm of physical attractiveness were more likely to feel embarrassed about 
the idea of screening.52 
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Ethical values 
Some researchers studied women’s views about breast screening within a broader context of 
social and cultural values and behaviours.14  These researchers did not necessarily think of 
themselves as studying ethics or values, but their findings are relevant to understanding the 
extent to which a woman’s ideas about what is right and wrong might influence what they 
think or do about breast screening.  This research most frequently took the form of studying 
what was said or done in relation to breast cancer or breast screening among women 
belonging to a specific cultural subgroup, and comparing the results, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to the more populous or apparently mainstream cultural group.  For example, the 
talk and behaviour of African-American, Hispanic, Chinese, Indian or Korean women living 
in the USA, Canada, UK or Australia were studied and compared with the comments or 
behaviour of Caucasian women living in the same country (for example50, 64).  Less 
commonly, the talk or behaviour of non-Caucasian women living in their own countries was 
studied, for example, South Korean women living in South Korea.32  In the process of 
studying women in this way, researchers discussed one or more ethical values held by the 
subgroup under scrutiny as being likely to influence their views or behaviour about breast 
screening.  That is, researchers suggested that certain culturally held values about what was 
right or wrong influenced a woman’s thinking about breast screening. The term “ethics” was 
never explicitly used; such ideas were commonly referred to as “cultural factors” or “values” 
(see Table 3.2). 
 
The kinds of values that these researchers studied and described as being relevant to breast 
screening included the extent to which a woman considers it right or wrong to: actively 
pursue disease, allow her breasts to be seen by a healthcare worker, or take particular interest 
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in her own health.  For example, some cultural groups reportedly consider breast screening to 
be wrong because a woman should prioritise her family’s health, not her own.50  Others such 
as traditional Chinese communities allegedly see the maintenance and pursuit of personal 
good health as being morally admirable, but regard the correct approach as being holistic 
self-care such as attention to sleep, psychological wellbeing and diet, and consider that 
actively seeking out disease through screening is wrong (“looking for trouble”).64 
 
Other researchers concentrated only on the most populous or apparently mainstream cultural 
group, studying the variety of ways that women spoke in terms of their assumptions and 
perceived obligations around breast screening and breast cancer.9, 15, 28, 53, 77, 79, 80  Although 
the term “ethics” was never used some researchers described their findings with explicit 
reference to ethics, using phrases such as “moral reasoning”,15, 79 “the right thing to do”9 and 
“social values”.15  Others described similar concepts with more oblique phrases such as 
“psychosocial factors”77 or wrote about moral elements in risk and risk avoidance (see Table 
3.2).13, 53, 84  These researchers discussed and described the influence of one or more of a wide 
range of values.  In particular, their results suggest that women’s sense of personal moral 
responsibility for their health often influences their views about breast screening by 
mammogram.15, 80  The steps involved in women’s reasoning might proceed as follows 
(although are rarely stated so explicitly): ‘pursuit of good personal health is right and 
responsible behaviour; early diagnosis of a breast cancer might give me a better health 
outcome; breast screening by mammography gives me the best chance of early diagnosis of a 
breast cancer; therefore breast screening by mammography is right and responsible 
behaviour’. The moralistic phrase, “better safe than sorry”, transcribed by several researchers 
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as a common form of women’s discussion about breast screening,61, 77 might reflect a 
truncated version of the reasoning process described above. 
 
Other values were also found to be important.  The degree to which women valued science 
and technology influenced their views on screening: women who placed a high degree of 
value in technology and scientific or medical expertise were likely to have more positive 
attitudes towards mammographic screening than women who placed higher value on their 
own abilities to detect abnormalities or care for their breast health.53, 84 Similarly women who 
valued knowledge about their breast (patho)physiology in its own right, apparently unrelated 
to the health outcomes of that knowledge, were likely to be supportive of screening.61, 75, 78  
Some women, for example, wanted to be screened for indolent breast cancer that would never 
cause a problem.9  As described in Chapter 2, certain women wanted to participate in breast 
screening because they thought it important to support the service so that it, and other 
healthcare services, would remain viable and available for others to use, or at least to 
consider using.15, 78, 79  For these women, it appeared to be the availability of healthcare 
choices that was of importance.  Other researchers described the influence of the concept of 
reciprocity, suggesting that some women felt it important to attend breast screening services 
at least partly because they had been made available to them.79  Finally, some women 
appeared to have a general concept that regular participation in breast screening was morally 
admirable, without necessarily specifying why this might be so.80 
 
Primary care practitioners 
The views and reasoning of primary care practitioners in relation to breast screening have 
been studied far less than the views of women.  The studies included in this review assumed 
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that the view of a woman’s primary care practitioner towards screening mammography was 
an important factor influencing her decision to screen or not screen.  Researchers were 
seeking to understand why a primary care practitioner would or would not refer a patient to 
breast screening.  The factors studied in primary care practitioners showed similarities and 
differences to those studied in women.  Many researchers explored practitioners’ knowledge 
about breast cancer or breast screening but there were very few studies of primary care 
practitioners that focused on psychological or ethical dimensions of their views.  
 
Researchers studying the knowledge of primary care practitioners focused on their 
knowledge of the natural history of breast cancer, risk factors,36 breast screening benefits12, 36, 
39, 85, 86  and breast screening harms.36, 85-87 Most primary care practitioners believed that 
benefits outweighed harms, and were enthusiastic supporters of breast screening (for 
example36, 88).  Others were concerned about harms, particularly for subpopulations of 
women in their practice such as those under 50 years or older than 69 years.12, 85, 87 
 
Several studies found that primary care practitioners’ knowledge was out of step with what 
the researchers themselves believed.  For example, some primary care practitioners 
considered that women with very limited life expectancies would derive benefit from breast 
screening.11, 12 American researchers who studied primary care practitioners from a variety of 
specialties noted that knowledge about breast screening benefits was influenced by the 
primary care practitioners’ specialty.  In particular, obstetrician-gynaecologists tended to 
perceived higher breast screening efficacy than primary care practitioners from other 
specialties.10, 12, 89 
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There were no studies that explored possible influences of psychological factors, such as fear 
or anxiety about breast cancer, on primary care practitioners’ breast screening views or 
referral practices.  Several studies explored the association between the primary care 
practitioner’s gender and their views, referral practices, or personal behaviour with regard to 
breast screening .35, 39, 41, 88 The results were contradictory, although at least two studies found 
that female primary care practitioners were more likely to refer patients for breast 
screening.39, 88  One of these studies also found that female primary care practitioners were 
more likely to believe that breast screening was a “very effective” test39p38 suggesting that 
health beliefs may be at least part of the mechanism for gender differences.   
 
Researchers noted the influence of normative pressures upon the breast screening referral 
patterns of primary care practitioners.  Normative pressures included perceptions about the 
views or referral practices of colleagues, experts and mentors, as well as the perceived 
expectations of women.  In particular, primary care practitioners were more likely to follow 
screening guidelines that were promoted by their speciality organisation.  Normative 
pressures may have acted partly by changing primary care practitioners’ knowledge about 
screening (as suggested above regarding the association between practitioner specialty and 
perceived screening efficacy), but may also have affected screening referral patterns by other 
means such as concerns about litigation20, 87 or responding to patient demands for other 
reasons.40, 90 Many studies noted that primary care practitioners’ attitude towards screening 
mammography did not necessarily predict their recommendations to patients.10, 12, 87 There is 
a large literature exploring the reasons why there might be a disconnect between what 
healthcare practitioners think and what they do.91-93 
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Only one researcher mentioned the influence of ethical values that were not explicitly about 
health outcomes.  Smith85 found that some physicians were positive about the availability of 
screening mammography or encouraging awareness about screening because they saw such 
policies as being respectful of their patients’ autonomy. 
 
Concluding arguments made in empirical papers 
The research conclusions were narrowly focused on a defined number of topics.  These 
tended to be closely related, as might be expected, to the stated aims of the papers.  Most of 
the studies used their results to suggest that particular interventions would increase breast 
screening participation rates, and concluded by arguing that those interventions should 
therefore be put in place.  For example, several papers argued in favour of using promotional 
activities to increase normative influences to screen, such as: broadcasting the messages that 
most women participate in screening27 or that most women find their family and friends 
would want them to attend breast screening,24 explicitly encouraging friends and family to 
express approval of breast screening,27, 50, 58 and using a range of culturally-specific female 
models in screening educational and promotional material.64 Others targeted primary care 
practitioners, suggesting that they should be encouraged and reminded to regularly discuss 
and promote breast screening (for example17, 18, 20, 24, 41, 42, 58) and should be educated to 
understand and explicitly address a woman’s fears or particular cultural values that may be 
negatively influencing her views about screening.18, 50, 58, 69, 73 Some papers called for more 
research into the ways that psychological factors and ethical values influence women, so that 
they could be better understood and harnessed for promotional activities.48, 62 
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Many of those researchers who aimed to reduce excessive harms through the facilitation of 
better-informed and more individualised decision making drew attention to their results 
showing the knowledge inaccuracies amongst women or primary care practitioners, and 
concluded by arguing for greater efforts to ensure correct knowledge.  Suggestions included: 
informing about harms and correcting misconceptions about benefits,6, 8, 9, 44, 46, 56, 61, 75 using 
particular communication elements such as absolute risk figures and decision aids,7, 55 and 
further research into how to best communicate the complexities of overdiagnosis.78 Other 
researchers argued for primary care practitioners to focus on individual patient 
considerations, rather than rely on standardised guidelines for screening advice.12 One 
researcher concluded with a competing argument, emphasising that since older women were 
reluctant to consider the impact of their own (limited) life expectancy on screening benefits 
even when this information was provided to them, an IDM approach would lead to overuse of 
screening amongst those unlikely to benefit and therefore should not be used for breast 
screening with older women.30 
 
The smaller number of researchers whose aims were to contribute to better understanding of 
social factors operating in breast screening used their results to argue for wider 
acknowledgement of the influence that non-health maximising factors have upon women’s 
screening views and actions.  They particularly argued for a wider recognition of the impact 
of breast screening policies on women’s breast screening views.13, 15, 80  
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3.4 Discussion 
This review of the empirical literature about factors that influence people’s views on breast 
screening showed a heavy research focus on the health beliefs of women and primary care 
practitioners.  This included substantial study of culturally specific health beliefs amongst 
women.  Such research rested upon and has potentially reinforced widespread acceptance of 
theoretical models that suggest the health beliefs of women and primary care practitioners are 
important influences on their views about breast screening, and are therefore suitable targets 
for activities aimed at influencing screening related behaviour or decision making.  
 
This review also revealed some important limitations in the existing body of empirical 
research. The use of terminology in this field was inconsistent and potentially misleading. 
There was limited research into the impact of psychological and ethical factors on people’s 
views about screening and I found no empirical research at all into the views of people who 
were involved in making or influencing breast screening policy and practice. 
 
While it was known that people who make or influence breast screening policy and practice 
hold different views about screening (for example,94 and paired articles presenting competing 
views95, 96), I identified a gap in the literature relating to the lack of empirical research into 
these views or the factors that might influence them.  In the same way that it was, and still is, 
widely assumed that women’s views are predominantly based on health beliefs, it may have 
been assumed that differences amongst the views of these influential people were 
predominantly based upon variations in their beliefs about breast cancer and breast screening.  
Given, however, that many of those with policy and practice influence would be leaders in 
their field, it seemed less plausible that such people would hold the kinds of health beliefs 
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sometimes described in women as “inaccurate” or “ill informed” (see Table 3.2).  There was 
no research, however, to back up or refute such assumptions, or to investigate alternative 
reasons as to why these influential people might hold different beliefs.  
 
The limited research focus on factors outside of health beliefs had been noted previously.  
Other reviewers noted and questioned the dominating influence of the Health Belief Model 
model in the research and understanding of women’s breast screening behaviour, particularly 
the seemingly widespread assumption that women’s perceived risk and perceptions of 
screening efficacy were the major influences on their intentions to screen.53, 97 There were 
calls for better understanding of a broader range of influences on women’s thinking about 
breast screening,23, 84 and greater acknowledgement of interactions between different 
influences.16, 98 My results reinforced and extended these concerns, highlighting an additional 
need to extend the wider research focus beyond women to include primary care practitioners, 
and those people involved in making or influencing breast screening policy and practice.  As 
noted above, there was negligible research on the influences of psychological or ethical 
factors in relation to the screening views of primary care practitioners, and none at all in 
relation to the views and decisions of those who exert influence on policy and practice in 
breast screening.  As such, it was not clear whether the views of people in these two groups 
were susceptible to the same kinds of psychological and ethical factors that influence women.  
That is, while it was known that primary care practitioners’ referral behaviour was at least 
partly shaped by their interpretation of a woman’s level of anxiety about breast cancer,90 
there was much less information about whether or not the screening views of primary care 
practitioners, or those with influence on breast screening policy and practice, were affected 
by their own anxieties or worries about breast cancer.  Similarly, while it seemed likely that 
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primary care practitioners and those with influence on policy and practice were, like women, 
driven by a desire to maximise health outcomes in their patients or in populations, it was not 
clear what other values might shape their views.  For example, there was no empirical 
knowledge about the extent to which, if at all, the people who make or influence policy 
regarded the provision of healthcare choice (i.e. about participating in breast screening) as 
being important in its own right. 
 
The views of primary care practitioners and those who influence breast screening policy and 
practice are important.  As discussed above, the advice and referral practices of primary care 
practitioners have a large influence on whether or not women attend screening.18, 24, 66 The 
views of those who write or influence screening guidelines and protocols have a significant 
impact on the screening choices available to women.  Breast screening policies themselves, 
together with the way they are promoted, are likely to have some bearing on women’s views 
on screening.84  Given that women’s breast screening behaviour is so heavily shaped by the 
views of primary care practitioners and those with influence on policy and practice, it seemed 
important to explore the range of factors that influence these groups.  The complete lack of 
research around the views of those with policy and practice influence was identified as a 
particularly glaring gap in the breast screening literature, and one that I address in the 
following chapters. 
 
The variable use of terminology found in this study accords with the findings of others, who 
noted differences in the research use of HBM terms16 and psychological concepts.76 Such 
differences limit the ability of theoretical models to find results16 and hamper the value of 
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review studies.  I would encourage researchers to discuss and agree upon terminology, and to 
publish definitive terms and definitions for common use in this important field. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Based on this review, I concluded that there were important gaps in the empirical literature, 
namely research into the factors that shape the views of those who make or influence breast 
screening policies and practices, including the role of ethical considerations.  The next 
chapters of this thesis address that gap. 
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4.1 Background and aims 
In the preceding chapters I have presented a history of breast screening with a biomedical 
focus (Chapter 1), and have introduced social and ethical considerations that are relevant to 
breast screening (Chapter 2).  I have conducted a literature review into empirical studies on 
people’s views about breast screening, and identified a gap in the empirical literature, namely 
the views of those who make and influence breast screening policy and practice, and the 
factors that affect those views (Chapter 3).  In the remainder of this thesis, I present my 
empirical research, which addresses this gap, and draw upon my results to make suggestions 
about how to include ethical considerations in decision making for future breast screening 
policy and practice.  This chapter describes the aims and methods of my empirical work. 
 
The direction of my research was influenced by several factors.  Firstly, my experiences as a 
breast physician, described in the Preface, had given me an interest in exploring the 
influences of ethical thinking on people’s reasoning about breast screening, particularly 
around the more contentious aspects of breast screening policy and practice.  Secondly, I was 
committed to empirical studies, partly because of an affinity for the empirical turn in 
bioethics (discussed in more detail below), and partly because I wished to obtain skills and 
experience in empirical research. I was particularly interested in qualitative research methods, 
as I felt they were well suited to my areas of interest: ethical reasoning and understanding.  
My identified gap in the literature concerning the views of those people who make or 
influence breast screening policies and practices (see Chapter 3) motivated me to focus on 
this group.  I therefore determined that my empirical work would concentrate on the role of 
ethical considerations on the reasoning and opinions of prominent breast screening “experts”.  
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For the purposes of my study I used the term “expert” to mean people with work-related 
experience in the breast screening arena, who hold, or had previously held, influence on the 
way that breast screening is carried out.  Given my geographical constraints, but also the high 
level of international prominence amongst local breast screening experts, it made sense to 
situate my empirical work within the Australian context.  Finally, my exposure to the 
practical use of ethics at the research unit in which I was based, and my interest in empirical 
ethics stimulated an interest in using the resulting information to draw normative conclusions 
that could assist with future decision making processes. That is, I was hopeful of being able 
to guide experts regarding the use of ethical considerations when evaluating, advising, or 
making decisions in future breast screening policy and practice. 
 
I had three research aims: 
1. Identify and analyse the values held by Australian decision makers in relation to 
breast screening policy and practice. 
2. Identify the aspects of the breast screening program that are particularly ethically 
salient and analyse those in detail. 
3. Describe how to incorporate ethical considerations in order to make the best decisions 
for future breast screening policy and practice. 
 
The remainder of this chapter provides detail on why my chosen methods were selected and a 
comprehensive description of how I carried out my research. Some of this information is 
covered in abbreviated versions elsewhere in this thesis, including in the Introductions and 
Methods sections of published papers. 
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4.2 Empirical ethics 
It is generally accepted that screening programs should be evaluated against public health,2 
economic, legal, and ethical criteria.3, 4 The aim of my work was to contribute to the ongoing 
debate about breast screening by concentrating on the ethical issues.  I set out to analyse 
ethical considerations in breast screening, exploring their role in shaping breast screening 
policy and practice, and providing practice and normative guidance for future decision 
making. 
 
There are many conceptual tools that can be used for ethical analysis, including: 
• Complete, relatively abstract, ‘ideal’ theories such as Rawl’s theory of justice5 and 
Kantian deontology (for a concise introduction, see6), which present what are 
intended to be universal rules and guidance about right and wrong. 
• Non-ideal theories, which are situated in the real, non-ideal world, and aim to be more 
concrete and immediately practical than ideal theories.7, 8 
• Mid-level principles such as Beauchamp and Childress’ Four Principles approach9 
which present a set of action-guiding concepts (beneficence, non-maleficence, 
autonomy, and justice) that are considered to be important within the context of 
clinical medicine. 
• Casuistry or case-based ethics, which starts with contextual facts and details and 
builds upon these with intuitive thinking and comparison with other, paradigmatic, 
cases in order to determine particular rights and wrongs.10-12 
 
Each of these approaches has limitations,10, 12, 13 whether it be the difficulty of applying 
idealised theories to a non-ideal world, unintended consequences that were unforeseen even 
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within non-ideal theories, the lack of guidance about negotiating between conflicting 
principles, or the lack of satisfactory justification for normative judgments in some case-base 
reasoning.  A fifth approach, and one that I, along with many other writers on screening 
ethics favour, is to use ethical principles and maxims, but to appropriately refine and apply 
them through due consideration and analysis of the particular case.3, 13 Guided by this 
strategy, I approached my study with the understanding that ethical theory and empirical 
research could inform and interact with each other such that existing theory could be used to 
direct empirical research, and that the data could be used to inform normative conclusions.  I 
aimed to combine the detailed contextual information from empirical work with the 
normative reasoning underlying philosophical or theoretical ethics, in order to provide new 
insights into how the world operates and draw normative conclusions about how the world 
should operate. This approach fits into the relatively newly-described field of empirical 
ethics, a way of working that is in the early stages of being defined, codified and justified.14  
 
In this new field, authors have proposed a range of methods for combining theory and 
empirical work in order to draw normative conclusions.14 Frith15 describes an approach that 
combines empirical evidence with theoretical reasoning, assuming that each can, and should, 
influence the other in an cyclical manner.  In this study, I understood data and theory to be 
united in a symbiotic relationship such that data collection and analysis could proceed 
iteratively with reflection on and modification of both the empirical process and my thinking 
about the ethical concepts that were relevant in the situation.15, 16 
 
In practice, this meant that the categories on which data analysis would focus were clarified 
and refined as data collection progressed. This was done through an ongoing and iterative 
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combination of inductive analysis of early empirical data and theoretical reflection.  As my 
analytic categories were developed, they were used to shape the direction of discussion in 
later interviews.  Further data collection contributed to refinement of theory and to further 
modification of categories, which again influenced data collection.  The process was repeated 
until the data had shaped a particular normative conclusion.  
 
In this way, my research aimed to describe how values influence the views of breast 
screening experts, and to draw on a combination of empirical data and theoretical analysis to 
produce normative conclusions about how ethical considerations might best be incorporated 
into decision making for breast screening policy and practice.  It will be clear from the above 
discussion that my chosen empirical ethics approach required both theoretical and empirical 
components.  The following paragraphs describe my work within each of these domains. 
 
Theoretical approach: principles in screening ethics 
Breast screening operates within the dual fields of clinical medicine and public health.  Some 
decisions and policies are made within the context of improving population health, but for 
many people, particularly women, breast screening appears to be a personal healthcare issue 
with important ramifications for individual health and wellbeing.  The ethical principles 
relevant to screening therefore need to include those used in both settings.  The Four 
Principles of clinical medicine (beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice) are 
well-known and widely used across many different healthcare settings.9  As noted in 
Chapter 2, several alternative sets of ethical principles have been suggested for the field of 
public health, on the grounds that the types of challenges and situations found in public 
health are substantially different from those in clinical medicine, such that the Four Principles 
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do not adequately cover the field.17-20 In Chapter 2 I drew on both medical and public health 
ethics literatures to review the ethical issues that are either explicitly discussed with regard to 
breast screening, or can be reasonably inferred to be relevant to an ethical evaluation of 
breast screening.  I used the list of ethical issues identified in Chapter 2 (and reproduced in 
Table 4.1), worded as principles or maxims, to draft a starting point for my empirical 
research. 
Table 4.1 Ethical considerations relevant to decision making for breast screening policy 
and practice. (Draft version)  
• Maximise health benefits
• Minimise harms
• Deliver more benefits than harms
• Deliver the most benefit possible within the resources available
• Respect autonomy
• Maintain transparency, including communicating honestly
• Distribute benefits and burdens justly
• Uphold reciprocal obligations
• Act in solidarity with others
SOURCE: Drawn from Chapter 2 
During my research I planned to examine the extent to which the empirical situation (in the 
context of influential Australian experts) matched the largely theoretical literature.  That is, I 
intended to study which, if any, of the ethical concepts in Table 4.1 influenced decision 
making for breast screening policy and practice (and if so, how), as well as remain sensitive 
to any other ethical considerations that appeared to be important. 
Empirical approach 
I have already reviewed the empirical literature that explores intersection between values and 
people’s views on breast screening (see Chapter 3), and described how the lack of research 
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into the perspectives of breast screening experts represents a gap in the literature.  My 
empirical approach sought to address this gap by gathering data on the views and moral 
reasoning of experts in breast screening. I used qualitative methods because they were well 
suited to the collection of rich, detailed data on what it is that people value and how they 
reason with those values.21 Many of these methods were informed by Grounded Theory, 
particularly as it is practised by Kathy Charmaz,22 but this was not a pure Grounded Theory 
approach. 
 
4.3 Methods 
Participants and sampling 
My study population was Australian breast screening experts: people currently or previously 
working in a breast screening related area who have exerted an influence on breast screening 
policy and practice.  For the purposes of this research, I assumed “influence” to be the 
fulfilment of one or more of the following criteria in relation to breast screening: writing or 
presenting for a lay or academic audience, holding a senior position in breast screening 
provision or administration, holding a professional or consumer representative position 
within a government or non-government committee, or filling a senior breast screening 
advocacy role.  I was interested in the wide range of views within this population and after 
obtaining approval from the appropriate ethics committees for my work (see below and 
Appendix 9) I began sampling purposively to achieve maximum variation.23  I included 
participants who were publically supportive of breast screening, and participants who had 
publicly criticised the program.  I also reasoned that people’s views might be influenced by 
factors such as professional role and experience, gender, and local policies and practices, so I 
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endeavoured to include participants across a wide variety of these characteristics.  I sampled 
across the states and territories of Australia, aiming for a balance of genders and professional 
roles including: clinical practice (oncology, surgery, breast medicine, radiology, radiation 
oncology and pathology), non-clinical research (epidemiology and biostatistics), senior 
administration and senior advocacy. Table 4.2 provides further detail on the characteristics of 
participants and those who were asked but did not participate in the study. 
 
Table 4.2 Characteristics of experts24 
 
Participants: 33 (Brackets contain experts who were invited but did not participate: 13) 
Professional 
rolea 
Cliniciansb15 (3) Oncologists 3 (1) 
 Surgeons 4 (0) 
  Breast physicians 1 (2) 
  Radiologists 2 (0) 
  Radiation oncologists 2 (0) 
  Pathologists 3 (0) 
  Clinicians, other 0 (1) 
 Non-clinical researchers 14 (3)  Epidemiologists/biostatisticians 9 (1) 
  Researchers, other 5 (1) 
 Administrators/managers 6 (2) Administrators/managers 6 (2) 
 Advocacy leaders 6 (7) Consumers working in advocacy 3 (6) 
  Clinicians/researchers working in advocacy 3 (1) 
Public 
stance on 
breast 
screeningc 
Supportive 16 (9) 
Mostly supportived 3 (1) 
Critical 6 (0) 
Unknown to researchers 8 (3) 
NOTE: aSome experts held more than one professional role. bMost clinicians were engaged in research to a 
greater or lesser extent. cI loosely categorised potential interviewees as being “supportive”, “mostly supportive” 
or “critical” about breast screening based on publicly available commentary. d“Mostly supportive” = broadly 
supportive of breast screening but with selected concerns about one or more elements of the program. 
 
I identified prospective participants from a variety of sources including the lay and academic 
press, personnel lists from websites of government and non-government advisory and 
advocacy bodies, and suggestions from colleagues and other participants.  I approached 
experts via email through email addresses that were in the public domain and preserved 
confidentiality of experts at all times.  A copy of the recruitment email and accompanying 
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information that I sent to experts is provided in Appendix 10. These were scrutinised and 
approved by the appropriate ethics committees (Appendix 9). 
 
I contacted 46 experts, and interviewed 33 (72%): 17 males and 16 females who met the 
inclusion criteria, and who were currently or recently residing across all states and territories. 
The only location in which I could not identify an expert to interview was the Northern 
Territory. The thirteen people who did not participate either did not respond (9), did not wish 
to participate (3) or were unable to participate in the time available (1).  I had some initial 
recruitment difficulties and sought advice from my supervisors as to how to overcome this.  
Together we developed a variety of strategies.  For example, some experts did not respond to 
my email, although I knew that the address was valid and up to date.  In such cases I sent a 
follow-up email, and generally this was successful.  I wondered if some busy experts were 
uninterested in what might have appeared to be a generic recruitment email and so, with 
approval from the appropriate ethics committees (see Appendix 9), I began to include a 
targeted comment in my initial email to subsequent experts specifying exactly why I was 
interested in hearing from them: “I particularly wanted to talk to you because … [you have 
published in this area / you are a member of XX committee etc].”  I had considerable 
difficulty recruiting senior consumer advocacy figures.  Two leading advocates did not wish 
to participate and I wondered if they were suspicious of my motivation for researching breast 
screening.  They may have assumed I was sceptical of its value.  In subsequent emails, again 
with ethics committee approval (see Appendix 9), I explicitly noted that there were no pre-
determined outcomes from my research, and that my goal was to map the range of ideas and 
understand the reasoning behind them.  Several other advocates did not respond to my 
emails.  I wondered if some members of this group might not see themselves as “experts”, 
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and also considered that there might be a higher turnover of staff in advocacy roles such that 
at least some advocates may no longer have been working in that role and may not have been 
contactable at the publically available email address. I persevered with recruitment amongst 
this group, including, as noted above, targeted comments about why I wanted to speak to 
each recipient.  I was ultimately satisfied that I obtained a sample with sufficient inclusion of 
a diverse range of professional roles and views about breast screening. 
 
My sampling evolved over the course of the research to ensure that I had adequate 
representation of the characteristics described above and to follow up on any aspects of the 
topic that emerged as the data collection and analysis progressed.22  I continued sampling 
until I was no longer hearing new information and had reached thematic saturation.21, 25 
 
Data collection 
I conducted interviews between October 2012 and October 2013. The discussions took place 
in the participant’s workplace, or if that was not convenient, in my office or over the 
telephone.  Each interview lasted between 39 and 105 minutes (average 66 minutes).  In 
keeping with other researchers, I found that face-to-face and telephone interviews were of 
comparable quality and length26 and telephone interviews were particularly useful in enabling 
me to speak with experts in distant locations throughout Australia. 
 
Prior to each interview I undertook detailed research about the participant, ensuring that I 
understood their role and had read any of their published or other public commentary on 
breast screening.  I used a semi-structured interview format, with questions and prompts 
designed to elicit the expert’s views on breast screening and to encourage them to reflect on 
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underlying values and other influences on their reasoning.  I did not use the terminology of 
values, ethics or morals, neither did I assume that the experts would necessarily be familiar 
with the theoretical basis or empirical study of these concepts. I began each interview with 
the consent process (either written or verbal), before progressing to a discussion of my 
clinical experience as a breast physician and my interest in the different views about breast 
screening that exist amongst experts. I asked experts about their activities and roles in the 
breast screening domain, and then loosely followed a series of questions about their views on 
what was good or bad, and why, within the Australian program.  Appendix 11 contains 
details of the interview format.  Where suitable, the questions were tailored to the individual 
expert’s particular experience and interest.  As my data collection and analysis progressed, I 
adapted the interview questions to elicit particular information that I had identified from 
previous interviews as being interesting or important.21 
 
I was new to interviewing as a research method and so engaged in active training, practice 
interviewing, coaching, and peer feedback before I commenced data collection.  I regularly 
discussed interview techniques and any problems with my supervisors, seeking ways to 
improve my skills. For example, although I was often aware of the publicly aired views of the 
expert, I learnt not to make too many assumptions about their reasoning prior to or during the 
interview:  I might well be wrong in my assumptions, and I might miss out on obtaining their 
own words and explanations as useful data.  I also learnt to introduce the more complex 
issues with a preliminary description, often prefacing with a comment such as, “You 
probably know this already but …” because I discovered that many participants were 
unaware of the details of aspects of breast screening that were beyond their immediate 
expertise.  Unlike myself, they had not spent the past year or more immersed in all the 
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different issues and controversies.  I initially found it difficult to ask controversial questions, 
particularly from clinicians.  I realised that I had been wanting to reassure clinicians that, as a 
clinician myself, I understood the pressures and dilemmas inherent in such work, and had not 
wanted to irritate or offend them by questioning their behaviour or opinions.  This meant, 
however, that I had not necessarily been obtaining a thorough understanding of the clinician’s 
reasoning.  After consultation with my supervisors I started to employ useful phrases such as, 
“I find this question hard to ask, because I see myself as a clinician, but I’m going to ask it 
anyway...” and I became more confident with asking searching questions.  All of the 
interviews were digitally recorded, professionally transcribed and de-identified. 
 
Data analysis 
I began analysis by using the literature and my previous knowledge to draw up a list of topics 
and concepts that I thought were likely to capture the important elements of experts’ 
comments and which I would use to code the transcripts. I devised shorthand codes for each 
major point or concept.  This list, or index, was refined and re-shaped in response to the data, 
particularly from the early interviews.22  One version of the index is included in Appendix 
12, along with other information and documents relevant to my data analysis. 
 
After each interview I wrote a short “Memo 1” which included biographical information 
about the participant, my initial impressions from our discussion and any new information 
and ideas that had emerged from the interview (my notes about the writing of Memo 1 are 
provided in Appendix 12). Once each interview transcript was available I read it through 
several times.  I reviewed it for accuracy, crosschecking with my interview recording if 
necessary, and I deleted any identifying information.  Using my index as a guide, I 
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highlighted phrases and lines within the transcript that represented important concepts and 
remarks, and identified them with a comment box containing my chosen shorthand.  I then 
collated the identified data from the interview and from Memo 1 into a second memo, titled 
“Memo 2” (see Appendix 12), placing relevant data under template headings that were 
drawn from the index.  I either included highlighted phrases from the transcript or a 
paraphrased summary depending on whether or not the exact wording seemed important or 
useful.  In either case I included line references so that I could return to the transcript when 
necessary.  The interview did not necessarily provide data that was relevant for each template 
heading, and in such cases, I simply left parts of the template blank.  I used this process to re-
visit the interview and consider what I had learned from it. 
 
I then distilled versions of Memo 2 into two sets of collated data that I had drafted using the 
template headings from Memo 2, and which were refined slightly as the research progressed, 
in response to the empirical findings.  The first collation was an excel spreadsheet called the 
“Chart”, which contained a simple, one or two word summary of the key points from each 
interview.  The Chart was a useful tool for reviewing the data set in its entirety, and for 
readily comparing and contrasting the findings from each participant.  The second collation 
was a word document titled “Rolling Memo”, which had room for more detailed comments 
from each interview, together with running commentaries under each heading about the 
collated data, including notes on any new information and new ideas that were emerging, and 
a synthesis of how my thinking was evolving.  (See Appendix 12 for excerpts from the Chart 
and the Rolling Memo.)  The ideas behind each of these collations came from the qualitative 
research literature, including Grounded Theory literature22, 25, 27 although they do not 
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necessarily adhere to any formal descriptions from these literatures, as I have drafted them in 
my own manner to suit my own analytic purposes as described.28 
 
In summary, from each interview I extracted useful data in the form of: a coded transcript, a 
set of initial impressions (Memo 1), an individual summary (Memo 2), and contributions to 
short (Chart) and long (Rolling Memo) collated data sets.  At each step I reflected on the 
findings and used them to create new theories and hypotheses, and refine previous ones.  I 
performed analytic tasks on each interview as soon as the transcript became available 
(typically two or three weeks), and used the emerging ideas to assist with identification of 
new participants and to shape the direction and questioning within subsequent interviews. In 
this way I was moving constantly between theory and data, allowing them to inform each 
other in an iterative manner.  This method of analysis was informed by Charmaz’s 
discussions of the constant comparative method.22 
 
Throughout this process, particularly after the early interviews, I sought regular guidance and 
assistance from my supervisors.  I talked through my index categories with them at the outset, 
and again as they were refined in response to my findings.  I checked my application of codes 
by having them independently code two of the earlier transcripts and comparing their results 
with my own.  We regularly discussed emerging concepts and ideas from the data, and how 
they might feed back into subsequent interviews as well as into new theories.  For example, 
after discussion with my supervisors, I began to ask participants for their comments on 
suggestions from previous interviewees about how the breast screening program might be 
improved (e.g. triennial screening instead of biennial; starting at 45 instead of 50 years).  I 
found that this was a good way to introduce and explore contentious topics.  On a more 
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abstract level, I began to ask participants about possible tensions between concepts such as 
respecting women’s autonomy and delivering benefit, or, depending on the expert’s interests 
and the direction of the interview, between more concrete applications of these concepts, 
such as promoting informed choice and promoting screening participation.  These kinds of 
questions enabled me to test new ideas and theories that were triggered by previous 
interviews. 
 
Although I had the overall aim of analysing the ethical issues in breast screening and had 
identified that my work would be empirically informed by the views of breast screening 
experts (see Chapter 3), I did not set out with a detailed outline for the direction of my 
project or analysis.  I planned to allow the important ethical issues to emerge from the data 
and from my reading of the literature, and to then focus on the topics that appeared likely to 
be the most rewarding in terms of being new and useful contributions to the debate.  My 
reading of the biomedical literature and public health ethics literature, together with my 
previous clinical experience, had led me to favour a values-based approach, as noted above.  
My analysis of the data suggested that experts frequently use values-based concepts when 
talking about breast screening, and this gave me confidence to proceed with this approach.  
My first sub-study thus became a detailed analysis of the ways in which experts use values in 
relation to breast cancer screening (see Chapter 5).  This was a big project, beginning with 
my previously drafted principles (see Table 4.1 above) and altering and expanding this list in 
response to close reading of my Rolling Memo.  I identified the important, frequently 
discussed values, and worked iteratively between broad thinking across experts and 
categories to identify patterns, and comprehensive re-visiting of interview transcripts to 
confirm and validate details.  Although I had originally intended to write only about ethical 
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values, it soon became clear that epistemological values were also highly relevant, so I 
included these in my published paper. 
 
After writing the first empirical paper, and reflecting further on the literature and the data, it 
became clear to me that there were two particularly contentious issues in breast cancer 
screening that I could usefully address: overdiagnosis in breast screening, and 
communication with breast screening consumers.  Overdiagnosis was, and still is, a 
particularly topical issue in breast cancer screening.  The much-anticipated Marmot 
Report,29,30 as it is widely known, was released shortly before I began data collection and was 
fresh in the minds of many experts. The report included the calculation that for every breast 
cancer death avoided, three women were overdiagnosed - that is, screening delivered an 
unnecessary and unhelpful, although technically correct, diagnosis of breast cancer to these 
three women.  The independence and reliability of Marmot and his reporting team gave 
credence to the concept of significant overdiagnosis harm in breast screening, something that 
had hitherto been strongly debated but beset by deep methodological disagreement and 
therefore widely viewed with scepticism.  Overdiagnosis was discussed in all of my 
interviews, having either been raised by the experts or, less commonly, by myself.  The 
interviews provided a large amount of data and many different views about overdiagnosis and 
I spent considerable time contemplating the ways that ethical thinking intersected with 
experts’ views, and how best to present this.  Framing theory offered a good fit for the data 
and the concepts that I wished to discuss, and I worked on identifying and explaining 
relationships within and between results and participants. 
 
 140 
Chapter 4: Aims and methods 
 
Communicating with consumers was also a contentious issue.  At the time, Australia and the 
United Kingdom were both in the process of reviewing a government-endorsed breast 
screening pamphlet that was provided to women31 (these revised pamphlets are now available 
at32 and33) and there was widespread interest in the type of information and level of detail that 
should be included.  Many experts discussed this topic in the interviews, and differing views 
emerged strongly.  My analysis focused on identifying the ways in which experts’ positions 
were broadly similar or different, and drawing up a simple model to present this to readers.  I 
also worked on uncovering patterns in the data relating to the various ways in which experts 
reasoned about their views. 
 
The large amount of data that I collected presented a variety of options for further focused 
analysis.  For my final empirical chapter, I decided to use the data to explore socially 
embedded concepts in the context of breast screening.  My reasoning for this was multi-
faceted.  Firstly, my reading in public health ethics had made me aware of growing academic 
interest in these kinds of concepts.34, 35 For example, publications on reciprocity in public 
health had been emerging over the last decade, particularly in response to the SARS epidemic 
in Canada.36, 37 There also appeared to be a growing interest in solidarity within public health 
ethics, including a recent publication from the UK that introduced me to the potential depths 
of this concept in the context of breast screening.38 Despite all of this, my understanding of 
socially embedded concepts such as reciprocity and solidarity was somewhat superficial, and 
I was interested in rectifying this.  Secondly, I was concerned by some of the promotional 
material in current or recent use by breast screening programs (for example39), and by 
comments that had emerged from my interviews, all apparently stating or describing what 
women should do in regard to breast screening for reasons that sounded like reciprocity or 
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solidarity.  It was not clear to me that the application of these concepts was appropriate in the 
context of women’s breast screening behaviour.  As such, it seemed important that there be a 
contextual study of the use of socially embedded concepts in breast screening, including a 
critique of whether or not their current use was in keeping with widespread understanding of 
what breast screening is about and for.  I was excited to undertake this research, although I 
knew that it would be challenging: unlike the studies into overdiagnosis and consumer 
communication, I had not had such a clear idea of the importance or even of the boundaries 
of socially embedded concepts during data collection.  I knew that although many experts had 
talked about them, I had not clearly highlighted this information in any of my memos or 
summaries.  I began, therefore, with intense reading of the literature to gain a deeper 
understanding of the concepts, then examined my Rolling Memo and multiple, selected 
transcripts, searching for the relevant data.  I soon realised that the data contained more 
information than I had first expected: as well as applying socially embedded concepts to 
women’s breast screening behaviour, experts talked about associated values in relation to 
government responsibilities and to the behaviour of themselves and other experts.  Iterative 
reflection on theory and data enabled me to develop useful categories to explain these and 
other uses of socially embedded concepts in the context of breast screening.  I used my 
reading of the literature to assist and justify my reflections. 
 
Research ethics 
I obtained ethics approval for my research from the Cancer Institute of New South Wales 
Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee [HREC/12/CIPHS/46] and the 
University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee [#15245].  The committees 
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specifically approved my original recruitment email and the accompanying material, as well 
as subsequent amendments. (See documents in Appendix 9) 
 
All participants gave individual consent.  Those who were interviewed in person were given 
the consent form to read, and all signed it.  Those who were interviewed over the telephone 
were read the contents of the consent form, and all gave verbal consent. Experts were free to 
withdraw from the study at any stage but none have withdrawn.  All the participants were 
assured of confidentiality, and because of the relatively small pool of experts within 
Australia, particular steps were taken to preserve anonymity.  For example, when providing 
information on the professional roles of quoted experts in my published papers I did not 
provide sub-specialty information, preferring to use more general descriptors such as 
“clinician” rather than “surgeon” or “oncologist”.  I also altered the numerical aliases that I 
gave to experts for different publications, in order to limit the amount of quoted material that 
could be identified as arising from any one individual and reduce any chance of recognition.  
One expert requested that any intentions to publicly quote from their interview be reviewed 
by them prior to submission for publication.  Quotes from this expert have not been used in 
public. 
 
Follow up 
Many participants requested that I keep them informed regarding the progress and findings of 
the research.  In order to comply with this request I have been in individual email 
correspondence with all participants shortly after publication of each of the research papers 
included in this thesis.  (See Appendix 13 for an example of this correspondence).  Two 
participants are not contactable via their original email addresses or any others that are in the 
 143 
Chapter 4: Aims and methods 
 
public domain.  Many participants have replied with very positive responses to my 
publications and findings.  
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5.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter contains the following publication and online supplementary notes:  
Parker L, Rychetnik, L, Carter, S. Values in breast cancer screening: an empirical 
study with Australian experts.  BMJ Open. 2015;5(5):e006333. 
 
Available at: http://bmjopen.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/bmjopen-2014-
006333?ijkey=4fede9Ou6qJVa7y&keytype=ref 
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ABSTRACT
Objective: To explore what Australian experts value in
breast screening, how these values are conceptualised
and prioritised, and how they inform experts’ reasoning
and judgement about the Australian breast-screening
programme.
Design: Qualitative study based on interviews with
experts.
Participants: 33 experts, including clinicians,
programme managers, policymakers, advocates and
researchers selected for their recognisable influence in
the Australian breast-screening setting.
Setting: Australian breast-screening policy, practice
and research settings.
Results: Experts expressed 2 types of values: ethical
values (about what was good, important or right) and
epistemological values (about how evidence should be
created and used). Ethical values included delivering
benefit, avoiding harm, promoting autonomy, fairness,
cost effectiveness, accountability, professionalism and
transparency. Epistemological values informed experts’
arguments about prioritising and evaluating evidence
methodology, source population and professional
interests. Some values were conceptualised differently
by experts: for example, delivering benefit could mean
reducing breast cancer mortality, reducing all-cause
mortality, reducing mortality in younger women,
reducing need for aggressive treatment, and/or
reassuring women they were cancer free. When values
came into conflict, experts prioritised them differently:
for example, when experts perceived a conflict between
delivering benefits and promoting autonomy, there
were differences in which value was prioritised. We
explain the complexity of the relationship between held
values and experts’ overall views on breast cancer
screening.
Conclusions: Experts’ positions in breast screening
are influenced by evidence and a wide range of ethical
and epistemological values. We conclude that
discussions about values should be a regular part of
breast-screening review in order to build understanding
between those who hold different positions, and
provide a mechanism for responding to these
differences.
INTRODUCTION
Mammographic breast screening was ﬁrst per-
formed in the mid-20th century and became
widespread in the 1980s. Public and profes-
sional debate about mammography screening
began immediately,1–3 and intensiﬁed after
publication of controversial meta-analyses of
breast screening randomised controlled trials
that suggested lower beneﬁts than originally
calculated4–6 and signiﬁcant overdiagnosis.7–9
(Throughout this paper, we use overdiagnosis
to mean: diagnosis of non-progressive or
slowly progressive breast cancer through
screening, a diagnosis that does not produce
a net beneﬁt for the women diagnosed. We
use the term overtreatment to mean the treat-
ment of overdiganosed cancers, treatment
which is, by deﬁnition, unnecessary10–12). It
was widely hoped13 that the recently updated
review of the evidence by Marmot et al14
would put an end to the controversy, but dis-
agreements between experts about breast
screening persist, particularly around the
amount of beneﬁt and the risk of overdiagno-
sis.15 Such disagreements can be a challenge
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This is the first application of empirical ethics to
breast-screening policy and practice outside of
consumer studies.
▪ The study has a wide reach, using data from a
broad selection of key players in breast screening
and covering all important stakeholder groups
across the country.
▪ The rich data set and detailed analysis provides a
comprehensive picture of how values guide think-
ing and influence experts’ opinions on mammo-
graphic screening.
▪ Experts in other jurisdictions, with different organ-
isational structures and different societal values,
may express different views. However, since the
Australian programme shares much in terms of
rationale, purpose and implementation with coun-
terpart programmes in the UK and many European
countries, it seems likely that our results will be at
least partially transferable to these contexts.
▪ There may have been differences between experts
who agreed to participate and those who did not.
However, we purposely interviewed experts from a
range of backgrounds and public opinions about
breast cancer screening.
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for policy and practice, particularly if they persist and
seem intractable. Relatively little is known about how
breast screening experts develop different interpretations
of the evidence on the beneﬁts and harms of breast
cancer screening. There have been a number of sugges-
tions. Some attribute the differences to variable epi-
demiological understanding of potential biases.12 16 17
Others acknowledge the possible effect of professional
bias or vested interests,6 12 17–19 or differing historically
based assumptions about the biology or inevitability of
cancer growth.20 While these are all potentially relevant,
it is likely that there are also deeper differences under-
lying the variation in experts’ positions: that is, these
experts may have different ideas about what is important
and what matters with regard to breast screening21 22
and/or the evaluation of evidence.6 Well-meaning,
thoughtful and epidemiologically competent experts may
hold a range of views and ideas about breast cancer
screening owing to differences in how they prioritise
certain values or principles.
Values are integral to public health programme plan-
ning and are emphasised in the aims of many national
breast-screening programmes including those of the
UK,23 Australia24 and many European countries,25 which
refer to concepts such as delivering beneﬁt, avoiding
harm, accountability and recently, transparency and
respect for autonomy. Many authors also see values as
being important in the creation and interpretation of evi-
dence.26 27 Our commitment to different values may be
expressed overtly, via debates and discussions about these
values; but debates around such issues are rare in the lit-
erature on breast screening. This sidesteps important
conversations about what is important and gives limited
acknowledgement to the role of these values in determin-
ing breast-screening policy and practice decisions.
The idea that values are important in healthcare is not
new. There has been considerable interest in paying
attention to: patients’ values in clinical practice28 and
health technology assessment;29–31 citizens’ values in
healthcare policy;32 33 and health practitioners’ values in
clinical practice.34 35 This way of looking at healthcare
not only assumes the importance of values in health-
care,36 but also accepts a plurality of values among differ-
ent stakeholders, and emphasises the need to explore
and work through values’ differences during healthcare
decision-making.35 With these ideas in mind, we aimed to
investigate experts’ values in breast screening, with a view
to identifying new means by which persistent disagree-
ments in this ﬁeld might be understood or mitigated.
This study is part of a larger Australian National
Health and Medical Research Council-funded project
examining ethics and evidence in cancer screening. In
this paper, we report on one component of a substudy
focused on ethics and evidence in screening for breast
cancer. Our aim in this paper is to empirically examine
the values or principles that Australian experts employ
when evaluating the Australian breast cancer screening
programme.37 We reasoned that by developing a clearer
understanding of the values employed by these experts,
we could move towards a better understanding of the
debate about this changing and sometimes difﬁcult
topic. We focused on experts because (1) they are well-
informed relative to the general population of citizens,
policymakers or researchers; (2) disagreement between
experts has been a central feature of breast screening, so
mapping experts’ values should assist in understanding
this disagreement and (3) these experts have inﬂuenced
breast-screening policy and practice, both directly
through decision-making bodies, and indirectly by inﬂu-
encing consumer groups and other policymakers.
Our research questions were:
▸ What are the values expressed in the talk of Australian
experts about breast screening in Australia?
▸ What are the implications for policy and practice of
experts holding particular values?
METHOD
Methodology
This study employed a qualitative methodology, with
sampling, data collection and analysis strategies designed
to best answer our research questions.38 We used open
qualitative methods because there was little pre-existing
knowledge about the topic and because we sought to
access the values of participants on their own terms. We
were motivated by our commitment to empirical bioeth-
ics, in particular to the view that practice and theory
must exist in a symbiotic relationship, where each has
the potential to alter the other.39 40 We undertook this
study in that spirit, expecting that existing ethical theory
would inform our analysis, but also that our data and
analysis could make a useful contribution to ethical the-
orising in the area of breast screening. We have consid-
erable experience and knowledge of grounded theory
methodology, which informed our study design,41 42 but
this was not strictly a ‘grounded theory study’.43 44
Participants and sampling
We selected participants from the population of ‘inﬂu-
ential experts’, individuals who had engaged in frequent
media commentary, publications, senior administration
or management, advice to government or professional
committees, or senior advocacy on breast screening. We
sampled purposively for maximum variation45 of ideas,
deliberately inviting participants with strongly divergent
opinions (table 1). We also reasoned that perspectives
may be associated with professional responsibilities and
experiences, so contacted participants with a range of
professional roles.
We identiﬁed potential interviewees by scanning aca-
demic and popular media publications on breast screen-
ing, and personnel lists on websites of organisations
involved in breast screening. We also followed up on sug-
gestions from colleagues and previously interviewed
experts. As experts, all participants were able to be
contacted via information in the public domain.
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We approached 46 experts via email, and interviewed 33
(17 male and 16 female). Thirteen people either refused
(3), or were unable to participate (1), or did not respond
to emails (9). We had a particularly low response rate
from volunteers who were on public record as holding
senior roles in consumer advocacy organisations. This
may have been due to a higher turnover of people in
these positions than in other professional roles: they may
no longer have been working as advocates when we sent
our email. Our sampling evolved as analysis progressed,
ensuring that we had enough representation of positions
and roles to give us conﬁdence in our ﬁndings.41 We con-
tinued to sample until we reached thematic saturation.38
Data collection
LP conducted semistructured interviews face to face in the
expert’s or LP’s workplace, or by telephone, if unavailable
to meet in person, from October 2012 to October 2013.
Interviews lasted 39–105 min (average 66 min). In keeping
with reports from the literature, we found that face-to-face
and telephone interviews were of comparable quality and
length.46 Utilising telephone interviews enabled us to
interview experts across the country.
Interviews were designed to elicit experts’ views and
opinions on breast screening in Australia. LP described
her interest in the topic as a medical practitioner under-
taking doctoral studies in cancer-screening ethics. She
noted aloud that there was an obvious range of opinions
among experts despite, and often about, the large
evidence base, and suggested that she was interested in
exploring this further. The aim of the interviews was
to ensure that participants could speak freely without
experiencing any judgement regarding their views.
We did not ask direct questions about abstract values or
principles, instead we asked about interviewees’ experi-
ence of the breast-screening programme and their views
on what was good or bad and why (see online supple-
mentary appendix). Interviews were digitally recorded,
transcribed by a professional service, and de-identiﬁed.
Analysis
Analysis focused on developing a set of categories that
captured the most important values in experts’ talk. Our
goal was not to develop a theory, but to identify mid-
range ethical concepts being used by participants, and
understand what those concepts meant in use.
Interviews were read repeatedly and coded in detail to
capture values-in-use. From codes, more abstract categor-
ies were developed; these evolved iteratively as the data
collection and analysis progressed. LP wrote analytic
memos throughout, and shared these with other authors
for discussion. Coding, categorisation and memo writing
were closely informed by Charmaz’s iteration of the con-
stant comparative method.41
All participants gave individual written or verbal
consent, were assured of conﬁdentiality, and were free to
withdraw from the study at any stage.
RESULTS
Experts disagreed as to whether, or to what degree,
values influenced their thinking
Although all experts discussed value-laden concepts in
relation to breast screening, they varied in how much
Table 1 Characteristics of experts
Participants 33 (brackets contain number of experts who were invited but did not participate; 13)
Professional role*
Clinicians† 15 (3) Oncologists 3 (1)
Surgeons 4 (0)
Breast physicians 1 (2)
Radiologists 2 (0)
Radiation oncologists 2 (0)
Pathologists 3 (0)
Not otherwise specified 0 (1)
Non-clinical researchers 14 (3) Epidemiologists/biostatisticians 9 (1)
Not otherwise specified [NOS] 5 (1)
Administrators/managers Administrators/ managers 6 (2)
Advocacy leaders 6 (7) Consumers working in advocacy 3 (6)
Clinicians/researchers working in advocacy 3 (1)
Public stance on breast screening‡
Supportive 16 (9)
Mostly supportive§ 3 (1)
Critical 6 (0)
Unknown to researchers 8 (3)
*Note that some experts held more than one professional role.
†Most clinicians engaged in research to a greater or lesser extent.
‡We loosely categorised potential interviewees as being ‘supportive’, ‘mostly supportive’ or ‘critical’ about breast screening based on publicly
available commentary.
§Broadly supportive of breast screening but with selected concerns about one or more elements of the programme.
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they considered values to be important in shaping their
opinions. Many experts suggested that values inﬂuenced
their thinking, volunteering that “ideology” (#15 epi-
demiologist), “values” (#17 researcher, not otherwise
speciﬁed (NOS)) or “judgements” (#13 consumer advo-
cate), as well as evidence, inﬂuenced how they and
others formed opinions about breast screening. Others
denied the inﬂuence of values, contrasting value-based
reasoning (characterised by use of “intuition, judge-
ment, political trickery, [and attending to] those with
the loudest voice” (#29 epidemiologist) against scientiﬁc
reasoning (in which, ‘the ﬁgures cannot lie’ #21 epi-
demiologist). For these experts, using values meant
being biased or unscientiﬁc, and as such, should be
avoided: “I’m a scientist, I look at the available evidence
and I try and evaluate that impartially” (#9 oncologist).
A single expert presented a unique argument against
using values when reasoning about breast screening.
Using values, they argued, required deep, philosophical
reﬂection. They saw themselves as a person of action
rather than reﬂection, which meant values thinking was
not relevant to them. This view suggested that values
thinking was only for philosophers or academics, not for
practitioners, and implied that practitioners could main-
tain a value-free position.
Experts invoked ethical and epistemological values in
their talk
At the most abstract level, experts’ value-talk about
breast screening could be categorised into two main
groups: ethical and epistemological (table 2). Ethical
values related to ideas about the right thing to do:
There [is] disagreement amongst experts about what we
should do. Even if you had a room full of people agree-
ing on the evidence, you would still get different ideas
about screening. I think it’s values … that is responsible
for those differences. (#17 researcher NOS)
Epistemological values related to preferred sources of
knowledge, including the nature of evidence-based
reasoning:
Table 2 Experts’ views on values that are important in breast cancer screening
Ethical values The range of meanings-in-use of this value* (common conceptions of values are in italics)
Delivering benefits† Breast cancer-related benefits (mortality: reducing population breast cancer mortality; reducing
breast cancer mortality in non-elderly women. Morbidity: enabling less aggressive treatments;
providing reassurance; reducing population burden of disease—incidence of total/advanced
breast cancer)
Non-breast cancer-related benefits (reducing all-cause mortality; improving health for communities
with the poorest health outcomes)
Avoiding harms† Low overdiagnosis rate; low false positive rate; minimal overtreatment; minimal pain and
inconvenience; low false negative rate (false reassurance)
Respecting autonomy† Providing information; facilitating informed choice; providing screening to women in the target age
range; providing screening upon request for older women beyond the target age; maximising
breast screening participation so that women will have the knowledge to make decisions about
their future
Equity Providing equal access to breast screening; contributing to equal health outcomes for all
Economic efficiency Cost effective relative to other health interventions; minimising inefficiencies
Accountability Regular audit and evaluation
Professionalism Performing well at required tasks of job; providing individualised and patient-centred care to
consumers
Fair process for policy
decision-making
Including all stakeholders; excluding those with possible vested interests; asking public opinion on
worthiness of breast screening; asking public opinion about breast-screening policy if the
scientific evidence is uncertain
Transparency Ensuring that underlying values that guide breast-screening policy are clear to consumers
Epistemological values The range of meanings-in-use of this value
Evidence-based
knowledge†
Randomised controlled trial evidence; all relevant scientific studies; scientific studies that have
been rigorously analysed for bias; preference for local and recent service studies; must include
evidence about harms; avoiding modelling studies; including modelling studies; evidence as
evaluated by expert methodologists; evidence as evaluated by impartial scientists without vested
interests; including studies of ‘uninformed’ consumer opinions; excluding studies of ‘uninformed’
consumer opinions
Other knowledge sources Clinical experience; logical reasoning; personal stories; government endorsement; include those
with extreme opinions; assume truth is in the middle
*Some experts may use more than one meaning simultaneously.
†Most commonly discussed values.
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What … people do with the same evidence and the same
statistics is, in the main part, ideologically driven...I don’t
think that anything is value-free—[that] any scientiﬁc
statement is particularly value-free. (#15 epidemiologist)
As shown in table 2, the range of ethical values discussed
by experts related to familiar concepts from the literature,
including the inﬂuential Four Principles47 of clinical medi-
cine (delivering beneﬁt, avoiding harm, respecting auton-
omy, supporting justice), as well as principles more
commonly endorsed in public health practice or public
health ethics (economic efﬁciency, accountability and fair
and/or transparent decision-making processes). Experts
also valued professionalism.
A range of epistemological values was also expressed
(table 2), with experts describing ways of thinking about
knowledge, including views on constructing or reviewing
the scientiﬁc evidence base and uses of non-evidence-
based knowledge.48
Experts had different interpretations of value-related
concepts
Although experts’ value talk reﬂected familiar ethical
and epistemological concerns, our central ﬁnding is this:
there was substantial variation in the way experts con-
ceived of each value. This is consistent with the litera-
ture, which acknowledges and discusses such distinctions
and complexities.35 The range of ways that experts con-
ceive of each value is shown in table 2. The most com-
monly discussed values were also the most variably
constructed: we discuss this in detail below.
Delivering benefits
Experts’ conceptions of delivering beneﬁt in breast screen-
ing fell into two main categories: breast cancer-speciﬁc
and non-breast cancer-speciﬁc outcomes. All experts
talked about breast cancer-speciﬁc beneﬁts, including
reduced population breast cancer mortality and morbidity.
Morbidity was mostly discussed in terms of enabling less
aggressive treatment and reducing population breast
cancer burden. Two experts (both consumer advocates)
also included breast cancer-related reassurance:
Some of that beneﬁt might be just peace of mind, the
fact that you don’t, as far as they can tell, have breast
cancer. (#24 consumer advocate)
Most experts suggested that breast screening delivered
modest to substantial population mortality beneﬁts. Many
also saw the breast cancer morbidity beneﬁts of screening
as substantial, but others saw them as being absent.
Participants’ conception of morbidity appeared to
inform their perception of the presence or absence of
this beneﬁt. When participants said, ‘screening offers
morbidity beneﬁts’ they usually meant ‘screening reduces
the treatment needed, or provides reassurance’. When
participants said, ‘screening does not offer morbidity
beneﬁt’ they usually meant, ‘screening does not decrease
the burden of breast cancer illness in populations’ (gen-
erally because of the impact of overdiagnosis).
A small group of experts argued that breast screening
did not deliver beneﬁts. When they argued this, they
used a broader, non-breast cancer-speciﬁc concept of
beneﬁts, and meant either that screening did not
reduce all-cause mortality, or that screening did not
assist the communities with the poorest health out-
comes. These experts were concerned that the high cost
and attention paid to breast screening meant that other,
possibly more worthy, public health programmes were
not implemented, meaning that the important public
health beneﬁt of improving health outcomes for the
most needy was not realised.
Avoiding harms
Experts’ described (avoiding) harm in a variety of ways
(table 2), with two main patterns and a third minor
pattern emerging. One group of experts, comprised
mostly of researchers, conceived of harm as being
mainly about overdiagnosis. A second group, mostly clin-
icians, saw signiﬁcant harms in false-positive diagnoses
and/or overtreatment. Not all researchers or clinicians
expressed a clear conception of harm, and of those that
did, not all described it along these lines. However,
these two major patterns were associated with particular
professional roles, suggesting some inﬂuence of availabil-
ity bias.49 Researchers whose work involved calculating
overdiagnosis in populations tended to conceptualise
harm as overdiagnosis. By contrast, clinicians working
with identiﬁable patients receiving false-positive results
and negotiating between appropriate treatment and
overtreatment, tended to see harm in these terms.
A third, less widely expressed view about harms concen-
trated on women’s experience of the screening process.
This view was held by all three consumer advocates and
one researcher, who described harm in terms of minor
physical discomfort and inconvenience, and denied that
overdiagnosis or false positives caused harm:
Women aren’t being harmed by breast screening and
society isn’t being harmed by breast screening. It’s … a
little mindset that has developed. (#13 consumer
advocate)
As with beneﬁts, we saw correlations between experts’
concepts of harm and ideas about levels of harm. Those
who viewed harm as overdiagnosis perceived harms as
more extensive than those who viewed harm as false
positives, overtreatment, or unpleasant experiences.
Respecting autonomy
Experts expressed differing versions of what respecting
autonomy means in breast screening. The dominant view
was that respecting autonomy is about providing compre-
hensive information to women who are offered breast
screening. A less common view, described by a smaller
number of experts, including all three consumer
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advocates, placed respecting autonomy as being about
the provision and promotion of breast screening, as this
enabled women to “ﬁnd out whether you have [a cancer]
or not” (#24 consumer advocate) early enough to enable
less aggressive treatments. For these experts, information
was less central to autonomy than the option/encourage-
ment to screen. They advocated limiting information in
order to avoid scaring women away.
Epistemological values
Most experts viewed the scientiﬁc evidence as the most
important source of knowledge about breast cancer
screening. There was a wide spread of ideas, however,
about what constitutes ‘good’ scientiﬁc evidence
(table 2), and this spread was evident across the subgroup
of epidemiologists and biostatisticians. For example,
some epidemiologists said it was important to consider all
studies, others preferred only top-quality studies, some
prioritised recent, local service studies, and there were
differing opinions about mathematical models. Several
experts emphasised their own studies when discussing
examples of evidence that they used and trusted.
A smaller number of experts described their lack of
understanding of the scientiﬁc evidence on breast
screening. Some explained that they still viewed this evi-
dence as important and relied on the interpretation of
trusted colleagues or opinion leaders. Others, including
two who openly stated that they did not trust the scien-
tiﬁc evidence, described additional or different sources
of knowledge (table 2) including: “intuitive interpret-
ation based on what has changed in breast screening
over 30 years … [and] common sense” (#23 surgeon).
We did not ﬁnd a clear pattern linking experts’ epis-
temological values and their overall opinion about
breast screening, and could not predict, from expressed
epistemological values, whether experts would be sup-
portive or critical of breast screening.
Experts’ awareness about different interpretations
Some experts were aware of variations in how values
were conceived, occasionally referring to an alternative
conception to their own, mainly in order to reject it.
Discussion of such differences was not common,
however, most experts expressed values implicitly rather
than explicitly, and did not explore alternative meanings
of the values they were using. This opens the possibility
that experts may sometimes be speaking at cross-
purposes about what is important in breast screening,
despite using similar terminology.
Conflicting values
Many experts described a perceived conﬂict between one
or more values in the breast-screening context. They saw
certain values as being in tension with each other, such
that respecting one value would necessarily entail sacri-
ﬁcing the other. Most experts who discussed conﬂicting
values described tensions between respecting autonomy
and delivering beneﬁt. These experts equated respecting
autonomy with providing information, and felt that pro-
viding information to consumers might reduce participa-
tion rates and, therefore, lower breast cancer mortality
and morbidity beneﬁts of screening. Some experts simply
described a spectrum of positions that one could take
regarding these conﬂicting values, such as ‘the con-
tinuum between individual autonomy and public health’
(#17 researcher NOS). Others openly favoured one value
over another, with implications for practice. Those who
prioritised delivering beneﬁts, for example, preferred to
limit breast-screening information in order to avoid frigh-
tening women away. Those who prioritised autonomy
were in favour of providing more comprehensive infor-
mation and encouraging informed choice.
A smaller number of experts discussed conﬂicting
values in terms of avoiding harms and delivering bene-
ﬁts. Their view about the relative importance of these
two values had practical implications for whether or not
they supported breast screening: those who prioritised
avoiding harm were less likely to support screening than
those who prioritised delivering beneﬁts. Experts’ con-
ceptions of harm were also important, however, and
box 1 describes several examples of ways in which the
combination of experts’ conception and prioritisation of
‘avoiding harm’ might affect their level of support for
breast screening.
As reported, experts rarely discussed alternative con-
ceptions of a particular value different to their own. By
contrast, experts frequently referred to alternative ways
other experts might prioritise values. Several experts
agreed that an important step towards resolving conﬂict
in breast screening was to seek consensus on which
values to prioritise.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that experts’ positions in breast screen-
ing are inﬂuenced by more than just the evidence50;
they are also inﬂuenced by a wide range of ethical and
epistemological values. We have demonstrated consider-
able variation in how experts conceive of individual
values, and how they prioritise certain values over
others. These differences, together with a lack of knowl-
edge about how one might, or whether one should,
engage in explicit values-based discussions, suggests a
vast potential for fundamental disagreement about
screening policies and programmes.
Disagreements in breast screening have persisted
despite multiple meta-analyses of the breast-screening
evidence, including the recent Independent Review led
by Marmot.14 This review made a vital contribution, pro-
viding a highly regarded consensus on quantiﬁcation of
mortality reduction and overdiagnosis. Its publication
was, however, immediately followed by disputes about
both the conclusions and their implications for policy
and practice.15 We noted earlier that differences of
opinion of this sort are often attributed to the correct-
ness or incorrectness of evidence interpretations,12 16 17
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but our ﬁndings suggest that evidence interpretations
may also be related to variations in epistemological
values. Other authors attribute disagreements to vested
interests.6 12 17–19 Although we did not explore experts’
ﬁnancial or commercial interests in this study, many par-
ticipants had direct clinical and/or research interests in
breast screening. Their familiarity with and trust in their
own work may have led them to ignore or discount evi-
dence that presented an alternative view. More signiﬁ-
cantly, our study suggests another, potentially more
subtle set of reasons to explain differing opinions:
experts may hold quite different values, or different ver-
sions of the same values. Even epidemiologically compe-
tent and non-conﬂicted experts may disagree about
breast cancer screening because of deep value commit-
ments. They may be working from very different under-
standings of what is good or bad about breast screening,
what its goals should be, and what matters.
Strengths and limitations
The strengths of this study are its empirical nature and
the completeness of its reach. This is, to the best of our
knowledge, the ﬁrst empirical ethics study with breast-
screening policymakers and practitioners. We were able
to interview a wide selection of key players in breast
screening in Australia, and so could provide a compre-
hensive picture of experts’ values and reasoning. Possible
limitations include the focus on Australia, as experts from
other jurisdictions may hold different values. However,
since the Australian programme shares much in terms of
rationale, purpose and implementation with counterpart
programmes in the UK and many European countries, it
seems likely that our results will be at least partially trans-
ferable. Note, that we were not seeking to demonstrate
the prevalence of particular values (which would require
a survey in a population-based sample), rather, we aimed
to capture the range and variety of values. By continuing
our sampling and analysis until we reached thematic sat-
uration we are conﬁdent that we have achieved this
aim.38 Finally, it is possible that experts who agreed to
take part were somehow different from those who did
not, however, we sought to minimise such potential bias
by ensuring that we interviewed experts from a range of
backgrounds and professed opinions about screening.
Implications for practice, policy and research
Our ﬁndings have strong implications for practice and
policy, as both the way experts conceive of values, and the
types of values they prioritise, directly inﬂuence the posi-
tions they take regarding breast screening. The current
situation where values are rarely explicitly considered or
discussed is not ideal. We do not presume that all experts
should adhere to one set of ‘correct’ public health values,
or even that such a thing exists. Rather we argue for a
closer, more explicit examination of the values underpin-
ning breast-screening service provision and policy by indi-
vidual experts, in expert decision-making bodies, and in
the public domain.51 52 Our ﬁndings highlight several
issues suitable for speciﬁc examination by breast-screening
decision-makers, the public and researchers (box 2).
If stakeholders are able to be more transparent about
values, this may enable people with seemingly divergent
positions to recognise points of agreement, or at least
improve their understanding of why others think the way
they do, helping to build bridges between opposing
viewpoints. It should also assist with the justiﬁcation of
breast-screening policy, and wider debate about concord-
ance or discordance between the values of inﬂuential
experts and the considered judgements of the commu-
nity.39 53 Empirical investigation of citizens’ values
regarding breast screening was beyond the scope of this
project, but is an important issue for future research.
Broad engagement regarding what is important to
experts and citizens (eg, by using a citizen’s jury
model32) could support the development of an explicit
framework of values to guide future decision-making on
breast screening.54 This would not be straightforward:
the plurality and apparent incommensurability of values
in communities is well recognised, such that it may be
best not to expect or force a consensus, but rather to
focus on the fairness of the decision-making process.55
Regardless, Weed56 reminds us that more engagement
with and knowledge about ethics and values has a ten-
dency to lead to more ethically appropriate decisions,
and that this is a worthy aim in provision of healthcare
and public health services.
Box 1 Conception of values and prioritisation of values
influences experts’ opinions on breast screening
The following three case study examples from the data illustrate
how experts’ conception and prioritisation of ‘avoiding harm’ can
influence their opinions on breast screening.
Expert A (#21 epidemiologist) saw breast-screening harm in
terms of overdiagnosis and considered these harms to be sub-
stantial. This expert saw both avoiding harms and delivering ben-
efits as being important, but because harms were, in their view,
so large, was not supportive of the breast-screening programme.
Expert B (#10 epidemiologist) saw breast-screening harms as
being limited to those inconveniences that women experienced as
a result of attending screening services: thus, they were seen as
very minor. Thus, although this expert believed strongly that
avoiding harms should take priority over delivering benefits in the
context of public health programmes in general, the harms from
breast screening were, in their view, so negligible they were
strongly supportive of breast screening.
Expert C (#9 oncologist) saw breast-screening harm in terms of
overdiagnosis. This expert was uncertain as to the level of over-
diagnosis harm: “you don’t know how much to worry about that”
but assumed it was, “probably lower that in some of the other
screening programs.” They thought delivering benefits should
take priority over avoiding harms: “[Some] professionals may put
a higher weight and value on ‘first do no harm’. It’s a point of
view. It’s not my point of view.” Their overall opinion was, like
Expert B but via a very different route, highly supportive of breast
screening.
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Engagement with values in breast screening—or any
other area of health intervention—cannot be a once-only
activity, as values change over time in expert and lay com-
munities. For example, since organised breast screening
began, consumer leaﬂets have become increasingly
detailed and information rich, reﬂecting the generally
increasing value given to promoting the autonomy of
healthcare consumers.57 Changes in epistemological
values have also occurred, including the introduction of
evidence-based medicine,58 changed thinking about
study quality,59 and the growing attention to impartial
reviews by independent experts.13 14 Growing evidence
about overdiagnosis has changed the way we think about
and prioritise the value of avoiding harm. Research about
values, and processes to incorporate values in policy
setting and decision-making, will need to evolve and con-
tinue to reﬂect this ongoing change. Debates around
ethical and epistemological values should sit alongside
the regular discussions of evidence, as part of ongoing
processes for planning the future of breast screening.
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APPENDIX 
Sample interview questions (note: this list is provided as a guide only; the questions were 
modified to suit the experience and perspective of the interviewee) 
x Can you tell me the story of your involvement in breast cancer screening, starting from 
when you first got involved and taking us up to the present?  
x Thinking back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, when breast screening was being 
introduced in Australia, did you have any particular views on it then? Have they 
changed? 
o Prompt for current views: I know you have written about breast cancer 
screening in… Can you expand on that? 
x Would you like to see any changes to the current program? 
o Prompt: What would your ideal program be?   
x What would it take to make such changes happen? 
o Prompt: who do you think should be making decisions about breast screening 
and what should that process look like? 
x There are many different ideas about breast cancer screening.  Can you comment on 
these?   
o Prompt: There are some who hold very extreme views about breast cancer 
screening.  How do you respond to these ideas?  What do you think drives those 
views?  
x (If the topic hasn’t yet surfaced) Recent studies suggest that some invasive cancers 
found at screening would never have come to clinical attention in that person’s lifetime; 
for example, Marmot and colleagues suggest that for every 1 life saved by breast 
screening there are 3 invasive cancers overdiagnosed. What are your thoughts on this 
issue? 
o Prompts: What level of overdiagnosis do you work with (eg is it – non-existent; 
exists but not a problem; a problem but not as great as the Marmot report 
suggests etc)? Should screening programs take responsibility for reducing 
overdiagnosis or should it be addressed elsewhere, for example, at the 
treatment stage? 
x Obviously you can’t read the future, but given your expertise and experience, what do 
you think will happen within the Australian breast screening program? 
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6.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter contains the following publication and additional online files:  
Parker LM, Rychetnik L, Carter S.  Framing overdiagnosis in breast screening: a 
qualitative study with Australian experts.  BMC Cancer. 2015;15(1):606. 
 
Available at: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2407/15/606 
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Framing overdiagnosis in breast screening:
a qualitative study with Australian experts
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Abstract
Background: The purpose of this study was to identify how the topic of overdiagnosis in breast cancer screening
is framed by experts and to clarify differences and similarities within these frames in terms of problems, causes,
values and solutions.
Methods: We used a qualitative methodology using interviews with breast screening experts across Australia and
applying framing theory to map and analyse their views about overdiagnosis. We interviewed 33 breast screening
experts who influence the public and/or policy makers via one or more of: public or academic commentary; senior
service management; government advisory bodies; professional committees; non-government/consumer
organisations. Experts were currently or previously working in breast screening in a variety of roles including clinical
practice, research, service provision and policy, consumer representation and advocacy.
Results: Each expert used one or more of six frames to conceptualise overdiagnosis in breast screening. Frames are
described as: Overdiagnosis is harming women; Stop squabbling in public; Don’t hide the problem from women;
We need to know the overdiagnosis rate; Balancing harms and benefits is a personal matter; and The problem is
overtreatment. Each frame contains a different but internally coherent account of what the problem is, the causes
and solutions, and a moral evaluation. Some of the frames are at least partly commensurable with each other;
others are strongly incommensurable.
Conclusions: Experts have very different ways of framing overdiagnosis in breast screening. This variation may
contribute to the ongoing controversy in this topic. The concept of experts using different frames when thinking
and talking about overdiagnosis might be a useful tool for those who are trying to negotiate the complexity of
expert disagreement in order to participate in decisions about screening.
Background
Overdiagnosis in breast screening has become a highly
contentious issue and source of strong disagreement
amongst experts. In this paper we use the term “overdi-
agnosis” to mean the diagnosis through mammographic
screening of an asymptomatic breast condition that is
non-progressive or so slowly progressive that it would
not otherwise have come to the patient’s attention in her
lifetime, and where this diagnosis provides no net benefit
to the patient [1]. The possibility of overdiagnosis in
breast screening was acknowledged from its early days
of use. The idea that breast screening might lead to the
detection of lesions that are “morphologically malignant
but clinically benign” was raised as early as the 1970s
([2], p490). Later it was also recognised that mammo-
graphic screening would uncover a significant number
of in-situ cancers, at least some of which “might not
have entered an invasive phase during their lifetime”
([3], p14) and would likely fall into the category of over-
diagnosis. Despite this, there was limited controversy
about overdiagnosis when breast screening programs
were being introduced in many Western countries dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s. This may have been partly be-
cause of poor outcomes from treatment of symptomatic
breast cancers and the evidence-based promise of a 30 %
reduction in population breast cancer mortality.
Since that time, however, the evidence-based estimates
of the mortality benefit from breast screening have been
revised and reduced [4, 5]. In addition, improvements in
* Correspondence: lisa.parker@sydney.edu.au
1Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine (VELiM), Sydney School of
Public Health, The University of Sydney, Medical Foundation Building, K 25
(92-94 Parramatta Road), Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Parker et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain
Dedication waiver(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
article, unless otherwise stated.
Parker et al. BMC Cancer  (2015) 15:606 
DOI 10.1186/s12885-015-1603-4
breast cancer treatment are likely to have further reduced
the potential impact of screening in the modern Western
setting [5, 6]. These developments have fostered a growing
interest amongst breast screening experts about the
significance of overdiagnosis, which is now a topic of
major international concern [7–9].
Researchers and clinicians present many different views
about overdiagnosis, and focus on different problems and
solutions, including: preventing overdiagnosis harm [10];
communicating with women about overdiagnosis [11–13];
and quantification of overdiagnosis [14–16]. There are
also big differences of opinion within these topics. Under-
standing how and why experts form their opinions about
this complex issue, and sometimes arise at opposing
views, would add to our understanding of the current pro-
cesses for early detection in breast cancer and assist those
who seek to contribute to mammography screening pol-
icy, as well as those participating in consumer decisions
about screening.
We conducted a detailed qualitative study of the views
and opinions of Australian breast screening experts on a
range of topics related to mammography screening. We
used a framing approach to map and analyse experts’
views on the issue of overdiagnosis. Framing describes
the particular mind-set through which a topic is under-
stood. The framing of an issue determines how the prob-
lem is conceived, what information is selected and the
value judgements that are made. Different frames in-
corporate different, apparently self-evident, strategies to
solve the perceived problem [17, 18]. Frames can be
used in politics or by institutions to convey a particular
message or point of view [19]. Frames are not only used
as deliberate tools: they are also used by individuals,
often unconsciously, as a way of thinking about and
making sense of a complex topic. Framing theory is par-
ticularly well-suited to the study of overdiagnosis be-
cause it allows for a detailed examination of different
viewpoints held, and used, by experts about this conten-
tious topic. We present our analysis of how experts
framed the topic of overdiagnosis in breast screening.
Our research questions were:
! How do Australian breast screening experts frame
overdiagnosis?
! How do those frames present the problems, causal
elements, value judgements and solutions relevant
to overdiagnosis?
Methods
This study is part of a larger Australian National Health
and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) funded project
examining ethical issues in cancer screening in Australia
[20]. One component of the larger project was a qualita-
tive study of contemporary issues in breast cancer
screening, using semi-structured interviews with influen-
tial breast screening experts. This paper is reporting on
one aspect of this breast screening study. We defined
“influential experts” as people working or researching in
breast screening who influence the public, primary care
practitioners and/or policy makers by engaging in one or
more of: media commentary; academic or lay publications
and presentations; senior service delivery management;
membership of government advisory bodies, professional
committees and/or non-government/consumer organisa-
tions related to breast screening. We sampled purposively
from this population, seeking to obtain a wide diversity of
views by inviting participants with a range of publicly
aired positions [21]. We reasoned that perspectives on
screening might be associated with professional back-
grounds so we ensured that we included experts with a
range of roles and responsibilities. See Table 1 for further
participant details.
We identified potential participants by scanning aca-
demic and lay literature on breast screening, examining
personnel lists on websites of government or non-
Table 1 Characteristics of experts
Participants 33 (Brackets contain number of experts who were invited
but did not-participate; 13)
Professional role* Clinicians^ 15 (3)
• Oncologists 3 (1)
• Surgeons 4 (0)
• Breast physicians 1 (2)
• Radiologists 2 (0)
• Radiation oncologists 2 (0)
• Pathologists 3 (0)
• Others [not otherwise specified; NOS)]
0 (1)
Non-clinical researchers 14 (3)
• Epidemiologists/biostatisticians 9 (1)
• Others [NOS] 5 (1)
Administrators/managers 6 (2)
Advocacy leaders 6 (7)
• Consumers working in advocacy 3 (6)
• Clinicians/researchers working in
advocacy 3 (1)
Public stance on breast
screening+
Supportive 16 (9)
Mostly supportive# 3 (1)
Critical 6 (0)
Unknown to researchers 8 (3)
*note that some experts held more than one professional role
^Most clinicians engaged in research to a greater or lesser extent
+We loosely categorised potential interviewees as being “supportive”, “mostly
supportive” or “critical” about breast screening based on publicly
available commentary
#Broadly supportive of breast screening but with selected concerns about one
or more elements of the program
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government advisory and advocacy bodies involved in
breast screening, and following up suggestions from
colleagues and participants. We used information in
the public domain to contact experts by email. Forty-
six experts were contacted, and 33 (17 male, 16 female)
participated in the study. Thirteen people either did not
wish to participate (3), did not respond (9) or were un-
able to participate in the time available (1). We had a
low response rate from senior community advocacy fig-
ures. Speculatively, this may have been due to a higher
turnover of staff in these (largely volunteer) positions
than in other professional roles. That is, the individuals
may no longer have been contactable at the email
addresses that we had access to. We continued sampling
until we had good representation of a range of profes-
sional roles and until we reached thematic saturation in
our analysis [22].
We used an interview format for in-depth exploration
of the views and reasoning of experts. LP conducted semi-
structured interviews from October 2012 to October
2013, meeting in the participant’s or her own workplace,
or talking over telephone if unable to meet in person. The
interviews lasted between 39 and 105 min (average
66 min) and there was no observed difference between
face to face and telephone interviews in terms of quality
or length [23]. At the beginning of each interview, LP dis-
cussed her interest in the topic with the expert, explaining
that she was a medical practitioner with clinical experi-
ence in breast screening, currently undertaking doctoral
studies in cancer-screening ethics. She clarified that the
purpose of the interviews was to glean the range of opin-
ions amongst Australian experts about breast screening.
The interviews drew loosely on a set of core questions de-
signed to draw out the participant’s views. We also sought
to tailor each interview to the particular expertise and in-
terests of the participants, and explored the leads and
topics that arose throughout the discussion [22, 24]. We
encouraged the participants to talk about overdiagnosis,
asking generally for interviewees’ views on this topic, with-
out pre-empting ideas about what might be considered
important. We only pursued particular lines of enquiry
about controversial elements – as informed by the litera-
ture – if this flowed on from preceding comments of the
participant. An additional file outlines sample interview
questions (see Additional file 1).
The interviews were taped, transcribed and de-
identified. We used an inductive analytic methodology,
developing a set of categories that captured the most
important views and values in the experts’ comments.
Each interview was read repeatedly and coded in detail
to capture views and values relevant to overdiagnosis.
The analysis was conducted as an iterative process com-
prising detailed coding of individual transcripts (LP) and
discussion and revision of the findings in group analysis
meetings (all authors). We used framing theory to organise
and understand different ways that experts thought about
overdiagnosis, identifying the dominant frames in use and
categorising important elements of each frame in terms of
problems, causes, solutions and moral evaluation [18].
Ethics approval was granted from the Cancer Institute
NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Com-
mittee [HREC/12/CIPHS/46] and the University of Sydney
Human Research Ethics Committee [#15245]. All partici-
pants gave individual consent to be interviewed, and were
free to withdraw from the study at any stage.
Results
We identified six frames that Australian breast screening
experts used with regard to overdiagnosis (Table 2).
Frame 1: overdiagnosis is harming women
“I would like to see breast cancer eradicated too but
not at the expense of … potentially treating them with
serious treatments for a condition that maybe didn’t
need to be found in the first place… To me, it’s all
about how do we run this program in a way that
minimises the harm … without losing the benefit.”
(Expert #33, clinician)
Experts who used this frame were passionate about
the topic of overdiagnosis in breast screening and saw
it as a major threat to the wellbeing of women. The
frame emphasised both quantity and quality of harm.
Harm quantity was described in terms of the high num-
ber of overdiagnosed cases compared to the number of
lives saved by screening. Harm quality was discussed by
highlighting the serious negative impact from each case of
overdiagnosis, including both the psychological impact of
a breast cancer diagnosis on a woman and her female
relatives (for whom it has perceived risk implications), and
the short and long term impact of unnecessary treatment
on lifestyle and physical health. This framing of overdiag-
nosis as a serious problem was grounded in a strong com-
mitment to avoiding harm in any public health program.
This frame encompassed two categories of solution.
Experts who were enthusiastic about the potential benefits
of screening suggested reducing overdiagnosis through a
targeted, personalised screening program, matching rec-
ommended screening frequency to breast cancer risk as
determined by factors such as breast density. This would
enable the population to simultaneously retain benefits of
screening and reduce harms. Experts who were more scep-
tical about the benefits accruing from breast screening
preferred a more extreme solution: reducing overdiagnosis
by decreasing overall breast screening participation. How-
ever, they assumed that cessation of public funding for the
program was politically unlikely, and promoted more
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realistic solutions such the removal of governmental pro-
motions and personalised screening invitations.
Frame 2: stop squabbling in public about overdiagnosis
“I feel that it’s unwarranted … when … the
[overdiagnosis] debate is mentioned in a way that it
might deter people from actually participating in
screening. I think that’s really counterproductive… The
debate should be managed in a way that it’s not
inadvertently discouraging screening.” (Expert #10,
consumer advocate)
This frame centres on the negative publicity generated
by overdiagnosis discussions and the decrease in breast
screening participation that might ensue. Underlying this
concern is a firm belief in the net benefit of breast
screening and a strong desire to have women avail them-
selves of life-saving opportunities. The frame delivers a
choice between life and overdiagnosis: “saving a life is
more important than the harm that’s caused in damaging
normal breasts.” (Expert #3, clinician). Experts using this
frame regarded overdiagnosis as a minor problem, for sev-
eral reasons. Firstly, and most commonly, it was seen as
an inevitable part of screening, particularly breast screen-
ing where cancer growth is variable and unpredictable.
Secondly, the number of overdiagnosed cases was consid-
ered low relative to the total number of breast cancers
picked up through the program. Finally, the harm associ-
ated with each overdiagnosed case was seen as low. This
was justified in several ways: 1) individual women could
not know whether or not their cancer was a case of over-
diagnosis; 2) women (allegedly) disregarded the concept of
overdiagnosis when considering treatment options; and 3)
treatment for small, low-grade cancers (ie those most
likely to be cases of overdiagnosis) was viewed as relatively
benign. In addition to the lack of harm, the frame
highlighted possible benefits from overdiagnosis. Al-
though, by definition, an overdiagnosed cancer will not it-
self threaten a woman’s life, experts suggested that as the
Table 2 Overdiagnosis frames adopted by Australian breast screening experts
Frame Defining the problem The reasons for the problem Value judgement Proposed or implied solution
1. Overdiagnosis is
harming women
Breast screening is resulting in
significant harm to women
because of overdiagnosis
The harms associated with
overdiagnosis are significant in
both quantity and quality
Breast screening programs
should pay more attention to
avoiding the serious harms of
overdiagnosis
Reduce overdiagnosis either by
performing targeted screening
or by reducing screening
overall
2. Stop
squabbling in
public about
overdiagnosis
The public discussion of
overdiagnosis is generating
negative publicity which may
reduce breast screening
participation & is therefore a
disservice to women
Exaggeration of harms in
public debates is causing
confusion amongst women
and threatening participation
rates.
Breast screening
commentators should give
priority to delivering health
benefits (saving lives)
Confine discussion about
overdiagnosis to academic
circles only, avoiding public
confusion
3. Don’t hide the
overdiagnosis
problem from
women
The breast screening program
is not facilitating informed
choice amongst women
There is a deliberate lack of
communication about
overdiagnosis from breast
screening providers because
of a desire to maximise breast
screening participation
Breast screening should give
absolute priority to
promoting autonomy via
informed choice
Fully inform women about
overdiagnosis
4. We need to
know the
overdiagnosis rate
It is not clear how much
overdiagnosis is present in
breast screening
There is huge variation in
overdiagnosis rates due to
different methodologies and/
or data sets; differences in the
way overdiagnosis figures are
presented hampers
interpretation by non-
epidemiologists
Overdiagnosis research
should be more rigorous,
robust and consistent
Commit to reaching a
consensus on appropriate
methodology & the way we
report the figures
5. Balancing
harms and
benefits is a
personal matter
It is not clear how to compare
the harms & benefits of breast
screening
It is impossible for experts to
definitively compare harms &
benefits because they are
qualitatively different
Breast screening decision
making should be guided by
a consumer-orientated
process, which takes into ac-
count public attitudes to
harms and benefits
Use deliberative methods to
inform policy decisions;
support individual consumers
to make personal decisions
about participation
6. The problem is
overtreatment
Breast screening is resulting in
overdiagnosis which leads to
overtreatment of some
women
Management of some women
with cancer is sometimes
unnecessarily aggressive
because we don’t know
enough about the natural
history of screen detected
lesions
While it is important that
screening continues to save
lives, we should seek ways to
reduce harms from
unnecessary (over) treatment
Ongoing education for
pathologists; renaming non-
invasive lesions; research into
prognostic biomarkers, targeted
treatments & less aggressive
management regimes; patient
centred care
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woman would be at increased risk of a second breast can-
cer she would benefit from being identified and treated
with tamoxifen.
In this frame, personal autonomy and informed
choice were important values in healthcare. However
experts rejected the idea that stopping ‘squabbling in
public’ might conflict with respecting womens’ auton-
omy. Their central concern was not so much that
overdiagnosis was mentioned, but that overdiagnosis
was invariably (mis) represented as an important
harm:
“Harm is a term that’s been developed by
academics, along academic lines… There’s a
possibility of over diagnosis … it’s not very much …
you shouldn’t call that harmful.” (Expert #17,
consumer advocate)
Some experts used this frame with the view that in-
formed choice was an unattainable goal, because overdi-
agnosis in breast screening is just so complex:
“There’s all this business of informed consent. Well,
frankly, I think it’s for the birds. I think it’s a very
difficult thing for people to have informed consent.
When people argue a lot, you know, people that are
informed, supposedly, argue, I don’t know how you
give informed consent. It’s very difficult for the
average layperson to understand.” (Expert #9,
clinician)
There was also moral condemnation of the particular
impact that negative publicity has upon disadvantaged
women. This group was presented as being particularly
likely to be confused by public debates, and vulnerable
to screening disengagement:
“There’s probably people in the [suburbs of lower
socioeconomic status] who stop going to screening.
Because they’re not as sophisticated … and they come
from non-English speaking backgrounds. The message
they get is that screening is not needed… It’s okay if
you’re in the [suburbs of higher socioeconomic status]
because you’ll keep coming anyway.” (Expert #29,
clinician)
In this frame, appropriate solutions focussed on pre-
venting a fall in participation rates. They included:
avoiding any implication that overdiagnosis is a harm;
keeping discussions confined to academic circles; and
informing women about overdiagnosis only when at-
tendance is secured (such as at the point of mammo-
gram or after diagnosis).
Frame 3: don’t hide the overdiagnosis problem from
women
“We should absolutely tell people, ‘These are the
benefits, these are the harms’; and some people say
that public health benefits should be what we are
aiming for, but for me I think you absolutely cannot
compromise on telling people. It’s just not something
I’m prepared to do.” (Expert #23, researcher NOS)
This frame centres on the lack of communication
about overdiagnosis from screening providers to women.
Experts acknowledged that while some women prefer a
simple advisory message about breast screening, others
want an informed decision making process, with the
readily available and easily-understood information. The
current lack of communication about overdiagnosis was
presented as a deliberate strategy by screening providers
to avoid risking a decline in participation. In this frame,
informed choice was an absolute right for individual
women, taking priority over the delivery of population
health benefits.
The solution was to make information about overdiag-
nosis available to women, despite the inherent complex-
ities in the topic and the tension with trying to encourage
participation:
“I agree with you that the experts can’t agree and how
do you talk to women about it, and it is a very
complex area and hard to talk about, but clearly an
important issue in the context of screening… I think
you have to share with women your uncertainty.”
(Expert #25, epidemiologist)
This frame accommodated a variety of solutions ranging
from detailed publicising of overdiagnosis information in
every screening pamphlet and advertisement, to making
detail of possible harms from screening available upon re-
quest. In this frame provision of information could co-
exist alongside government promotion of screening.
Frame 4: we need to know the overdiagnosis rate
“There is a recognition that there are tumours found
that are either frankly non-progressive or are likely to
progress so slowly they don’t matter. I don’t think too
many people would say, ‘Well that wouldn’t exist at
all’. The argument is over how much and the scale of
that.” (Expert #22, epidemiologist)
In this frame, the main problem was overdiagnosis
measurement and quantification. Experts spoke of overdi-
agnosis as being of indeterminate significance because of
uncertainty about the overdiagnosis rate. They saw the
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wide range of estimates as a central conundrum, possibly
explainable by different methodologies and variable data
sets. A subsidiary problem was the inconsistent presenta-
tion of overdiagnosis figures, variably portrayed as accept-
ably low by comparing with the (large) number of cancers
diagnosed, or as unacceptably high by comparing with the
(smaller) number of lives saved by screening. This made it
difficult to compare studies and understand the implica-
tions of overdiagnosis. In this frame sloppy research
methods aimed at generating quick or provocative publi-
cations were a particular problem, eliciting strong disap-
proval. The first step to solving this quantitative problem
would be to reach consensus on the most reliable and ro-
bust ways to calculate and present overdiagnosis.
Frame 5: balancing harms and benefits is a personal
matter
“Descriptively they’re quite different … I don’t think
there is any formula for the balance… It’s very
subjective of the balance of disparate outcomes.”
(Expert #20, clinician)
Through this frame, the problem was comparing harms
and benefits of breast screening. Experts discussed both
overdiagnosis harms and mortality benefits accruing from
breast screening. They suggested that while each are likely
to be important to women, current estimates about their
rates meant that harms and benefits were closely balanced;
in this situation, qualitative differences between the two
made it impossible for experts to draw exact conclusions
about where and when equipoise arose. In this frame, such
uncertainty required that the public should assist with de-
cision making. Experts explained that since individual atti-
tudes to harms and benefits would determine what was
perceived as the net outcome of screening, the process of
decision making needed consumer input: it was insuffi-
cient to rely on pre-determined program values or system
priorities. The frame encompassed two possible solutions.
Some experts discussed seeking public assistance with de-
cision making at the policy level, using a deliberative
process such as a citizens’ jury to make a ruling about the
balance between benefits and harms:
“I believe that for a lot of screening things there should
be a community jury. There are some things that are
obvious, that we can just proceed with them, but other
things where there’s a balance between the benefits
and harms, I think we need some sort of deliberative
democracy process.” (Expert #21, researcher NOS)
Others spoke of more explicit attempts to achieve in-
formed consumer decision making, encouraging women
to consider the net value of screening for themselves as
individuals. They suggested screening participation deci-
sions should be based on women’s personal priorities rather
than potentially coercive input from screening providers.
Frame 6: the problem is overtreatment
“I don’t really believe in overdiagnosis as such. I mean,
I think there’s over treatment … Finding it is not the
issue. Treating – how it’s treated is the issue, as I see
it.” (Expert #9, clinician and provider)
The final frame through which overdiagnosis was under-
stood purposefully separated the treatment process from
the screening process, and presented the problem as arising
from treatment decisions. Several causal elements for the
growing problem of overtreatment were presented: some
experts spoke of the increasing sensitivity of radiological
equipment, meaning that more and more lesions were
identified. Others noted that diagnostic criteria for certain
pathological entities were vague, and “not … easy to get
inter-observer agreement on.” (Expert #28, clinician) They
discussed resulting disagreements about the threshold for
atypia, with tendencies amongst some pathologists for
‘overcalling’ cancer so that benign changes were more likely
to be named and treated as borderline lesions. Finally,
experts commented on the limited research around natural
history and management guidelines for low-risk lesions.
Expert #28, (clinician) noted that, “a lot of those guidelines
are based on reviews of data which are not robust” and sug-
gested that they were instead driven by clinicians’ observer
bias and accepted by women with high levels of anxiety and
fear. Women with low-risk lesions were perceived as under-
going aggressive treatments while, “you really wonder
whether any of it was actually necessary.” (Expert #13,
clinician)
In this frame, both mortality benefit and harm avoid-
ance were valued. Thus appropriate solutions in this frame
maintained current screening parameters, and only altered
downstream elements. Experts presented a range of solu-
tions including: regular pathology updates on diagnostic
criteria and thresholds; research into better prognostic
tools (such as biological markers of aggression); develop-
ment of more targeted / less harmful therapies, research
into less aggressive treatment regimes for low-risk lesions;
and patient-centred care for women with borderline le-
sions, relying on correlation between clinical, radiological
and pathological findings to make a diagnosis and plan
the management, rather than following set guidelines.
How experts used frames
Each expert used between one and four frames. Some
experts employed two or more moderately incommen-
surable frames, and were often conscious of inherent
contradictions. For example Expert #7 (clinician) used
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both the “stop squabbling in public” and “stop hiding
the problem” frames, acknowledging the possible incon-
sistency of this position. However, none of the experts’
discussions combined frames that were strongly incom-
mensurable, for example, no experts used both the “over-
diagnosis is harming women” and the “stop squabbling in
public” frames. The “stop hiding the problem” frame was
the most commonly used, and was adopted by experts
working across all roles except consumer representation/
advocacy. All (three) consumers working in advocacy roles
used the “stop squabbling in public” frame.
There were observable patterns between experts’ overall
views on breast screening and their use of overdiagnosis
frames. All experts who were critical of breast screening
used the “don’t hide the problem” frame, and none of
them used the “stop squabbling in public” frame. Experts
who were supportive of breast screening used one or
other, but not both, of these frames (in approximately
equal numbers), and were the only group to use the “stop
squabbling in public” frame. Further detail on this is avail-
able in Additional file 2: Table S1-S2).
Discussion
It is recognised in the breast screening literature that
experts hold differing opinions about overdiagnosis, but
the basis for those differences has not been explored.
We identified six overdiagnosis frames in use by Australian
breast screening experts and analysed the elements of
each frame. There was considerable variation between
frames, in terms of: how overdiagnosis was problematised,
what information was highlighted as being relevant, what
values were prioritised as being important, and what solu-
tions were suggested. These multiple points of difference
explain much of the controversy and disagreement that
surrounds this important topic.
To our knowledge, there has been no detailed empir-
ical study on what and how breast screening experts
think about overdiagnosis. Some journals have presented
debates containing opposing arguments as a way of ex-
ploring some of the diversity within this topic [25, 26].
Others have published letters to the editor in response
to controversial elements within breast screening articles
[27]. Our work builds upon and extends the existing
literature, providing a comprehensive analysis of the
frames used to talk about and understand overdiagnosis
in breast screening. Previous research has suggested that
consumers are largely unaware about overdiagnosis [12],
but nevertheless an important avenue for future research
would be to investigate whether women have pre-existing
ideas and concerns about aspects of overdiagnosis that
have not been captured within the frames presented here.
An understanding of the elements within different
overdiagnosis frames will help those who work in, or
consider participating in breast screening [28, 29]. The
different frames may be a useful scaffold upon which to
generate thoughtful discussion amongst practitioners.
These frames also offer new tools for experts to clarify
their own positions and to understand the opinions of
others on overdiagnosis including views on whether and
how it is a problem, and what solutions might be appro-
priate. This may facilitate recognition of points of agree-
ment and form a basis for co-operative dialogue in the
best interests of consumers [19]. Policy makers are faced
with a baffling array of suggestions about what, if any-
thing, should be done with regard to breast screening
overdiagnosis. The experts who participated in this study
offered a range of solutions, focusing on different points
along the screening journey, including primary research,
evidence translation and presentation, communication with
consumers, screening practices, diagnostic practices, and
treatment. By viewing these solutions in connection with
the frame to which they belong, it becomes easier to see
why one solution might be preferred over another, and by
whom. Any management plan or policy is likely to need
multiple solutions, and incommensurability between some
frames will necessitate compromises and negotiations.
This study benefits from the open qualitative method-
ology, which allowed us to explore a topic about which
there was little pre-existing knowledge. We were able to
access the views and opinions from a range of influential
individuals and expert stakeholders from different parts
of Australia. Its strength lies in the depth of its enquiry
and its ability to capture the complexity of the evidence
base and value judgements underlying the range of dif-
ferent views. As with much qualitative work, we cannot
make any predictions about the prevalence or pattern of
our results within the wider population, and this may be
a useful avenue for future survey research. While this
study was limited to the Australian setting, much of the
developed world has organised breast screening pro-
grams, comparable values, and access to the same body
of scientific evidence, and thus the findings are likely to
be broadly applicable across these countries. It is pos-
sible that experts who participated in our study were
somehow different from those who were invited but did
not participate. We sought to minimise any bias of this
sort by ensuring that we interviewed experts with a
range of attitudes to screening, and a wide variety of
professional roles and experience.
Conclusions
Our results demonstrate that experts approach overdiag-
nosis in various ways, see a range of issues and values at
stake, and are inclined to promote different solutions.
This may be an important contributor to the ongoing
controversy in this topic, and offers a new explanation
for why some debates about overdiagnosis are so heated.
The concept of experts using different frames when
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thinking and talking about overdiagnosis might be a use-
ful tool for those who are engaged in the topic, assisting
with communication and facilitating better understand-
ing of others’ viewpoints.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Sample interview introduction and questions
(note: this list is provided as a guide only; the questions were
modified to suit the experience and perspective of the interviewee).
(DOC 30 kb)
Additional file 2: Table S1. Overdiagnosis frames used by experts
(organised according to main professional role). Table S2. Overdiagnosis
frames used by experts (organised according to attitude to breast
screening). (DOCX 35 kb)
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
LP initiated and performed the study, and prepared the first and subsequent
drafts of the paper. LR and SC assisted with study planning and data analysis
and made substantial contributions to draft revisions. All authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
LP: MBBS (Hons), MBioethics, PhD candidate
LR: MPH, PhD, Associate Professor (Translation Research)
SC: MPH (Hons), PdD, Associate Professor
Acknowledgements
The study was funded by the Australian National Health and Medical
Research Council (project grant 1023197). LP is supported by a National
Health and Medical Research Council PhD scholarship (1038517). SC is
supported by a National Health and Medical Research Council Career
Development Fellowship (1032963).
Author details
1Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine (VELiM), Sydney School of
Public Health, The University of Sydney, Medical Foundation Building, K 25
(92-94 Parramatta Road), Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. 2School of Medicine
Sydney, The University of Notre Dame, 160 Oxford St, Darlinghurst, NSW
2010, Australia.
Received: 26 November 2014 Accepted: 14 August 2015
References
1. Carter SM, Rogers W, Heath I, Degeling C, Doust J, Barratt A. The challenge
of overdiagnosis begins with its definition. BMJ. 2015;350:h869.
2. Fox MS. On the diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer. JAMA.
1979;241(5):489–94.
3. Forrest P. Breast cancer screening: report to the Health Ministers of England,
Wales, Scotland & Northern Ireland. London: Department of Health and
Social Security; 1986.
4. International Agency for Research on Cancer. IARC handbooks of cancer
prevention: breast cancer screening, vol.7. Lyon: IARC Press; 2002.
5. Marmot MG, Altman DG, Cameron DA, Dewar JA, Thompson SG, Wilcox M.
The benefits and harms of breast cancer screening: an independent review.
Br J Cancer. 2013;108(11):2205–40.
6. Bleyer A, Welch HG. Effect of three decades of screening mammography on
breast-cancer incidence. N Engl J Med. 2012;367(21):1998–2005.
7. Moynihan R, Heneghan C, Godlee F. Too much medicine: from evidence to
action. BMJ. 2013;347:f7141.
8. Elmore JG, Fletcher SW. Overdiagnosis in breast cancer screening: time to
tackle an underappreciated harm. Ann Intern Med. 2012;156(7):536–7.
9. Esserman LJ, Thompson IM, Reid B, Nelson P, Ransohoff DF, Welch HG, et al.
Addressing overdiagnosis and overtreatment in cancer: a prescription for
change. Lancet Oncol. 2014;15(6):e234–42.
10. Welch HG, Black WC. Overdiagnosis in cancer. J Natl Cancer Inst.
2010;102(9):605–13.
11. Entwistle VA, Carter SM, Trevena L, Flitcroft K, Irwig L, McCaffery K, et al.
Communicating about screening. BMJ. 2008;337:a1591.
12. Hersch J, Jansen J, Barratt A, Irwig L, Houssami N, Howard K, et al. Women’s
views on overdiagnosis in breast cancer screening: a qualitative study. BMJ.
2013;346:f158.
13. Waller J, Whitaker KL, Winstanley K, Power E, Wardle J. A survey study of
women’s responses to information about overdiagnosis in breast cancer
screening in Britain. Br J Cancer. 2014;111(9):1831–5.
14. Jorgensen KJ, Gotzsche PC. Overdiagnosis in publicly organised
mammography screening programmes: systematic review of incidence
trends. BMJ. 2009;339:b2587.
15. Duffy SW, Tabar L, Olsen AH, Vitak B, Allgood PC, Chen THH, et al. Absolute
numbers of lives saved and overdiagnosis in breast cancer screening, from
a randomized trial and from the Breast Screening Programme in England. J
Med Screen. 2010;17:25–30.
16. Zahl PH, Jorgensen KJ, Gotzsche PC. Overestimated lead times in cancer
screening has led to substantial underestimation of overdiagnosis. Br J
Cancer. 2013;109(7):2014–9.
17. Goffman E. Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience. New
York: Harper & Row; 1974.
18. Entman RM. Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. J
Commun. 1993;43(4):51–8.
19. Ryan C. Prime time activism: media strategies for grassroots organizing.
Boston, MA: South End Press; 1991.
20. Cancer Screening Ethics. 2014. http://cancerscreeningethics.org. Accessed
28 May 2015.
21. Miles MB, Huberman AM. Qualitative data analysis: an expanded
sourcebook. 2nd ed. Claifornia: SAGE Publications; 1994.
22. Mason J. Qualitative researching. 2nd ed. London: SAGE Publications; 2002.
23. Sturges J, Hanrahan K. Comparing telephone and face-to-face qualitative
interviewing: a research note. Qual Res. 2004;4(1):107–18.
24. Charmaz K. Constructing grounded theory: a practical guide through
qualitative analysis. London: SAGE Publications; 2006.
25. Bell RJ, Burton RC. Do the benefits of screening mammography outweigh
the harms of overdiagnosis and unnecessary treatment?–no. Med J Aust.
2012;196(1):17.
26. Roder DM, Olver IN. Do the benefits of screening mammography outweigh
the harms of overdiagnosis and unnecessary treatment?–yes. Med J Aust.
2012;196(1):16.
27. Lancet T. The benefits and harms of breast screening: letters to the editor.
Lancet. 2013;381(9869):799–803.
28. Baines CJ. Are there downsides to mammography screening? Breast J.
2005;11 Suppl 1:S7–10.
29. Autier P, Esserman L, Flowers C, Houssami N. Breast cancer screening: the
questions answered. Nat Rev Clin Oncol. 2012;9(10):599–605.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Parker et al. BMC Cancer  (2015) 15:606 Page 8 of 8
Chapter 6: Overdiagnosis in breast cancer screening 
 
Additional file 1: Sample interview introduction and questions 
Note: this list is provided as a guide only; the questions were modified to suit the experience 
and perspective of the interviewee. 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. As you know, there has been quite a lot 
written in the literature and in the media about breast screening and what the program should 
look like.  Plenty of people are happy with things the way they are, but others are not.  So I’m 
interested in exploring that range of opinion, particularly amongst people who work in the 
field, including those who work in clinical practice, research, administration, or in breast 
cancer advocacy. 
 
• Can you describe the scope of your professional activities that involve breast screening, 
to give me an idea about your involvement in the program? 
 
• Would you like to see any changes to the current program? 
o Prompt: What would your ideal program be? 
 
• There are many different ideas about breast cancer screening.  Can you comment on 
these?   
o Prompt: There are some who hold very extreme views about breast cancer 
screening.  How do you respond to these ideas?  What do you think drives those 
views? 
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• (If the topic hasn’t yet surfaced) Recent studies suggest that some cancers found at 
screening would never have come to clinical attention in that person’s lifetime; for 
example, Marmot and colleagues suggest that for every 1 life saved by breast screening 
there are 3 cancers overdiagnosed. What are your thoughts on this issue? 
o Prompt: e.g. is it – non-existent; existing but not a problem; a problem 
• (if appropriate to expert’s views) What level of overdiagnosis do you work with? 
• (if considered a problem) Should screening programs take any responsibility for 
reducing overdiagnosis? e.g. should we tailor the program to minimize overdiagnosis? 
• (if expert talks about the development of biomarkers or other prognostic tools as a 
way of addressing concerns about overdiagnosis) What should we do in the 
meantime? 
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Additional file 2: Tables 3 & 4  
Table 6.3 Overdiagnosis frames used by experts (organised by main professional role) 
 
Expert 
profession# 
Frame 1: 
Overdiagnosis 
is harming 
women 
Frame 2: 
Stop 
squabbling in 
public about 
overdiagnosis 
Frame 3: 
Don't hide 
the 
overdiagnosis 
problem 
from women 
Frame 4: We 
need to know 
the 
overdiagnosis 
rate 
Frame 5: 
Balancing 
harms & 
benefits is 
personal 
Frame 6: The 
problem is 
overtreatment 
clinician     x       
clinician     x       
clinician     x x   x 
clinician     x       
clinician     x       
clinician     x     x 
clinician x   x       
clinician           x 
clinician       x x   
clinician     x       
clinician     x       
clinician     x       
clinician     x       
clinician   x         
clinician   x       x 
epidemiologist* x   x x   x 
epidemiologist     x   x   
epidemiologist     x x     
epidemiologist x   x       
epidemiologist     x x     
epidemiologist     x       
epidemiologist       x     
epidemiologist   x         
researcher^ x   x   x   
researcher             
researcher     x       
researcher             
researcher   x         
advocate#   x         
advocate   x         
advocate   x       x 
administrator   x         
administrator     x       
NOTE: #Experts who held more than one professional role are classified under their main role. *This category 
includes epidemiologists and biostatisticians. ^This category includes all non-clinical researchers who are 
neither epidemiologists nor biostatisticians. #Clinicians and researchers who worked in advocacy are categorised 
under their main role. 
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Table 6.4 Overdiagnosis frames used by experts (organised according to attitude to 
breast screening) 
 
Expert’s 
public 
position 
on breast 
screening 
Frame 1: 
Overdiagnosis 
is harming 
women 
Frame 2: 
Stop 
squabbling in 
public about 
overdiagnosis 
Frame 3: 
Don't hide 
the 
overdiagnosis 
problem 
from women 
Frame 4: We 
need to know 
the 
overdiagnosis 
rate 
Frame 5: 
Balancing 
harms 
and 
benefits is 
personal 
Frame 6: The 
problem is 
overtreatment 
supportive     x       
supportive   x         
supportive   x         
supportive   x         
supportive   x       x 
supportive   x         
supportive     x x     
supportive     x       
supportive     x       
supportive       x x   
supportive     x   x   
supportive     x       
supportive     x       
supportive     x       
supportive   x         
supportive   x       x 
mostly
supportive
 
    x       
mostly
supportive     x x   x 
mostly
supportive     x       
critical x   x       
critical x   x   x   
critical     x x     
critical x   x       
critical x   x x   x 
unknown     x       
unknown     x     x 
unknown           x 
unknown       x     
unknown             
unknown     x       
unknown             
unknown   x         
unknown     x       NOTE: mostly supportive = broadly supportive of breast screening but with selected concerns about one or more elements of the program.
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7.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter contains the following publication and additional online files:  
Parker LM, Rychetnik L, Carter SM. The role of communication in breast cancer 
screening: a qualitative study with Australian experts. BMC Cancer. 2015;15(1):741. 
 
Available at: http://bmccancer.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12885-015-1749-0 
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Abstract
Background: One well-accepted strategy for optimising outcomes in mammographic breast cancer screening is to
improve communication with women about screening. It is not always clear, however, what it is that communication
should be expected to achieve, and why or how this is so. We investigated Australian experts’ opinions on breast
screening communication. Our research questions were: 1 What are the views of Australian experts about
communicating with consumers on breast screening? 2 How do experts reason about this topic?
Methods: We used a qualitative methodology, interviewing 33 breast screening experts across Australia with
recognisable influence in the Australian mammographic breast cancer screening setting. We used purposive and
theoretical sampling to identify experts from different professional roles (including clinicians, program managers,
policy makers, advocates and researchers) with a range of opinions about communication in breast screening.
Results: Experts discussed the topic of communication with consumers by focusing on two main questions: how
strongly to guide consumers’ breast cancer screening choices, and what to communicate about overdiagnosis. Each
expert adopted one of three approaches to consumer communication depending on their views about these topics.
We labelled these approaches: Be screened; Be screened and here’s why; Screening is available please consider
whether it’s right for you. There was a similar level of support for all three approaches. Experts’ reasoning was
grounded in how they conceived of and prioritised their underlying values including: delivering benefits, avoiding
harms, delivering more benefits than harms, respecting autonomy and transparency.
Conclusions: There is disagreement between experts regarding communication with breast screening consumers.
Our study provides some insights into this persisting lack of consensus, highlighting the different meanings that
experts give to values, and different ways that values are prioritised. We suggest that explicit discussion about
ethical values might help to focus thinking, clarify concepts and promote consensus in policy around communication
with consumers. More specifically, we suggest that decision-makers who are considering policy on screening
communication should begin with identifying and agreeing on the specific values to be prioritised and use this to
guide them in establishing what the communication aims will be and which communication strategy will achieve
those aims.
Keywords: Breast cancer, Mass screening, Communication, Decision making, Ethics, Qualitative research,
Mammography
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Background
Mammographic breast screening opportunities and pro-
grams have been introduced in many high-income
countries over the past three decades [1–3], with the
expectation of achieving significant population breast
cancer mortality reduction. This outcome was suggested
by evidence from early randomised control trials (RCTs)
and cohort studies [1, 2] and later backed up by further
studies and multi-study reviews [4, 5]. In Australia the
government provides free biennial screening mammog-
raphy for all women over 40 years of age through its na-
tional program BreastScreen Australia [6]. The government
actively encourages the regular participation of women
aged 50–74 years, with promotional communications fo-
cusing on this target age range [7]. An important focus of
breast screening research has been how to communicate
effectively with women in order to achieve high screening
participation rates and realise the mortality benefits de-
scribed in the literature [8].
At the same time there has been growing interest in
encouraging and supporting members of the public to
be more informed about health matters, including
screening, and more engaged in decisions about their
own healthcare [9–13]. This is partly underpinned by a
desire to respect the autonomy of patients and health-
care consumers [14–16] and partly for reasons such as
engendering greater public satisfaction, more efficient
use of healthcare services and possibly even better health
outcomes for individuals and communities [17–19].
More recently, uncertainties about both benefits and
harms of breast screening have emerged. The benefits
may be less than first anticipated from the early studies.
Meta-analyses of what is by now a substantial body of
RCT evidence on mammographic breast screening pro-
vide different estimates of benefit, depending on which
of the RCTs are considered to be of sufficiently high
quality to include in the review [20, 21]. There are also
suggestions that the RCT evidence may be out of date,
with recent improvements in breast cancer treatment to-
gether with increased awareness about prompt symp-
tomatic presentation leaving less room for screening to
have a beneficial effect [22, 23]. At the same time, a
growing body of research is contributing to concern
about harms associated with breast screening, including
cumulative false positive tests [22] and overdiagnosis
(the diagnosis of non-progressive or slowly progressive
breast cancer through screening, a diagnosis that does
not produce a net benefit for the woman diagnosed)
[24–27]. The amount and significance of overdiagnosis
harm is particularly contentious [23]. There is concern
about whether or not hearing about these uncertainties
and harms will deter women from screening, and in-
deed recent RCT evidence does suggest that women
who are more informed about overdiagnosis express a
lower intention to screen [28]. A perceived tension
has thus arisen between the aim of achieving high
breast screening participation rates and the aim of
enabling women to make informed choices about
screening, with debate about whether communication
with consumers should focus on maximising partici-
pation or on communicating to support citizen’s
knowledge and autonomy [29].
Official government policy endorses shared decision
making to achieve informed choice in healthcare gener-
ally and in screening more specifically [30, 31]. Many
claim that informed choice is particularly pertinent to
screening because it actively targets healthy people ra-
ther than sick people who are seeking help for symp-
toms. Others highlight the importance of informed
choice in those screening programs for which evidence
about outcomes is insufficient or controversial, or where
benefits and harms are finely balanced such that individ-
ual values become relatively more important in guiding
decisions about being screened [32, 33]. There have been
concerns that government directives to facilitate in-
formed choice are not being adequately followed within
breast screening [29, 34–36], with international criticism
of breast screening information pamphlets on the
grounds that they withhold important information about
possible harms of breast screening [37–40], and sugges-
tions that consumers should be explicitly encouraged to
make their own choice whether or not to attend screen-
ing [36, 41, 42]. Not all authors prioritise the target of
achieving informed consumer choice in cancer screen-
ing. Some prefer to focus on achieving adequate uptake
in order to realise screening benefits [43]. Others have
concerns about the process or reasoning behind such a
target. For example, some writers suggest that it may be
unreasonable to expect even fully informed citizens to
take on what they depict as the burdensome task of
decision making for cancer screening: weighing up
uncertain benefits and harms, about which experts dis-
agree [44]. Others contend that requiring or encouraging
informed citizen decision making about cancer screening
may be unecessary since, arguably, justification for it
may rely on an inapporpriately narrow version of auton-
omy [45]. According to this view, a respectful approach
should accommodate citizens who wish to rely on others
to guide or choose for them. Finally, some argue that
providing citizens with enough information to make
fully informed screening choices may be prohibitively
time consuming [46].
It is well-recognised that there are differences of opin-
ion amongst clinicians regarding the involvement of
patients in decision making for clinical care [47] and it
is known that there are differences in how frequently or
enthusiastically primary care practitioners discuss mam-
mographic breast screening with their patients [48–50].
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The ongoing discussions in the academic literature about
the aims and content of breast screening communication
suggests there is also likely to be diversity of expert opin-
ion about policies for consumer decision making in rela-
tion to breast screening [29]. We could find no empirical
work that examined this topic and to fill this gap we inves-
tigated the opinions and priorities of influential Australian
experts with respect to breast screening communication
with consumers. Our research questions were:
! What are the views of Australian experts about what
and how we should communicate with consumers
about breast screening?
! How do experts reason about this topic and how
does this explain the positions they take?
Methods
Methodology
Our study was part of a larger project exploring the social
and ethical issues around cancer screening in Australia
[51]. Data collection from experts in breast screening was
undertaken as a sub-study in the project, and this paper
reports on one component of the sub-study. Other com-
ponents of the sub-study involving analysis of different
aspects of the data set have been written up separately
[52]. We used an empirical, qualitative methodology. The
emerging research field of “empirical bioethics” uses em-
pirical research methods alongside traditional theoretical
ethics in the context of healthcare and other biological
sciences. Empirical methods are used to study and de-
scribe an ethical issue; theory is used to varying degrees by
different researchers to shape the empirical study and
inform interpretation and discussion of findings. We situ-
ate ourselves close to the style of Frith [53], who combines
empirical and theoretical ethics in a symbiotic relation-
ship, arguing that each can and should, inform eachother
[54]. We used sampling, data collection and analysis strat-
egies that were best suited to the particular circumstances
and aims of our project, and enabled us to conduct our
study with internal coherence [55–58].
Participants and sampling
We sought to include influential breast screening ex-
perts from within Australia as participants. We defined
influential experts as people with experience of working
in a field directly related to breast screening in Australia
and who had influence through one or more of: senior
service delivery; academic or lay publication; member-
ship of government or professional advisory committee;
senior position in non-government breast screening or-
ganisation or consumer group. We sought to maximise
the diversity of perspectives amongst our participants by
deliberately seeking experts known to have publically
expressed divergent opinions about breast screening
(loosely categorised by us as being “supportive”, “mostly
supportive” or “critical”) and experts from a range of
professional roles across Australia including clinical
practice, research, program administration, advisory staff
and consumer advocacy.
We identified potential participants by reading local aca-
demic and lay literature; scanning personnel lists on web-
sites of government and non-government organisations;
and following up on suggestions from previously inter-
viewed experts and from colleagues involved in cancer
screening research. We approached 46 experts via email
and interviewed 33 (17 males, 16 females). The remainder
were unavailable (1), unwilling (3) or did not respond (9).
We had a particularly low response rate from volunteers
in consumer advocacy roles, which may have been at least
partly due to a higher turnover of people in these posi-
tions than in other professional roles – that is, they may
no longer have been acting in a senior advocacy capacity
when our email was sent.
We performed our analysis in parallel with data collec-
tion, and used the information in the early interviews to
direct further sampling, aiming to capture and explore
the range of different ideas about this topic. We contin-
ued sampling until we were satisfied that we had suffi-
cient diversity of opinions and roles [58] (Table 1) and
until we were no longer hearing any new information.
(thematic saturation) [54, 57].
Data collection
LP conducted semi structured interviews between October
2012 and October 2013. The interviews lasted an average
of 66 min (range 39–105 min) and were conducted in the
expert’s or in LP’s workplace, or by telephone if unavailable
to meet in person. Making use of telephone inter-
views enabled us to speak with experts from disparate
locations around the country and we found that tele-
phone interviews were similar in quality and length
to face-to-face interviews [59].
LP discussed her interest in the topic with experts,
explaining that she was a medical practitioner with clin-
ical experience in breast screening, currently undertak-
ing doctoral studies in cancer-screening ethics. She
informed participants that the purpose of the interviews
was to glean the range of opinions amongst Australian
experts about breast screening. They were asked about
their general attitudes to the current program, their sug-
gestions and hopes for the future of the program, and
their opinions on communicating with consumers (Add-
itional file 1). The interviews were digitally recorded,
professionally transcribed and any identifying informa-
tion (such as person or place names) that was articulated
during the discussion was removed from the transcripts
before analysis began.
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Analysis
Analysis involved iterative reading, coding and categor-
isation of interview data. We sought to identify and
understand the range of attitudes and underlying values
that experts expressed around the topic of consumer
communication. Repeated reading was undertaken in
conjunction with the generation of a set of codes that
captured attitudes and values, and the development of
more abstract categories, that evolved as data collection
and analysis progressed. LP wrote case-based memos
throughout the project and shared these and provisional
analysis with the other authors [58]. All authors contrib-
uted to ongoing analysis, involving comparison between
codes and data, revision of findings and development of
concepts presented in this paper.
Ethics approval
Ethics approval was granted from the Cancer Institute
NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics
Committee [HREC/12/CIPHS/46] and the University of
Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee [#15245].
All participants gave written or verbal informed consent
to their involvement in the study (those who were inter-
viewed face to face gave verbal consent; those who were
interviewed via telephone gave verbal consent). This
research complies with current Australian laws and
guidelines.
Results
Expert opinions on communicating with consumers
Experts spoke in detail about communicating with con-
sumers regarding breast screening. Their comments
focused on two issues: 1) the degree of guidance for con-
sumers, and 2) the extent of information provided to
consumers about overdiagnosis. Table 2 shows how ex-
perts’ views on communication could be divided into
three approaches according to the interaction between
these two issues (guidance and overdiagnosis informa-
tion). The first approach, which we have named “Be
screened”, combined guiding consumers towards screen-
ing with limited information on overdiagnosis. The sec-
ond approach, “Be screened and here’s why”, combined
guiding consumers towards screening with full con-
sumer information. The third approach, “Screening is
available, please consider whether it’s right for you”
combined no guidance about screening with full con-
sumer information. We found a similar level of expert
support for each of the three approaches. Logically there
could potentially have been a fourth approach (no guid-
ance and limited information – see Table 2) but there
were no experts who advocated for this position. All
experts were in favour of either guidance or full infor-
mation or both; there were no experts who would rec-
ommend no guidance and no means for consumers to
make an informed choice of their own.
Overall more experts preferred guiding women to be
screened, and overall more experts preferred that full
information be provided. Examining Table 2, and recalling
that there were approximately the same number of experts
in each cell, reveals why. Two out of three approaches
(“Be screened” and “Be screened and here’s why”) sup-
ported guidance to screen. Two out of three approaches
(“Be screened and here’s why” and “Screening is available”)
supported the provision of full information on overdiag-
nosis. Thus providing guidance, and providing full infor-
mation, were preferred to the alternatives.
Expert descriptions of what it means to guide consumers
to be screened, or not
The detail in Table 2 describes experts’ ideas of what it
means to guide consumers to be screened, or not. The
majority argued that consumer communication should
include guidance towards screening. They endorsed the
existing strategy whereby the screening provider is the
main source of guidance. They also approved of current
participation targets for screening units, suggesting they
Table 1 Characteristics of experts
Participants 33 (Experts who were invited but did
not-participate 13)
Professional rolea Cliniciansb15 (3) Oncologists 3 (1)
Surgeons 4 (0)
Breast physicians 1 (2)
Radiologists 2 (0)
Radiation oncologists 2 (0)
Pathologists 3 (0)
Other 0 (1)
Non-clinical
researchers 14 (3)
Epidemiologists/
biostatisticians 9 (1)
Other 5 (1)
Administrators/
managers 6 (2)
6 (2)
Advocacy leaders
6 (7)
Consumers working in
advocacy 3 (6)
Clinicians/researchers
working in advocacy 3 (1)
Public stance on
breast screeningc
Supportive 16 (9)
Mostly supportived 3 (1)
Critical 6 (0)
Unknown to researchers 8 (3)
anote that some experts held more than one professional role, for this reason
the numbers attached to specific professional roles do not neatly add up to
n = 33 (participants) or n = 13 (experts invited but not participating)
bmost clinicians engaged in research to a greater or lesser extent
cWe loosely categorised potential interviewees as being “supportive”, “mostly
supportive” or “critical” about breast screening based on publicly
available commentary
dbroadly supportive of breast screening but with selected concerns about one
or more elements of the program
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were a useful tool for developing and maintaining a suc-
cessful guidance strategy. Several experts advocated extend-
ing and enhancing consumer guidance by providing greater
marketing support to local screening units, along with edu-
cation and reminders for primary care practitioners to take
a more active role in promoting breast screening.
A smaller number of experts recommended against guid-
ing women to participate in screening (Table 2). These ex-
perts suggested that consumers be educated about the
availability of screening, encouraged to understand benefits
and harms, then asked to carefully consider whether or not
the program was right for them. They recommended that
communications with consumers be written by an independ-
ent body, suggesting that providers were likely to view and/
or present screening in a favourable light. These experts were
in favour of replacing participation targets with targets
around information provision or public understanding of
screening. They opposed personalised letters of invitation,
suggesting that these carried the weight of government sup-
port and would therefore be seen by women as persuasive,
even coercive. A couple of experts explicitly suggested that
women should be given assistance with decision making, dis-
cussing strategies such as online decision making tools and
primary care practitioner support in understanding the evi-
dence and making choices in accordance with consumers’
personal values. They suggested that guidance about screen-
ing could be made available for those who wanted it.
Expert descriptions of what it means to inform consumers
about overdiagnosis, or not
Experts described two approaches to information about
overdiagnosis (Table 2). The majority of experts thought
that information about overdiagnosis should be limited.
These experts thought consumer communications should
impart simple, uncomplicated information about screen-
ing benefit, with limited detail on possible downsides.
They suggested overdiagnosis information should be pre-
sented briefly along the lines of, “some of the things that
we are going to be treating you for may not progress.”
(Expert #33, clinician and provider) These experts pro-
posed that further information could be made available
for those who wanted it. Contrary to this position, a
smaller group of experts advocated full information about
both benefits and harms of breast screening. They particu-
larly wanted consumers to be provided with understandable
data about overdiagnosis, including readily comparable
information on chances of mortality benefit versus
overdiagnosis.
Experts’ reasoning about their preferred communication
approach
Experts gave a variety of reasons to explain their positions
on communicating with consumers. Table 3 presents the
range of reasons for experts’ preferred approaches to breast
screening communications. Further data, including quota-
tions from experts that encapsulates the range of reasoning
about communications, is included in Additional file 2. The
major concerns of experts are discussed below.
Experts’ reasoning about guidance to attend screening
Experts who preferred guidance for consumers were par-
ticularly concerned to maximise screening participation
rates in order to deliver breast cancer related benefits to
individuals and populations. Many also reasoned that
Table 2 Experts’ preferences regarding guidance and information when communicating with women about breast cancer
screening
Guidancea No guidanceb
Limited informationc “BE SCREENED”e N/A
Full informationd “BE SCREENED AND HERE’S WHY”e “SCREENING IS AVAILABLE, PLEASE CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS RIGHT FOR YOU”e
aGuidance: Experts who preferred guiding women to screen advocated for the following:
• Provider-to-consumer guidance to screen via public promotional advertising & personalised letters of invitation to women from the screening program
• Marketing support & participation targets for local breast screening units to ensure guidance is effective at maintaining high participation
• Educational support & electronic reminders to enhance GP-to-consumer guidance to screen
bNo guidance: Experts who preferred not to guide women’s screening choices advocated for the following:
• An independent body to provide information to women about screening options & encourage them to make a thoughtful choice about participation
• Online decision aid tools available to consumers
• No personalised invitations
• Targets for consumer understanding rather than participation
• Educational support to enhance GP assistance for women to make an informed screening choice
• Directed advice available from GP upon request
cLimited information: Experts who preferred limiting the overdiagnosis information presented to women advocated for the following content in consumer
communications:
• Information that breast screening saves lives
• Information that a recall does not necessarily mean you have cancer
• Brief mention that overdiagnosis is a possibility and that it is unlikely
• Advising that further information is available to women upon request
dFull information: Experts who preferred providing full information to women advocated for the following content in consumer communications:
• Detailed information about mortality benefit, false positives & overdiagnosis associated with breast screening
• Numerical / pictorial comparison of chances of deriving benefit & being overdiagnosed
eThere were roughly equal numbers of experts supporting each of the three named approaches
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guidance was important because benefits of screening
outweighed harms. Some experts added to this by assert-
ing that overdiagnosis was not a harm, rather that the
diagnosis of small cancers was exactly what the screen-
ing program was intended to do in order to reduce
breast cancer mortality and morbidity. Experts also
argued beyond the breast screening context, suggesting
that providing advice and guidance on health matters
were important public health responsibilities.
Experts who advocated against guidance were worried
about overdiagnosis harms and were enthusiastic about
enabling individual consumers to make their own decisions
about health. They suggested that independent consumer
decision making was particularly important in breast
screening because of the close balance between benefits
and harms, and what experts saw as the individual nature
of the benefits. These experts suggested that, unlike some
other public health programs, there was no community
benefit associated with individual participation in breast
screening: “there is a community benefit from immunisa-
tion, but there’s no such community benefit from screening.
Like, the benefit is to the individual,” (expert #8, researcher)
because, “if I choose not to go, the only person that’s being
harmed by my choice is me. I’m not giving the person next
door to me breast cancer.” (Expert #27, researcher). They
also expressed concerns that breast screening enthusiasts
might not necessarily act in the best interests of individual
consumers. For example, these experts suggested that
governments might be driven by the promise of political
gain from addressing women’s health, and that providers
and clinicians may have vested interests in their own
employment security and remuneration.
Both groups referred to evidence-based decision mak-
ing to justify their positions about guidance. Those pre-
ferring guidance suggested that individual consumers
would be unable to understand the complex evidence
and should therefore be provided with advice from ex-
perts about where the balance of benefits and harms lies.
Those against guidance suggested that consumers, rather
than experts, were better placed to use the evidence
appropriately, since experts tended to ignore the harms
and focus on the benefits. One expert advocated against
guidance on the basis that, as they saw it, the evidence
showed breast screening was likely to deliver more
population harms than benefits. They believed that ad-
vising against screening was politically unacceptable, so
removing guidance to screen was the next best option.
Experts’ reasoning about providing information on
overdiagnosis
Experts who expressed a preference for limiting informa-
tion to consumers were mainly concerned about the po-
tential impact of discussing overdiagnosis. They suggested
that detailed information about overdiagnosis may result
Table 3 Experts’ rationales for their stance on guidance and
information provision to women regarding breast screening
Guiding women towards breast screening
FOR
● Maximises screening participationa
● Saves livesa
● Women will have more treatment optionsa
● Overall, screening delivers more benefits than harms to the populationa
● Overdiagnosis is not a harm
● Providing guidance about good health is a government public
health responsibility
● You don’t want people to make decisions in public health, you just
want them to follow advice
● Expecting consumers to make their own informed choice is unfair
and unrealistic because the evidence is so complicated
● (Some) people want to be told what to do
AGAINST
● Individuals should be free to make their own decisionsa
● Personal autonomy is importanta
● Harm:benefit ratio is equivocal so screening should be an individual
choice, not a government-promoted activitya
● Screening affects only the individual concerned, so there is no
community-benefit argument to justify promotion of screening
● Others may not have the best interests of the individual consumer
at heart
● Consumers tend to be better than policy makers at remembering
to consider screening harms as well as benefits, so judgements
about screening should be left to consumers
● The harms of breast screening are greater than the benefits
Limiting consumer information on overdiagnosis
FOR
● Maximises screening participationa
● Calling overdiagnosis a “harm” is just one (mis)interpretation of the
facts
● Women don’t consider overdiagnosis a harm; main harms that
women care about are: pain, hassles of parking and making
appointments, radiation, breast damage, anxiety about recalls
● Population based information on overdiagnosis is not applicable to
individuals
● The real problem is not overdiagnosis but overtreatment
AGAINST
● People should know what they are signing up for when they
participate in screeninga
● Providing information enables informed decision makinga
● Informed decision making is particularly important for breast
screening because there are some downsidesa
● Providing full information is a professional responsibility
● (Some) women want full information
avery strongly/frequently expressed reasons
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in consumers becoming confused or scared, decreasing
the likelihood that they would attend screening, and redu-
cing their options for life-saving treatment. As noted
above and in Table 3, many of these experts challenged
the conception of overdiagnosis as a harm, and used this
to justify their support for both guidance and limited in-
formation. Importantly, these experts did not see their
preference for limiting overdiagnosis information as being
against informed decision making. Many of these experts
were consumer advocates, and were strongly supportive of
informed patient choice in relation to breast cancer treat-
ment. They explained their apparently contradictory pos-
ition on information about screening versus treatment in
two ways. Some stated that the concept of overdiagnosis
being a harm was based on opinion, rather than fact and
therefore did not count as information. Other experts in
this group suggested that maximising screening uptake
would enhance patient choice (about life-saving treat-
ments) because early knowledge of breast cancer status
was an important part of this.
Experts who preferred full information argued that con-
sumers should be informed about what they were being
asked to do. In particular these experts claimed that full
information on overdiagnosis was important for its instru-
mental role in informed consumer decision making.
Experts’ reasoning was grounded in underlying values
Table 4 shows how experts prioritise and conceptualise
values differently when discussing their communication
preferences. Some experts explicitly referred to values,
naming principles such as “delivering benefits”, “respect
for autonomy” and “avoiding harms”. Other experts were
more concrete in their discussion, but underlying values
could be readily discerned. Abstracting the experts’ rea-
soning in this way clarifies how values were used and
prioritised in association with particular communication
preferences. For example, experts who advocated for “Be
screened” prioritised the values of delivering benefits and
delivering more benefits than harms. Those who recom-
mended “Be screened and here’s why” added transparency
to this list. Experts who advocated for “Screening is avail-
able” prioritised avoiding harm, delivering more benefits
than harms and respect for autonomy.
Table 4 also shows that experts conceived of or applied
values differently, such that the same abstract value was
sometimes used to justify opposing communication pref-
erences. For example, although respect for autonomy
was prioritised by some more than others, all experts
were able to use this value to justify their preferences.
Those experts who preferred “Be screened” and “Be
screened and here’s why” saw the provision of guidance
to screen as being respectful of autonomy because it
would maximise consumer choices around breast cancer
treatment. Those who preferred the “Screening is avail-
able” approach suggested a no guidance agenda would
better respect autonomy because it facilitated informed
consumer decision making without expert or govern-
mental influences.
Table 4 Experts’ conceptualisation and prioritisation of values in three approaches to communication with consumers
Values Conception of values
underpinning the “Be
screened” approach
Conception of values
underpinning the “Be screened
and here’s why” approach
Conception of values underpinning the
“Screening is available, please consider
whether it is right for you” approach
Delivering benefits Reduced breast cancer mortality
& reduced treatment related
morbiditya
Reduced breast cancer
mortality & reduced treatment
related morbiditya
Reduced all cause mortality and
morbidity
Avoiding harm Minimising pain, parking hassles,
radiation, anxiety about false
positives
Minimising pain, parking
hassles, radiation, anxiety about
false positives
Minimising overdiagnosis harmsa
Delivering more
benefits than harms
Experts informed by evidence
to assess population benefits
& harmsa
Experts informed by evidence
to assess population benefits &
harmsa
Consumers informed by evidence
and personal values to assess balance
of benefits & harms for themselvesa
Respect for autonomy Maximising consumer choices for
life saving breast cancer treatment;
freedom from misleading influences
on consumer screening participation
Maximising consumer choices
for life saving breast cancer
treatment
Facilitating informed consumer decision
making about screening, freedom from
external (positive or negative) influences
on decision makinga
Transparency n/a Telling consumers what might
happen when participating in
screeninga
Telling consumers what might happen when
participating in screening
Professional
responsibility
Providing guidance on healthy
living to the population
Providing guidance on healthy
living to the population
Providing full information to the
population about healthy living
Respect for public
preferences regarding
decision-making
responsibility
Consumers want to be told what
to do
Consumers want to be told
what to do; consumers want
full information
Consumers want full information
avalues that were prioritised for this particular communication approach
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Discussion
This study is, we believe, the first empirical exploration
of experts’ views on communicating with consumers
about breast screening. We found experts considered
the most important elements of this communication
were the degree of guidance and the amount of informa-
tion on overdiagnosis. These interacted to produce three
approaches to consumer communication: “Be screened”,
“Be screened and here’s why” or “Screening is available,
please consider whether it is right for you”. We expected
that experts would be conversant with academic and
public debates, and our study confirms that their views
on breast screening communications reflect ideas being
discussed in the literature [45]. The existence of contro-
versy about breast screening is widely recognised; our
results deliver both empirical confirmation and practical
detail to this broad recognition.
Our study explored the reasoning and motivation of
experts. Our analysis fits with and builds upon what
others have suggested about the aims of screening com-
munication. Many writers discuss what they see as the
competing goals of maximising participation versus re-
specting consumer autonomy by facilitating informed
choice about screening [29, 36, 60]. Our study explains
the reasoning of experts who aim to achieve one or both
goals. The detail in our study provides some insights
into why debates about communication persist. We
found experts disagree on what values to prioritise when
considering communication strategies and have different
conceptions of what it means to respect a particular
value, such as autonomy, in the context of breast screen-
ing. These results validate previous, more theoretical,
discussions about possible variations in use and concep-
tion of values in healthcare [16, 61, 62] and extend other
research looking at experts’ values in breast screening
generally [52]. It is not only the values of experts that
are important of course, but also the views and attitudes
of the public: our study sits alongside and complements
ongoing work into ascertaining public opinion about
topics such as consumer communication on cancer
screening [63, 64].
This study has implications for current debates about
the use of ethics frameworks in public health. The Four
Principles approach to medical ethics [65] is well recog-
nised as a useful tool for assisting decision making in
clinical practice and there is ongoing interest in promot-
ing ethical care alongside or as part of evidence based
medicine [66]. There is increasing recognition that the
particular aims, responsibilities and challenges of public
health as distinct from clinical medicine might be better
served with a specific set of principles or values [67, 68].
While there is ongoing discussion about what this might
look like, there seems to be broad support for some kind
of values-based public health ethics framework. Our
study, however, illustrates the complexity of using such
an apparently simple framework in a particular, practical
context, by showing that the prioritisation and interpret-
ation of the same values amongst influential experts is
not consistent. Significantly, our results indicate that the
same bare list of values could be used by different
experts to potentially justify each of three very different
communication approaches. In order to use values and
principles to assist and steer policy, rather than “rubber
stamp” existing plans, greater discussion of the meanings
of values is required, situated in a concrete context (in
this case, breast screening).
To support experts and others who are involved in
shaping polices on communication with consumers about
breast screening, we suggest the following questions as a
structure to guide decision-making:
What values should drive this communication?
A wide range of values relevant to public health should
be considered before deciding which one/s should be
prioritised in this particular context. Those involved in
discussions might start with the values that have been
discussed in this paper: delivering benefits, avoiding
harms, delivering more benefits than harms, respect for
autonomy, transparency, professional responsibility and
respect for public preferences regarding decision-making
responsibility. The ethics literature suggests other values
that were not raised by these experts, including distribu-
tive justice, procedural justice and trust [67–70]. Decid-
ing which of these values to prioritise in any given
context will not always be easy [68]. For the purposes of
communication with consumers about breast screening,
there is likely to be strong debate around the relative
importance of two potentially conflicted values: deliver-
ing more benefits than harms, and respecting autonomy.
Central tasks here are to agree which values are import-
ant and develop a shared understanding of what these
values mean [52]. Existing public health ethics frame-
works provide some guidance [67–70].
How will selected value/s be prioritised?
In order to address this question it may be useful to
debate different conceptions of values and consider what
communication aims would correspond with each. Note
that the priority value/s are decided first, and these will
help to identify and guide the stated aims of the commu-
nication. Imagine, for example, the main value is to de-
liver more benefits than harms. This raises the question
of whether it should be experts or consumers who de-
fine which benefits and harms matter and how they are
weighed. If the conclusion is that experts should decide,
then the aim of communication may be to persuade
consumers to act in line with expert assessment. If, in
contrast, the decision is that consumers should make
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their own decisions about which benefits and harms
matter and how they should be weighed, then the aim of
screening communication would be to encourage con-
sumer understanding and choice.
What communication strategy corresponds to these
selected aims?
It will be necessary at this point to build on answers to
the questions above. For example, if it is decided that
the main value is to deliver more benefits than harms,
and that this is best achieved by persuading consumers
to act in accordance with expert opinion, then a “Be
Screened” approach would be recommended (or a “Be
Screened and here’s why” approach, if transparency was
also selected as an important value). However if it is
decided that delivering more benefits than harms is best
achieved by encouraging consumer understanding and
choice then the “Screening is available, please consider
whether its right for you” strategy will be selected for
communicating about breast screening.
Our study’s strengths include its detail and depth of
coverage through interviews with a broad range of experts
from different fields and locations across the country.
We must consider that the study may be limited due
to its geographic focus on Australian experts. It is likely,
however, that our findings will have broader application
beyond this country since the nature and detail of the
breast screening program in Australia is similar to those
throughout much of UK and Europe, and the values and
principles discussed by the experts are well recognised
worldwide. It is also possible that our findings are lim-
ited by the participating sample – that is, we must con-
sider the question of whether or not the experts who
were asked but did not participate held different views
to those who did participate. Since we specifically sought
to include participants from a range of professional roles
and attitudes to screening, and since we continued sam-
pling until we reached thematic saturation, we are
confident that our study has mapped a sufficiently wide
range of opinions and values [57].
Conclusions
This study provides the first empirical explanation of
why well-informed experts take such different views on
communication with consumers about breast screening.
Experts do not necessarily have the same values prior-
ities in mind, and even if they do, they do not necessarily
agree on what actions would be in line with that particu-
lar value. Thus there are layers of difficulties in imple-
menting recommended public health ethics frameworks
as guidance for public health policy. We advocate for
greater research into values thinking amongst public
health policy makers, and would encourage explicit and
ongoing discussions about what values mean and which
ones are important and why. In the meantime we pro-
vide step-by-step guidance as to how to use values in
policy making within the context of breast screening in
order to develop ethically robust communication strat-
egies for consumers.
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Additional file 1: Sample interview introduction and questions 
Note: this list is provided as a guide only; the questions were modified to suit the experience 
and perspective of the interviewee. 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. As you know, there has been quite a lot 
written in the literature and in the media about breast screening and what the program should 
look like.  Plenty of people are happy with things the way they are, but others are not.  So I’m 
interested in exploring that range of opinion, particularly amongst people who work in the 
field, including those who work in clinical practice, research, administration, or in breast 
cancer advocacy. 
 
• Can you describe the scope of your professional activities that involve breast screening, to 
give me an idea about your involvement in the program? 
 
• Would you like to see any changes to the current program? 
o Prompt: What would your ideal program be? 
 
• There are many different ideas about breast cancer screening.  Can you comment on these?   
o Prompt: There are some who hold very extreme views about breast cancer 
screening.  How do you respond to these ideas?  What do you think drives those 
views? 
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• (If the topic hasn’t yet surfaced) One of the topics I’m interested in is communicating with 
women.  You may know that some places are looking at re-doing the breast screening 
leaflet.  What are your thoughts on what should be said to women? 
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Additional file 2: Table 5 
Table 7.5 Experts expressed a range of reasons to explain their preferred approach to 
breast screening communication 
 
Guiding women towards breast screening 
FOR 
Maximises screening 
participationa 
“The key thing is getting women in to screen and getting them there to be 
screened.” (Expert #31, consumer advocate) 
Saves lives and means 
that women have more 
treatment optionsa 
“Early detection is very important in terms of the treatment options that are 
possible for the women.  For example smaller tumours are likely to result in 
less invasive surgery, less radical surgery.  So a lumpectomy, versus a 
mastectomy.  Early detection is thought to be also important in survival 
outcomes too, but that’s obviously been a mixture of early detection plus 
improved treatment.” (Expert #6, consumer advocate) 
  “These patients with clinically palpable lesions may then not be 
conservable; they may only have an option of mastectomy.  They may have 
had an option of chemotherapy or not, whereas they’ll all be looking at 
chemotherapy if it’s progressed and therefore also radiotherapy.” (Expert #3, 
clinician) 
Overall screening 
delivers more benefits 
than harms to the 
populationa 
“The whole premise of population improvements are [sic] that some people 
are not going to benefit at all from the intervention.  And so if you take a 
vaccine, if you take - you take anything, some people will react, you know.  
But on average you're hoping to do better … [With breast screening] look at 
the benefits of the intervention … [and] the costs of it. And there is no easy 
ethical call on that … By being part of this program, it accepts that some 
people at high risk are going to go on a more rapid trajectory for treatment, 
and some of them who would have just become normal get intervened upon 
and they have psychosocial consequences as a result of it.” (Expert #26, 
epidemiologist) 
Overdiagnosis is not a 
harm 
“Harm is a term that’s been developed by academics, along academic lines 
… [Overdiagnosis is not] women’s definition of harm.” (Expert #24, 
consumer advocate) 
Providing guidance 
about good health is a 
government 
responsibility 
“By the time the governments have accepted that it’s a good thing, I think 
the government’s role is just to go all-out advertising it positively.” (Expert 
#7, clinician) 
You don’t want people 
to make decisions in 
public health, you just 
want them to follow 
advice 
“There’s this idea that everybody has to go through individual decision 
making.  Whereas, see, in pubic health, you don’t want people to make 
individual decisions about washing their hands or getting their children 
immunised.  You just want them to do it …  Now this might sound a bit 
extraordinary but it’s not really, for public health people.” (Expert #10, 
epidemiologist) 
Table continued overleaf 
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Guiding women towards breast screening 
FOR (continued from previous) 
Expecting consumers to 
make their own 
informed choice is 
unfair and unrealistic 
because the evidence is 
so complicated 
“When people argue a lot, you know, people that are informed, supposedly, 
argue, I don’t know how [women] give informed consent.  It’s very difficult 
for the average layperson to understand.” (Expert #11, clinician) 
  “Explaining the odds … is hard, and you can put little figurines in this box 
with, so many women might, if you’re in this box, you might be there, but 
nothing is so black and white and everything is kind of nuanced.  And it’s 
really hard to see people making judgements independent of what the doctor 
might think is the best route possible.” (Expert #26, epidemiologist) 
(Some) people want to 
be told what to do 
“Some people don’t want to be involved; some people just want to be told 
what to do.” (Expert #24, consumer advocate) 
Guiding women towards breast screening 
AGAINST 
Individuals should be 
allowed to make their 
own decisionsa 
“We can’t … be like grandparents and say, ‘You have got to do this’, and 
impose our will on them.” (Expert #33, clinician & provider) 
Personal autonomy is 
importanta 
“We just, I don’t think, want to have bodies like governmental bodies or any 
other sorts of bodies making decisions about what people ought and ought 
not to be doing because it’s good for them … I think we have to respect 
people’s autonomy, I think it’s a basic principal in the democracy and I think 
you have to respect it.” (Expert #27, epidemiologist) 
Population benefits and 
harms are finely 
balanced and thus 
consumer attitude to 
risk is relevant to 
likelihood of delivering 
more benefits than 
harms to the individuala 
“There’s actually a lot of evidence of harm here.  If I look at it carefully, 
then you think, oh the benefits and the harms are much more finely balanced 
than I had actually appreciated, then a persuasion campaign is just 
indefensible.” (Expert #27, epidemiologist) 
There is no community 
benefit or harm attached 
to participating in 
screening 
“The only person who’s going to be harmed [if they don’t attend screening] 
is the person themselves – I mean, probably and their families because of the 
consequences of the treatment – but I might apply a different level of – a 
different sort of standard to that compared with, say, something like 
immunisation, where people’s decision not to be immunised affects people 
other than themselves.” Expert #21, epidemiologist) 
  “If I choose not to go, the only person that’s being harmed by my choice is 
me.  I’m not giving the person next door to me breast cancer … whether I go 
or not doesn’t mean that anybody else is more or likely to get breast cancer.  
So I don’t think persuasion or enforcement has a role there.” (Expert #27, 
epidemiologist) 
Others may not have the 
best interests of the 
individual consumer at 
heart 
“You’ll get politicians like Bob Hawke who think that adding the screening 
program in will buy them votes … the consultants, who are often people 
with vested interests, like the radiologists or the breast cancer surgeons.” 
(Expert #8, researcher, other)  
Consumers are better at 
considering both 
benefits and harms 
rather than just focusing 
on the benefits 
“At the public policy level and at that community emotive level, there is a 
tendency to ignore cost and harm and focus on the benefits.  At the personal 
level …  it looks like women can [better] understand that argument about 
overdiagnosis.” (Expert #20, epidemiologist) 
Table continued overleaf 
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Guiding women towards breast screening 
AGAINST (continued from previous) 
The harms of breast 
screening are greater 
than the benefits 
“The evidence in Australia is that the health benefit : harm ratio is simply too 
high … Opportunity costs are too high … I would argue very strongly that 
[instead of breast screening] we increase our emphasis on getting women to 
present … early … and make sure that the healthcare system can diagnose 
disease competently in women with symptoms and treat them optimally … 
My strategy for unwinding [the breast screening program] would be to stop 
the invitation and provide the information.” (Expert #12, clinician) 
Limiting consumer information on overdiagnosis 
FOR 
Maximises screening 
participationa 
“To give them that much information I think would scare them.  They’d 
chuck it in the rubbish, and they’d be, like, ‘This is too hard’.” (Expert #25, 
provider) 
Calling overdiagnosis a 
“harm” is just one 
(mis)interpretation of 
the facts 
“[Information on overdiagnosis] is a bit of a worry, because of the way it’s 
presented and interpreted … Women aren’t being harmed by breast 
screening and society isn’t being harmed by breast screening … It comes 
from the epidemiologists, who are quite far removed from actually having 
breast cancer or treating it - they’re looking at populations and then they take 
it upon themselves … to actually put their personal view as to what this 
might be doing to women, what harm it might be doing, which is very 
unscientific.  Early diagnosis, breast screening, leads to more of your 
diagnoses and overtreatment and that’s [not] a harm, it’s a value… That bit 
of information [about the harms of overdiagnosis] is opinion interpretation… 
You have to be very careful what information you do give [women] and that 
you’re not giving them a set of facts that’s been interpreted by one kind of 
view.” (Expert #13, consumer advocate)  
Women don’t consider 
overdiagnosis a harm; 
main harms that women 
care about are: pain, 
hassles of parking and 
making appointments, 
radiation, breast 
damage, anxiety about 
recalls 
“Pain and parking, right?  They were the two complaints that women had 
about mammograms.  And also having to book.” (Expert #10, 
epidemiologist) 
  “If you ask women what harm is from breast screen they’ll say, maybe, 
harm is the x-rays that you get.  Maybe harm is the fact that you have your 
breast squeezed so much and that might cause damage to your breasts … As 
long as you’re given the key factors … you know, ‘We just thought this is 
your first time at Breast Screen, you better come back for further diagnostic 
images’, [so] then if you are going to be recalled then you’re not panicked.” 
(Expert #24, consumer advocate) 
Population based 
information on 
overdiagnosis is not 
applicable to 
individuals 
“I don’t think you need to put in the business about overdiagnosis ‘cause you 
don’t actually know that it’s overdiagnosis.  Until you know which women 
were – that some were actually – you don’t know.  It’s just not there, so I 
don’t think it’s very straight reasoning, to get those very big picture things 
and try to apply them to the individual, when you don’t know whether they 
could possibly apply to the individual.” (Expert #13, consumer advocate) 
The real problem is not 
overdiagnosis but 
overtreatment 
“I always like to think [the harm] is not necessarily overdiagnosis but 
overtreatment …  So don’t stop yourself from actually being diagnosed but 
then when you get the information, it’s what you do with it.  And the patient 
needs to be very well informed around what your risks are if there’s no 
treatment versus the treatment.” (Expert #6, consumer advocate) 
Table continued overleaf 
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Limiting consumer information on overdiagnosis  
AGAINST 
People should know 
what they are signing 
up for when they 
participate in screeninga 
“They need to be provided with adequate information to know what they are 
signing up for.  If they are coming to screening they need to know.” (Expert 
#33, clinician & provider) 
Providing information 
enables informed 
decision makinga 
“[We should let] women know in an intelligent way about this complex topic 
so that they can be fully informed and make an informed choice … you don’t 
want to just say, ‘Trust me I’m a doctor.’” (Expert #22, clinician & provider) 
Informed decision 
making is important 
because there are some 
downsides to breast 
screeninga 
“This is not straightforwardly a good thing.  There are some downsides and, 
while we don’t necessarily think the downsides are such that you shouldn’t 
be doing it, at the very least, we should be telling women about this so that 
they can make an informed decision.” (Expert #20, epidemiologist) 
Providing full 
information is a 
professional 
responsibility 
“We have a responsibility for them to understand why they’re coming.” 
(Expert #4, clinician) 
  “I do believe … that people working in public health have a responsibility 
to talk about their work and to educate the community.  I don’t think it’s 
something where you do the work, you publish it in an academic journal and 
that’s the end of it.” (Expert #21, epidemiologist) 
(Some) women want 
full information 
“People ... are different in … their needs for information … You have to 
cover the high information needs people.” (Expert #23, clinician) 
NOTE: aVery strongly / frequently expressed reasons. 
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  8.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter contains the following publication and additional online files:  
Parker L, Carter S. The role of socially embedded concepts in breast cancer screening: 
an empirical study with Australian experts. 2016. Public Health Ethics. 
2016;Apr19:phw012. 
 
Available at: 
http://phe.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/04/18/phe.phw012.short  
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It is not clear whether breast cancer screening is a public health intervention or an individual clinical service. The
question is important because the concepts best suited for ethical reasoning in public health might be different
to the concepts commonly employed in biomedical ethics. We consider it likely that breast screening has
elements of a public health intervention and used an empirical ethics approach to explore this further. If
breast screening has public health characteristics, it is probable that policy and practice experts will employ
socially embedded concepts when reasoning about it. We gathered data on whether and how these concepts
existed in the discussion and reasoning of Australian breast screening experts. We found that experts employed
these concepts when talking about the purpose and practices of breast screening, and the behaviour of breast
screening professionals and consumers. Experts gave varied judgements about breast screening based on
reasoning with these concepts, considering it to be more or less successful in contributing to the public interest
and in incorporating socially embedded concepts into its operational agenda. Our findings are compatible with
breast screening having public health characteristics. We advocate for the incorporation of socially embedded
concepts in breast screening policy and practice.
Introduction
The breast screening programme in Australia is gov-
ernment-funded and organized, and offers free bien-
nial screening by mammography to all women from
the age of 40 years. The programme aims to reduce
breast cancer mortality and morbidity within
Australia through early breast cancer detection via
mammographic screening (BreastScreen Australia,
2015a,b). Screening providers recruit through regular,
personalized written invitations that are sent to all
women in the target age range of 50–74 years whose
contact details are accessible through government
sources (the electoral role). Breast screening is pro-
vided in fixed locations throughout urban areas and
in mobile screening vans that service rural and remote
communities on a regular basis. There has been recent
international controversy about breast screening,
particularly around: the extent of breast cancer mor-
tality benefit, including for younger women; the extent
and significance of overdiagnosis1 in breast screening;
and the extent to which women should be informed
about overdiagnosis (Carter et al., 2015b; Parker
et al., 2015a).
The Public Nature of Breast Screening
In writing about the ethics of screening, a number of
writers have questioned to what extent screening should
be seen as an individual enterprise—a service to indi-
vidual patients for their benefit—and to what extent it
should be viewed as a collective enterprise, that is, a
public service designed to benefit populations
(Verweij, 2000; Juth and Munthe, 2012). This question
is important because the sorts of concepts that are best
suited for ethical reasoning in public health might be
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different to the concepts that are commonly employed
in biomedical ethics (Dawson and Jennings, 2012).
Arguments to support the view that breast screening
has an at least partially ‘public’ character are described
here. First, Verweij (2000) suggests that a policy of offer-
ing breast screening to a population serves the public
interest, even if only weakly. In making this argument,
Verweij describes public interests in the context of pre-
ventive medicine as interests that are shared by (or
common to) all members of the public, including
those not at risk from the illness being considered (i.e.
those who will not immediately benefit from an inter-
vention). Thus, for the offer of breast screening to be
regarded as in the public interest, it would have to be in
the interests of everyone, not just in the interests of
women. If we accept that the offer of breast screening
in a population leads to reduced breast cancer mortality
rate in that population, then this is likely to be true, since
it is reasonable to suppose that everyone in a population
benefits from a reduced breast cancer mortality rate,
even if quite tangentially. However, there is only a
weak public interest, for two reasons: it is unlikely that
an offer of breast screening is universally in everybody’s
net interest, where net interests are determined from
consideration of all of a person’s preferences, since
some individuals would quite plausibly not have their
overall preferences best served by being part of a popu-
lation that offers breast screening. Furthermore, if we
compare an offer of breast screening against other health
interventions, or even with other ways of reducing
breast cancer deaths (such as better treatment), breast
screening will not necessarily come out on top for all
people.
Secondly, Juth and Munthe (2012) argue that screen-
ing programmes look more like social institutions, with
specific internal regulations and particular societal func-
tions and goals, than like a disconnected series of con-
sumer-provider interactions. They argue that this means
screening programmes should be considerate of collect-
ive values, such as might apply to any social group or
institution with a particular agenda and mode of oper-
ation, as well being responsive to individual values.
Finally, the offer and the promotion of breast screening
accords with the view of Verweij and Dawson (2007) as
to what constitutes ‘public health’, which includes (1) an
aim to improve the health of the public and (2) oper-
ation through a collective (government funded)
intervention.
Notwithstanding other aspects of breast screening
that seem to have a clearly individual or clinical charac-
ter (e.g. a personal choice to participate, the importance
of outcomes to the individual) the arguments described
above present a strong case for considering that breast
screening is, in some meaningful sense, unavoidably
public. As noted earlier, this is likely to have implica-
tions for how we should reason about breast screening.
That is, it is commonly argued that the set of concepts
often applied in biomedical ethics are insufficient for
reasoning about ethical challenges in the kinds of
health programmes and interventions that have this
‘public’ character. One form of this argument is to pro-
pose that socially embedded concepts should form the
basis for reasoning in public health ethics (Dawson and
Jennings, 2012).
Socially Embedded Concepts in Public Health
Ethics
Socially embedded concepts are associated with a par-
ticular way of looking at the world that begins with
community and relationships as being of central im-
portance. This is founded in acceptance that humans
are social beings. This has been contrasted to a way of
looking at the world that prioritizes the interests of in-
dividuals and assumes prima facie priority for liberty or
respect for autonomy (Dawson, 2011; Dawson and
Jennings, 2012). In the public health ethics literature, a
range of concepts have been recognized as having this
‘socially embedded’ character including reciprocity,
solidarity, trust and social justice (Upshur, 2002;
Dawson, 2011; Dawson and Jennings, 2012).
Reciprocity, for example, is one concept that has been
of particular interest in recent years. According to this
principle, the receipt of benefit creates a moral obliga-
tion to return benefit. Empirical studies have shown that
humans have a tendency to deliver benefits to, or
comply with requests from those who have previously
acted favourably towards us (Gouldner, 1960; Whatley
et al., 1999). The principle of reciprocity also applies to
the spread of burdens in a society: public health ethics
writers have suggested that communities have a respon-
sibility to ensure that burdens are fairly distributed by
supporting and/or compensating those who are heavily
burdened or wronged in the process of acting in the
public interest (Harris and Holm, 1995; University of
Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics Pandemic Ethics
Working Group [JCB Working Group], 2005; Verweij,
2005; Selgelid, 2008; Viens, 2008; Viens et al., 2009).
Despite increasingly common usage in public health,
and strong support from the social science literature
for reciprocity being an important influence on societal
behaviour (Whatley, et al., 1999; Viens et al., 2009), the
details surrounding the concept may not always be
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obvious. It is not clear, for example, how and by whom
the value of benefits and burdens should be measured.
Neither is it clear whether the nature of the reciprocal
behaviour should be a positive act (such as doing a
favour or shouldering a burden), a negative act (such
as deliberately avoiding behaviour that may harm the
other) or both (Viens, 2011). There are differing views
about whether the principle of reciprocity should only
apply when a benefit has been accepted or invited, or
whether it should apply in all situations (Viens, 2008).
Solidarity is another example of a socially embedded
concept of recent interest in the public health ethics lit-
erature. Solidarity involves identifying with the other,
such that you are prepared to ‘stand beside’ them, work-
ing together towards a common or collective cause such
as promoting community health and well-being
(Dawson and Jennings, 2012; Ter Meulen and Wright,
2012; Jennings, 2015). It relies on the understanding of
mutual vulnerability and respect between members of a
community, delivering an obligation to share burdens
and threats (Hayry, 2005; Prainsack and Buyx, 2011;
Butler, 2012; Dawson and Verweij, 2012; Illingworth
and Parmet, 2012). There are debates about whether
solidarity sits as a discrete entity alongside other guiding
values in public health ethics, or should instead operate
as a particular perspective that sees the world as a series
of enmeshed relationships, and interprets all relevant
moral considerations in light of this (Dawson and
Jennings, 2012; Jennings, 2015; Jennings and Dawson,
2015).
Solidarity relies upon identification with the other to
drive a sense of moral obligation to act, while reciprocity
relies upon awareness of the mutually beneficial system
of transactional debt and repayment. The meanings of
these concepts may overlap; for example, some consider
that reciprocity is a constituent part of solidarity and
vice versa (Houtepen and Ter Meulen, 2000; Haryry,
2005; Butler, 2012). Reciprocity, solidarity and other
socially embedded concepts have their roots in public
interests and the idea that community and relationships
have intrinsic moral value, not merely instrumental
value as a means to promote particular ends, including
self-interests (Houtepen and Ter Meulen, 2000;
Perugini et al., 2003; Hayry, 2005).
The Role of Socially Embedded Concepts in
Breast Screening
To summarize: there is recognized contention about the
degree to which cancer screening can be thought of
meaningfully as a public health programme. While not
negating the possibility of breast screening having a clin-
ical or private dimension, we have argued that screening
has at least some elements of a public health interven-
tion: the availability of breast screening is in the public
interest; the programme itself operates and functions
like a social institution; breast screening aims to benefit
the public and is supported, funded and promoted by
the government. If these arguments are accepted, then
concepts relevant to public health ethics are likely to be
relevant to breast screening, including recently cham-
pioned socially embedded concepts.
To further explore this topic, we undertook an em-
pirical study to understand what concepts experts used
when reasoning about breast screening. If our analysis of
the public elements within breast screening is correct, it
might be expected that experts would draw on socially
embedded concepts when reasoning about breast
screening. We present an analysis of the data in which
they did this to expand on what has already been written
about the public-ness of screening programmes, and the
associated relevance of socially embedded concepts. Our
research questions were as follows:
(1) Do experts refer to, or reason with, socially
embedded concepts in relation to breast screening?
(2) If so, what forms does this take (how do they
reason, what is the range of ways that experts
reason with these concepts)?
In keeping with our Empirical Ethics approach (see
below), we were also interested in considering the nor-
mative implications of our findings–i.e. whether or not
the reasoning that occurs with references to socially
embedded values is morally good.
Method
Methodology
This research was part of a larger empirical study into
ethical issues in breast screening practice and policy,
itself an element within a bigger project looking at
ethics in cancer screening more generally. Other papers
arising from the breast screening arm of the project have
been published elsewhere (Parker et al., 2015a,b,c). We
approached our topic with a commitment to empirical
bioethics, that is, on the assumption that both the practice
and theory of ethics are important (Carter, 2009; Frith,
2012). More particularly, we sought empirical data about
the range of ways that those people involved in influen-
cing breast screening policy refer to socially embedded
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concepts when talking about breast screening. We were
interested in mapping all of the ways that experts rea-
soned with concepts about breast screening, and were
also interested in experts’ perceptions of how these con-
cepts were being used and understood in a broader public
setting. We assumed that the insights gained from ana-
lysis of this data might have implications for public health
ethics researchers and for breast-screening policymakers
and practitioners (Strong et al., 2010).
We used an open qualitative methodology, with
methods for sampling, data collection and analysis
that were best suited to conducting our study and an-
swering our particular questions with internal coher-
ence (Carter and Little, 2007; Carter, 2010).
Methodologically we were committed to developing
new insights through inductive analysis, while being
sensitized to existing ethical concepts (Mason, 2002;
Charmaz, 2006). We did not set out to examine the
role of socially embedded concepts in breast screening:
rather, this topic was developed inductively as our work
progressed as something that was important to at least
some of the participants.
Participants and Sampling
We sampled the population of influential Australian
breast screening experts, defining ‘influential’ as those
who had a strong impact on public opinion or policy
related to breast cancer screening by virtue of: frequent
commentary or publications in lay or academic press;
membership of policy advisory bodies; a senior role in
breast screening administration or service delivery; or a
senior role in breast screening advocacy. The population
was identified through academic and media publica-
tions on breast screening, web-based personnel lists of
organizations involved in breast screening and breast
screening advocacy, and suggestions from colleagues
and previously interviewed experts. To gain maximum
variation of ideas and opinions, we used purposive sam-
pling, inviting people with a range of experience and
professional roles including clinicians, non-clinical re-
searchers, administrators and advocacy leaders (see
Table 1; Miles and Huberman, 1994).
We invited 46 experts via emails and interviewed 33
(17 male, 16 female) about the Australian breast-screen-
ing programme and breast screening generally. We had a
Table 1. Characteristics of experts (Parker et al., 2015a)
Participants 33 (Experts who were invited but did not participate 13)
Professional rolea Cliniciansb 15 (3) Oncologists 3 (1)
Surgeons 4 (0)
Breast physicians 1 (2)
Radiologists 2 (0)
Radiation oncologists 2 (0)
Pathologists 3 (0)
Other 0 (1)
Non-clinical researchers 14 (3) Epidemiologists/biostatisticians 9 (1)
Other 5 (1)
Administrators/managers 6 (2) 6 (2)
Advocacy leaders 6 (7) Consumers working in advocacy 3 (6)
Clinicians/researchers working in advocacy 3 (1)
Public stance
on breast screeningc
Supportive 16 (9)
Mostly supportived 3 (1)
Critical 6 (0)
Unknown to researchers 8 (3)
aNote that some experts held more than one professional role.
bMost clinicians engaged in research to a greater or lesser extent.
cWe loosely categorized potential interviewees as being ‘supportive’, ‘mostly supportive’ or ‘critical’ about breast screening based
on publicly available commentary.
dBroadly supportive of breast screening but with selected concerns about one or more elements of the programme.
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low response rate from volunteers in formal consumer
advocacy roles. This may have been due to a higher
turnover of people in these positions than in other pro-
fessional roles, that is, they may no longer have been
available at the publically listed email addresses we
used. We continued sampling from this and all other
professional roles until we were confident that we had
sufficient variation in the perspectives included, and
were no longer hearing new information (thematic sat-
uration; Mason, 2002).
Data Collection
Interviews were conducted in person in the workplace of
the expert or Author 1, or via telephone if the expert was
interstate or otherwise unavailable. There was no ob-
servable difference between the two forms of interview
technique in terms of rapport or interview length, as
previously reported in the literature (Sturges and
Hanrahan, 2004). All interviews were conducted by
Author 1 between October 2012 and October 2013
using a semi-structured question list designed to elicit
the experts’ views on breast screening in general, and
paying particular attention to current controversies
such as overdiagnosis (Additional File 1). We did not
pre-empt participants by asking direct questions about
socially embedded concepts such as reciprocity or soli-
darity, instead we asked experts about their experience
and opinions on screening and what they thought was
good or bad about the programme and why. We pro-
vided experts with ample opportunities to expand upon
their own perspectives in their own words and probed
issues as they arose. The interviews lasted between 39
and 105 minutes (average 66 minutes) and were taped,
transcribed and de-identified.
Data Analysis
Socially embedded concepts were identified as key con-
cepts in interviewees’ talk. Further data analysis was
conducted through a series of iterative steps. We read
transcripts closely, extracting all text that expressed con-
cern for notions like, or aligned with, socially embedded
concepts such as reciprocity or solidarity, trying to be
inclusive in our data extraction. Only one expert used
the word ‘solidarity’ and none mentioned the word
‘reciprocity’, but their discussion did address the kinds
of concepts and related issues that our reading of the
literature on socially embedded concepts had led us to
understand as being relevant to these moral consider-
ations. Clues that experts might be talking about these
kinds of concepts included conversational triggers such
as responsibility, obligation, owe, accountability, duty,
if. . . then, as well as more conceptual pointers.
Following this, transcripts were coded to capture these
values-in-use, and the codes were collapsed into more
abstract categories (Additional File 2). The analyst
(Author 1) then returned to the transcripts to check
the validity and applicability of the categories de-
veloped, and to extract any further relevant data
(Reichertz, 2007). These steps were repeated as neces-
sary. Analytic memos were written by Author 1
throughout the period of data collection and analysis
and these, along with codes and categories, were
shared and discussed with the other author. Some of
the early interview transcripts were double coded by
both authors as a cross-check on the interpretative
work of Author 1. Our analysis deliberately pursued
the range of variation of experts’ views. Data analysis
kept pace with data collection, enabling early ideas to
inform and be tested during later interviews, thus max-
imizing the efficiency and analytic fertility of data col-
lection. We remained critical and reflexive about our
analysis, working against confirmation bias and check-
ing our working hypotheses regularly and rigorously
(Mason, 2002; Charmaz, 2006).
Research Ethics
Ethics approval was granted from the Cancer Institute
NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics
Committee [HREC/12/CIPHS/46] and the University
of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee
[#15245]. Informed written or verbal consent was
given by all experts, and they were assured of confiden-
tiality. Experts were free to withdraw at any time.
Results
Experts reasoned with many concepts when talking
about breast screening. Much of their reasoning
revolved around important individually oriented con-
cepts, particularly (1) respect for individual autonomy;
(2) the potential to deliver benefit to individual screen-
ing participants; and (3) the potential to harm individ-
ual screening participants. We have written extensively
about this in other papers (Parker et al., 2015a,b,c). As
described above, in this sub-study we focused our ana-
lysis on experts’ discussions of socially embedded con-
cepts. We found that experts referred to and reasoned
with socially embedded concepts in the following cate-
gories: the purpose of the programme, how the pro-
gramme should operate, behaviour of breast screening
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professionals and women’s breast screening behaviour.
We describe these findings below.
The Purpose of Breast Screening
Some experts talked as though socially embedded con-
cepts were highly relevant to decision making for breast-
screening policies and practices, with many of them
alluding to a public interest in breast screening, or to
‘the benefit that [a screening programme] will give to
the society’ (Expert #28, clinician). For example, one
expert saw breast cancer as a cause of widespread com-
munity suffering, and understood breast screening as
being at least partly an attempt to prevent suffering at
the societal level:
Breast cancer is such a common illness and it
touches everybody. A lot of people have someone
in their family or close friends. . . everybody
knows someone or there’s another mother at
the school or there’s some story. . .there’s great
hope that the screening program is going to be
protective in some way. (#30, clinician)
Some of the experts who discussed the public interest in
breast screening saw the programme as being hugely
successful in this regard. For example, one expert who
looked at the ‘whole impact’ of breast screening on ‘so-
ciety and the economy’ including ‘the economic value of
longer productive lives. . . [and the] psychosocial impact
for families, friends and colleagues’ judged the pro-
gramme to be successful because it delivered ‘a lot of
value to. . . families and workplaces. . . value to the econ-
omy as well’ (#32, consumer advocate).
Other experts who discussed the possible public inter-
ests of breast screening questioned the strength of the
public interest argument for breast screening in com-
parison with other public programmes:
As a population is it our priority to reduce the
burden from breast disease or is it
poverty?. . .Could we actually achieve the same
aims of reducing the death toll from breast
cancer without spending the vast amounts of
money and put money to some other use that
might be of more benefit to people in general?
(#28, clinician)
Some were more openly critical about the apparent fail-
ure of breast screening to address the health concerns
and needs of the whole community, and suggested that
such purposes might be better served through greater
attention to interventions in issues such as domestic
violence or disability or other public health interven-
tions that particularly focused on the health of those
who were most needy. Overall, these experts appeared
to suggest that the public were best served by attending
not only to the aggregated health of a society, but also to
health distribution:
It’s a bad thing if there are groups in our society
that are left behind in terms of their health. A
civilised society needs to think about the health
of each population. (#22, epidemiologist)
The Process of Breast Screening
Several experts appeared to reason about or judge cer-
tain breast-screening policies by referring to socially
embedded concepts, particularly the principle of reci-
procity, with participants linking burdens of breast
screening with (reciprocal) moral obligations of the pro-
gramme. For example, some experts suggested that
breast screening required higher standards than might
be expected from a clinical healthcare perspective in
relation to aspects such as certainty of evidence, oper-
ational and evaluation excellence and avoidance of
harm. According to these experts, ‘the bar has to be
higher’ (#21, researcher) because the screening pro-
gramme was being paid for out of the ‘public purse’
(#3, clinician) and because, like other public health en-
deavours, it requested the participation of healthy indi-
viduals, delivering a burden of consideration on
consumers who were otherwise well:
A screening program is taking people that are well
as opposed to people that are unwell, going and
seeking medical attention. And therefore you’ve
got a greater obligation to do it properly. (#9,
clinician)
One expert raised the issue of possible compensation to
those who carried the heaviest burdens, recommending
monetary remuneration to those who were likely to have
been overdiagnosed:
Say, every woman who was diagnosed by Breast
Screen with a breast cancer under 1 cm in diam-
eter–can’t be felt–who is alive and disease free at 3
years, would be compensated $100,000 because
there is a 15:1 chance they didn’t need treatment.
(#31, clinician)
Experts saw some breast screening policies as being
(wrongly) focussed on breast screening consumers to
the apparent exclusion of the needs or interests of the
wider community, including women with breast cancer.
They spoke about the separate financial arrangements
for mammography screening and follow-up in
Australia that facilitated free, high-quality screening
6 " PARKER AND CARTER
 at University of Sydney on July 12, 2016
http://phe.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
mammograms for women without breast cancer, while
women with breast cancer were required to pay for their
follow-up mammograms, and/or (allegedly) had access
only to inferior equipment, or no access at all. In other
locations, they described a policy of physical separation
between women without breast cancer and women with
breast cancer attending mammography services for
screening and cancer follow-up, respectively. One
expert explained that ‘you can’t mix a woman who’s
got breast cancer with a woman who doesn’t have
breast cancer’ (#29, clinician) and another provided
the allegedly official reason: ‘It could be a negative
impact on normal women because they would be
afraid to have their screening because they [would] as-
sociate it with breast cancer and death and dying and
stuff.’ (#5, clinician). Experts expressed moral disap-
proval for the ‘inward looking culture’ (#29, clinician)
in breast screening that allowed for this apparent lack of
interest in members of the public beyond the immediate
breast screening consumers.
The Behaviour of Breast Screening
Professionals
Experts applied socially embedded concepts to the be-
haviour of themselves or other breast screening profes-
sionals. Some experts spoke with moral censure about ‘a
lot of fighting’ (#9, clinician) amongst screening pro-
viders, rather than a co-ordinated process of working
together towards a common goal. Others described co-
operative work, but towards a goal that failed to serve
the public interest:
It’s look after themselves. . . that’s what I saw. . .
All they cared about was their jobs, their promo-
tions, their money, their salaries. (#29, clinician)
Other experts appeared to see themselves as being per-
sonally involved in and morally bound by reciprocal
transactions within their breast screening activities.
For example, one expert spoke about the duty of health-
care professionals to provide personal guidance and
advice about breast screening, as opposed to devolving
responsibility to the consumer, an obligation that was at
least partly incurred because of being a beneficiary of
medical university training (university degrees in
Australia are financially subsidized by the federal
government):
It’s really hard to see people making judgements
independent of what the doctormight think is the
best route possible. . .Why did we pay this person
so many taxpayers’ money to go through a de-
gree? (#15, epidemiologist)
Another expert discussed obligations arising within the
research community, speaking disparagingly about ex-
perts who worked with figures generated by the research
activities of others, without ever generating their own
primary data, thus failing to pay off their apparently
incurred debt:
[The other side] have done no trials, zero.
They’vemilked the data from the breast screening
trials and not got ethical clearance for their own
particular viewpoint. They’ve not won any grant
money for that. They’ve not conducted popula-
tion based studies with long follow-up, and
they’ve piggy backed off someone else’s research.
(#3, clinician)
Finally, we noted that experts talked at length about the
multiple collective benefits relating to the management of
breast cancer that they considered had arisen as a direct
result of the introduction of organized breast screening in
Australia and extended over and above any breast cancer
mortality or morbidity benefits derived by individual
women as a result of being screened:
The current program. . . has [had] a lot of bene-
ficial effects. . . over many years, particularly in
raising the bar for treatment of all breast cancers,
whether screen detected or symptomatic. So no
doubt the screening program has contributed a
lot to the better care of patients with breast
cancer, however they are diagnosed because it
has made people work in multi-disciplinary
teams. It’s made us audit what we do, collect
our results, all of those things which would
never have happened without it. (#12, clinician)
Other experts spoke about how organized breast screen-
ing enabled surgical and radiological sub-specialization
in breast work and the beneficial legacy of that. Experts
did not voice any debt arising from receipt of these
benefits, but their presence raises the possibility that
experts may feel some kind of obligation to continue
supporting breast screening, an obligation that might
remain even as the evidence about the balance of bene-
fits and harms becomes more uncertain.
The Breast Screening Behaviour of Women
Experts recognized that women saw themselves, and
were seen by others, as being under a certain degree of
moral obligation to participate in breast screening and
having a sense that not participating in screening was
somehow wrong:
[Screening is] something that women guilt them-
selves into doing. (#2, researcher)
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They described such obligations as coming from collect-
ive values such as solidarity. For example, one expert
suggested that the public (incorrectly) saw breast
screening as having a community benefit akin to the
community benefit associated with vaccination pro-
grammes, and that this meant that women felt an obli-
gation to contribute to that benefit via participation in
screening:
The way that it’s put forward by screening pro-
gramsmakes it seem like that, that this is the right
thing to do rather than it’s a personal decision
about whether you should do this for your own
good or not. . . There is a community benefit
from immunisation, but there’s no such commu-
nity benefit from screening. Like, the benefit is to
the individual and yet we almost make it a moral
issue and people perceive this, that if they’re not
screening they’re. . . a bad person in some way.
(#21, researcher)
Another expert noted that some women felt a moral
obligation to attend screening to preserve healthcare
services for the community, inspired by a strong sense
of solidarity with others. These consumers perceived
that government-funded services would be withdrawn
from small communities if they were not supported by
public participation, and that this would be a bad out-
come for those communities:
I [know] women. . . who’d said, ‘I don’t think I’ll
ever get breast cancer. I don’t think I’m at risk of
breast cancer. I’m not scared about getting breast
cancer. But if I don’t use this service and people
like me don’t use this service, the [breast screen-
ing] bus might not come back again and that will,
that affects people in my community’. . . So it’s
about loss of services. . . And people in small
communities are connected. (#8, researcher)
These experts felt disturbed by such feelings of societal
obligation in women because they thought they were
based on faulty assumptions about screening, or were
unreasonably large burdens for women to be carrying.
Discussion
In this article, we have sought to explore the place of
socially embedded concepts in breast screening. It seems
reasonable to assume that socially embedded concepts
are relevant to public health, not least because, as
Dawson (2011) argues, there are many public health
policies that seem vitally important and morally good
that would not be easily defensible with a traditional
biomedical ethics approach that uncompromisingly
prioritizes individual liberty. There is, however, debate
over the extent to which breast screening should be con-
sidered a public health endeavour or a clinical interven-
tion aimed at serving individual interests. We argued in
our introduction that breast screening has enough
‘public’ characteristics to justify a claim that socially
embedded concepts are relevant. For example, it has
been suggested that having a breast screening pro-
gramme lies in the public interest, even if only weakly;
breast screening programmes appear to function as a
social institution; and, in Australia at least, breast
screening is a collective action, publically organized,
funded and promoted, with the aim of improving the
population’s health.
Interviewees in this study used socially embedded
concepts in a variety of ways when reasoning about
breast cancer. Some experts used them to judge the suc-
cess or moral worth of breast screening on the basis of its
contribution to the public interest. Others used these
concepts to judge or justify particular aspects of breast
screening policy and practice, morally evaluate the be-
haviour of breast screening clinicians and researchers
and consider women’s breast screening behaviour.
In the following section, we draw on the literature to
normatively evaluate these uses and consider whether
and how might they support breast screening being
seen as a public, rather than a private or clinical,
intervention.
Normative Implications of this Study
Is the offer of breast screening in the public
interest?
We drew earlier on Verweij’s argument that a public
interest is one in which ‘all persons as members of the
public have a common interest in’ (2000: 61, Verweij’s
italics). In the context of breast screening, it would be
valid to say that it is in the public interest if we could
reasonably agree that everyone, including those not at
risk of getting breast cancer, have an interest in the pro-
gramme being available. In the introduction, we gave
reasons for at least weak support for this claim.
Informants in this study echoed this, emphasizing
breast cancer is common within the community, and
suggesting that preventing breast cancer deaths will de-
liver economic and psychosocial value to a community
which is over and above the benefit for the at-risk
individual.
There are, however, counter-arguments to this view.
For example, as other interviewees argued, there may
well be much stronger public interests in other
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healthcare programmes, which are unable to be realized
if money continues to be channelled into an expensive
breast screening programme. According to this view, the
claim that there is a public interest in breast screening is
only true if breast screening is compared against noth-
ing. It may become untrue if compared against an offer
of other public health programmes in which there is a
stronger public interest (Verweij, 2000). Furthermore,
recent recognition of overdiagnosis in breast screening,
the rate of which remains highly contentious, has led to
the possibility that an offer of breast screening in a
population will deliver an increase in population
breast cancer morbidity even as it delivers a modest de-
crease in population breast cancer mortality. If this is
true, it is much less clear that all at-risk women would
share a (common) interest in the offer of breast screen-
ing, let alone the wider public. That is, it is not at all clear
that an offer of breast screening is in the public interest.
The institutional model of breast screening
Juth and Munthe (2012) emphasize a different kind of
‘publicness’ for screening programmes. They propose
that screening programmes are institutions. This insti-
tutional character suggests socially embedded concepts
are relevant to internal practices as well as to the pro-
gramme’s overall role in society. Our findings support
this claim. Some interviewees certainly saw breast
screening programmes as having an institutional char-
acter: operating with a degree of autonomy and internal
cohesion, having specific aims, functions and key
players (consumers and providers). They used socially
embedded concepts to judge these internal operations
and practices of screening and its key players. They also
applied socially embedded concepts to the programme’s
role in society, highlighting that breast screening might
act in a manner that is contradictory to the public inter-
est as defined above. While one useful contribution of
the institutional model to an understanding of the ethics
of cancer screening might be in the way that it highlights
the application of ethics to both internal operations and
to external functions of the screening programme, we
were concerned about the possible implications of this
model for judging the behaviour of consumers. That is,
such a model might appear to reduce consumers to the
role of pawns in a complicated societal institution with
defined goals. We discuss this in greater detail below.
We note, however, that Juth and Munthe (2012) per-
ceive their institutional model as complementary to,
rather than a replacement for, public health andmedical
(healthcare) ethics, and a combined approach would be
likely to limit any tendency to judge the behaviour of
consumers according to their contribution to institu-
tional goals.
Are socially embedded concepts relevant to how
breast screening is delivered?
Notwithstanding all of the above (i.e. regardless of
whether or not an offer of breast screening is in the
public interest, and whether or not the institutional
model is useful or sufficient), given that a breast screen-
ing programme exists, the other elements of public-ness
in breast screening that we described in the Introduction
would seem to provide enough justification for a claim
that socially embedded concepts have some relevance to
the way that breast screening is delivered. Participants in
our study appeared to agree with this, making judge-
ments about aspects of breast screening delivery based
on concepts such as reciprocity and solidarity. The use
of socially embedded concepts in this context provides a
new perspective on breast screening, illuminating topics
and issues that are seldom explored in breast screening
but seem worthy of closer inspection.
For example, if we accept that the concept of reci-
procity has relevance in breast screening, it follows
that the programme should consider the issue of sup-
port or compensation for those who carry the most bur-
dens, such as overdiagnosis. In particular, policy
decisionmakers might consider the extent to which gov-
ernment promotion of screening to individual women
should mean that the government has some kind of re-
ciprocal responsibility to those women for the outcome
if they participate (albeit limited by the inherent uncer-
tainties in screening). In such a scenario, the idea of
support for those who carry the heaviest burdens
seems reasonable; this may or may not include financial
compensation or alternatives such as restitutions or rep-
aration (Viens et al., 2009). If governments adopt an
approach that is more in line with enabling women to
exercise informed choice about breast screening, then
the programme may move closer to being a clinical
intervention than a public health intervention, and the
role of socially embedded concepts such as reciprocity
would be less clear.
Is women’s participation in breast screening in the
public interest?
In his discussion of the public interests in breast screen-
ing, Verweij argues that a (weak) public interest in
having a policy to offer breast screening does not
imply any public interest in actual participation by
any particular woman, since ‘the decision of the indi-
vidual woman not to participate in screening does not
affect the potential benefits for, and hence the common
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interests of other women’ (2000: 59). However, the lit-
erature suggests that some women feel morally obliged
to attend screening to benefit others (for example, see
Willis, 2004), and we found that experts in our study
also recognized this. In the introduction, we suggested
that there may be no clear public interest in the partici-
pation of individual women in breast screening, and
here we elaborate on that point.
First, there is no breast screening equivalent to ‘herd
immunity’ from vaccination, whereby individual par-
ticipation delivers some protection to the collective in
the form of reduced risk of disease: the screening par-
ticipation of an individual woman will not decrease the
likelihood that other women will get breast cancer.
Secondly, there is no clear basis for an argument that
participation in breast screening helps to keep services
cost-effective and by extension, open. Like many other
cancer-screening programmes, breast screening has low
set-up costs and high running costs, meaning that the
cost per screen is unlikely to significantly decrease with
high participation rates (Torgerson and Donaldson,
1994; Howard et al., 2005). It is possible that at least
some level of participation is necessary to maintain pol-
itical support and funding for breast screening services,
and to maintain professional expertise in identification
and investigation of abnormal screening results.
However, this is speculative, and may be more of an
issue in rural and remote communities where absolute
numbers are lower and critical thresholds more easily
reached.
Finally, we consider that argument alluded to by one
participant that there might be a public interest in
having women participate in breast screening because
this will (allegedly) enable them to live longer and thus
deliver more economic and psycho-social benefits to
others. There is debate about the extent to which par-
ticipation in breast screening delivers all-cause mortality
benefits to a community: there are suggestions that the
reduced breast cancer population mortality rate asso-
ciated with a breast screening programme might be at
least partially offset by an increase in all-cause mortality
because of a higher breast cancer incidence from over-
diagnosis and the treatment-related mortality ramifica-
tions of that. Particularly given the marginal and
contested mortality benefits of breast screening, the sug-
gestion that women should participate in breast screen-
ing because they have a moral obligation to the public to
remain alive seems very weak. This could readily be ex-
tended into an obligation to participate in any kind of
intervention that might lengthen life, which would
quickly become oppressive to individual women.
We are left, then, with two weak arguments about
breast screening participation being in the public inter-
est: (1) based on a pragmatic recognition that breast
screening services require at least some (minimal) use
to remain viable; (2) based on the contribution that a
woman’s continued existence brings to community
flourishing. According to Verweij’s (2000) model,
weak public interests are likely to disappear when the
net benefits to individuals are considered, or when the
intervention under scrutiny is compared against alter-
natives and we suggest that either of these can do the job.
First, given that there are considerable personal costs
associated with participating in breast screening (anx-
iety, pain, the possibility of a false positive diagnosis, or
more seriously, an overdiagnosis and the sequelae of
that), we cannot assume that participation in breast
screening is in every woman’s net interests. For example,
a woman’s preference to avoid a breast cancer deathmay
be at least partially matched by a preference to avoid an
unnecessary breast cancer diagnosis, and given that the
likelihood of the latter is a more likely outcome of
screening participation than the former, it may not be
in her net interests to screen. Secondly, if we compare
the public interest in having an individual woman par-
ticipate in screening with the public interest in having an
individual woman feeling empowered to make decisions
about screening that are based upon her own personal
(informed) preferences it can be concluded that the
latter public interest is stronger, because this means
that women feel they are of intrinsic value, not simply
valued for what they contribute to others.
We conclude that there is little or no public interest
served by women’s individual participation in breast
screening. Furthermore, we suggest that breast screening
providers should be open about the extent to which an
individual woman’s participation does or doesn’t serve
the public interest: it would seemwrong to be aware that
women participate in screening for reasons that are
spurious or invalid without at least discussing and at-
tempting to correct them.
Implications for Researchers
This study highlights some ethically relevant issues in
breast screening that have not, to our knowledge, been
well covered in the public health ethics literature. For
example, socially embedded concepts appear to be im-
portant in driving the process of public health interven-
tions, but their application is rarely discussed in detail
(one notable exception is ‘Stand on Guard for Thee’ by
the JCB Working Group, 2005). It might be useful for
healthcare workers if public health ethics researchers
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provided practical guidance about the use of socially
embedded values in the process of breast screening–
Table 2 provides an example of what this might look
like in practice.
In addition, the contribution of ethics researchers to
specific public health interventions might be enriched
by not only exploring arguments about the public inter-
est in participation, but by comparing theoretical rea-
soning with empirical evidence about consumer
motivation to participate. As in breast screening, it
may be that there is a mismatch between what re-
searchers suggest about the strength of the public inter-
est in participation and what consumers perceive to be
their moral obligation to participate to contribute to
others. Exploring and explaining this might be helpful
for consumers.
Implications for Policymakers and Practitioners
As discussed above, socially embedded concepts are at
least relevant at the process level in how breast screening
is delivered, and policymakers and practitioners should
therefore consider these concepts when talking about
policies and practices. They might benefit from educa-
tion and support in the use of these concepts. Table 2
describes one possible framework for guiding these
kinds of discussions. In addition, policymakers and
practitioners should be aware of the arguments for
and against a public interest in screening participation,
and take care that their policies and practices reflect
valid messages in this regard.
Finally, one unexpected finding in our studies was the
hint that some of our participants might feel a sense of
obligation to the programme itself because of benefits
that had been delivered in relation to breast cancer man-
agement and to auditing practices for screening. If pol-
icymakers and practitioners are indeed strongly
influenced by the principle of reciprocity in this
manner, they might be supporting breast screening pro-
grammes to a greater extent than would be warranted by
the evidence. However, we note that while the benefits
discussed by these interviewees have already been de-
livered, it may be that there are more of these type of
benefits that breast screening programmes might deliver
in the future, or that the continued existence of the pro-
gramme will at least support their maintenance. For ex-
ample, quality control of screening mammography
might plausibly remain higher with the continuation
of an organized, government-sponsored programme
containing a built-in auditing process, compared with
a purely opportunistic programme that does not have
any centralized quality assurance programme. As such,
for those women who have a net interest in participating
in breast screening, an organized breast-screening
Table 2. Specific questions to guide considerations and discussions about socially embedded concepts in breast screening
policy
To what extent is the offer of breast screening in the public interest?
To what extent is the promotion of breast screening in the public interest?
What are the burdens and harms attached to the breast screening programme? Suggestions include:
! Demands on public attention
! Increased anxiety about breast cancer suffering and death
! Burden of decision-making
! Financial burdens
! Physical and emotional morbidity of screening participation and sequelae
! Screening-related mortality
What might be the reciprocal obligations incurred by the breast screening programme as a result of delivering
these burdens and harms? Suggestions include:
! Ongoing efforts to measure and reduce burdens
! Consideration of alternative, less burdensome ways to achieve aims of the programme (and deliver similar
benefits?)
! Consider ways to support and/or compensate those who carry the heaviest burdens
Consider the impact of breast screening policies and practices on solidaric connections between people, including:
! Key players in breast screening (such as consumers, providers)
! The general public (including breast screening consumers, breast cancer patients, others)
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programme might be preferable to an opportunistic
programme. This is a complex issue, worthy of further
research, and largely beyond the scope of this article
except insofar as to suggest that policymakers and prac-
titioners should be alert to the possibility of their own
sense of moral obligation to the programme, and con-
sider the strengths and weaknesses of such an attitude.
Strengths, Limitations and Future Research
As with any inductive analysis, we had to guard against
circularity in our arguments: that is, we were careful not
to define socially embedded concepts in particular ways
that fitted our data. Instead, we were sensitized to the
various meanings of socially embedded concepts in the
literature and while purposefully looking for any text
that expressed any ideas similar to these we also
sought diversity in our data and looked for counter-ex-
amples. We closely examined each element of data that
suggested experts were using socially embedded con-
cepts, deliberately testing for compatibility with other,
more individually orientated concepts and being clear
about levels of uncertainty in our results.
Our study benefits from in-depth analysis of attitudes
and values amongst experts from a range of backgrounds
and experience. However, it is focused on a particular
situation—breast screening—so may not be transfer-
rable to other contexts. The results suggest that at least
some experts refer to socially embedded concepts in
breast screening. It is possible that we have not captured
the full range of the ways that experts reason with these
concepts. Although we sought to maximize diversity of
views and ideas amongst the participants, theremay have
been some concepts that were not discussed during our
interviews, and it is possible that the experts who agreed
to take part were somehow different from those who did
not. We are confident, however, that our efforts to con-
duct extensive interviews and include participants with a
range of backgrounds and differing opinions about
breast screening has minimized such possibilities. We
have not sought, in this study, to explore the views of
women ormembers of the broader public. This would be
an important area for future research.
Conclusion
We set out to examine whether and how expert policy-
makers used socially embedded concepts to reason about
breast screening using an Empirical Ethics approach.
Our empirical findings suggested that at least some ex-
perts employ socially embedded concepts when talking
about breast screening. Experts reasoned with these
concepts in relation to the purpose of breast screening,
the way that it is delivered, and the behaviour of breast
screening professionals and consumers. Experts drew a
variety of conclusions, judging the breast screening pro-
gramme to be very or not very successful in serving the
public interest, and in the inclusion of socially embedded
concepts such as reciprocity and solidarity into its oper-
ational agenda. They censored colleagues who appeared
not to be acting in accordance with socially embedded
concepts, and acknowledged that these concepts might
produce a sense of moral obligation to participate in
breast screening in some women.
Our empirical findings are compatible with the claim
that breast screening has at least some elements of a
public health intervention. We advocate for consider-
ation of socially embedded concepts in relation to the
purpose and internal operations of breast screening. We
also suggest that those who formulate breast screening
policies and practices should be aware of the moral ob-
ligations that drive some women’s breast screening be-
haviour, and take care with what messages they are
sending in this regard.
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Notes
1. For the purposes of this study we defined overdiag-
nosis as the screening diagnosis of a breast cancer
that would not otherwise have come to symptomatic
or clinical attention during the woman’s lifetime,
and where the diagnosis does not deliver any benefit
to the woman (Carter et al., 2015a).
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Chapter 8: The role of socially embedded concepts in breast cancer screening 
 
Additional file 1: Sample interview introduction and questions 
Note: this list is provided as a guide only; the questions were modified to suit the experience 
and perspective of the interviewee. 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. As you know, there has been quite a lot 
written in the literature and in the media about breast screening and what the program should 
look like.  Plenty of people are happy with things the way they are, but others are not.  So I’m 
interested in exploring that range of opinion, particularly amongst people who work in the 
field, including those who work in clinical practice, research, administration, or in breast 
cancer advocacy. 
 
• Can you describe the scope of your professional activities that involve breast screening, 
to give me an idea about your involvement in the program? 
 
• Would you like to see any changes to the current program? 
o Prompt: What would your ideal program be? 
 
• There are many different ideas about breast cancer screening.  Can you comment on 
these?   
o Prompt: There are some who hold very extreme views about breast cancer 
screening.  How do you respond to these ideas?  What do you think drives those 
views? 
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• (If the topic hasn’t yet surfaced) One of the topics I’m interested in is communicating with 
women.  You may know that some places are looking at re-doing the breast screening 
leaflet.  What are your thoughts on what should be said to women? 
 
• (If the topic hasn’t yet surfaced) Recent studies suggest that some cancers found at 
screening would never have come to clinical attention in that person’s lifetime. What are 
your thoughts on this issue? 
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Additional file 2: Sample codes and categories 
Examples of codes used for analysing interview data. 
• Views on screening 
o Overall thoughts on breast cancer screening 
o What is important about breast cancer screening 
o How own views are formed 
o Harms including how to balance harms and benefits 
o Changes would like to see / ideal program 
o Justification for suggesting those changes or having stated views  
o Why own view is right  
• Evidence & more  
o What evidence is accepted or used as right (numbers, names)  
o Why that evidence used e.g. what are the influences on self regarding 
interpretation of evidence  
o General ideas about evidence  
• Views of other people 
o Comments on different / contradictory evidence 
o Comments on possible influences on other people / why they think the way 
they do 
 
Examples of categories used for analysing interview data 
• What does the state owe women? 
• What do women owe the state? 
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• What do experts owe each other? 
• What do experts owe women / the state? 
• Breast screening – women assisting women  
• Breast screening – community interests 
• Experts working together 
• Community interests vs. individual interests 
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9.1 Chapter Introduction 
This study began with the observation that there were substantial disagreements about breast 
screening among many leading experts in the field. People who are intelligent, apparently 
well-meaning, and familiar with the evidence, seem to arrive at different conclusions 
regarding the right thing to do in breast screening policy and practice.  I set out to explore the 
reasons behind this conflict and make suggestions for constructive progress, with particular 
emphasis on the role of values. I found that breast screening experts held different values and 
that these values appeared to underpin their views on breast screening.  I discovered that 
values were conceptualised and prioritised in a range of ways, but that as values were rarely 
discussed, there was ample potential for miscommunication and seemingly irresolvable 
conflict about what was considered important in breast screening.  I concluded that people 
involved in influencing or directing breast screening policies and practices might benefit 
from information, further education, and opportunities to think and talk about values in a 
structured way.  This might include teaching and learning activities to promote greater 
familiarity with the language and concepts of ethics, explicit encouragement of personal 
reflection around values, and regular discussion of values in the context of breast cancer 
screening.  In order to improve understanding among experts about each others’ views, and to 
assist in consensus building, it would seem useful to formally include discussions about 
ethics in decision-making processes for breast screening policies and practices. 
 
 214 
Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusion 
 
9.2 Conflict in breast screening 
Disagreements about evidence 
Many writers and journal editors have acknowledged the controversy about breast screening 
and the often-polarised nature of expert opinion.1-6 Concerns about self-interest and 
commercial matters aside,7-10 the cause of disagreement amongst well-meaning experts has 
been frequently attributed to disagreements about the evidence.  Certainly the vast amount of 
breast screening evidence includes many conflicting results and interpretations.  There are 
numerous plausible explanations about why this might occur.  For example, the particular 
evidence that experts construct or consider as most important to read and use, will vary 
depending on their epistemic preferences11, 12 as I discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  It may be 
influenced to a greater or lesser extent by cognitive biases that affect human judgement 
generally, including wish bias (the tendency to interpret evidence that supports what one 
wishes to hear), confirmation bias (the tendency to seek out or interpret evidence that 
reinforces existing views),7, 13, 14 or availability bias (the process of judging importance or 
frequency by the ease with which examples come to mind).15 Such biases can help explain 
some of the patterned links between experts’ professional roles and opinions about breast 
screening that I described in Chapters 6 and 7.  Experts’ interpretation of the evidence will 
also be influenced by the extent to which their thinking conforms to the biomedical 
paradigms I described in Chapters 1 and 2, including assumptions about the natural history 
of breast cancer and the use of technology in medicine.7, 10, 11, 16  Furthermore, the views of 
experts are likely to be shaped by the wider social and political factors I discussed in 
Chapter 2.  For example, experts – like all people - are vulnerable to the framing effect of 
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widely used relative risk formats for reporting risk reduction associated with breast screening, 
which may lead them to overestimate the benefits of breast screening.17 
 
Disagreements about values 
While these factors help to explain at least some of the expert disagreements about breast 
screening, they do not reveal the full story.  That is, even when experts agree about the 
evidence they may still disagree about one or more aspect of breast screening.2, 9, 11, 18  
Decisions in healthcare depend not only on analysis of the evidence but also on what is 
valued in relation to that evidence.19  Thus, for example, it is not enough to have information 
about outcomes and the processes of achieving those outcomes: there must also be a set of 
values that shapes what is considered good or bad about those outcomes and processes.  
Disagreements about values are therefore likely to be another important factor behind 
disagreement amongst breast screening experts.  The influence of values on the views of 
breast screening experts has been acknowledged, but not, until now, systematically or 
empirically studied.  One of the major contributions of my research has been to provide 
empirical detail about how experts’ values influence their perspectives on breast screening.  
In Chapter 5 I have described wide variation in how experts conceptualise and prioritise 
relevant values, and the ways in which this influences their views on breast screening in 
general.  In Chapters 6 and 7 I have drawn out the relationship between the values that 
experts hold and their views about the particular topics of overdiagnosis and communication 
with consumers.  In Chapter 8 I described experts’ discussions around socially embedded 
values and discussed their relevance to breast screening. 
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This detailed picture of the ways in which values influence experts’ views about breast 
screening provides a solid base for understanding some of the ongoing controversies.  For 
example, disagreements about the significance of overdiagnosis may be at least partly to do 
with conceptualisation and prioritisation of “avoiding harm” (See Chapter 6).  Similarly, 
much of the disagreement about what is communicated to consumers about breast screening 
may be underpinned by variation in conceptualisation and prioritisation of “respect for 
autonomy” (See Chapter 7).  This thesis provides knowledge and understanding about 
experts’ values and the roles they play in shaping experts’ views and disagreements, an ideal 
position from which to begin examining how best to guide policy and practice decision 
making, particularly around contentious issues. 
9.3 How to proceed in the face of conflict in breast screening 
Throughout the empirical papers in this thesis, I have not only described the range and 
variation of experts’ values, I have also drawn on that information to make suggestions for 
constructive debate and decision making regarding breast screening policy and practice, even 
in the face of ongoing expert disagreement.  The remainder of this chapter draws on and 
extends these discussions. 
Addressing conflict requires identifying and then considering the sources of disagreement.20 I 
have noted above how the role of evidence in the conflict has been well discussed and 
described, and how the role of values has been noted, but until now, not considered in any 
detail.  There have also been a number of suggestions about what, if anything, to do about 
breast screening controversies.  I describe here two main approaches from the existing 
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literature, concentrating on evidence and values respectively, and then add my own new 
interpretations and recommendations. 
Evidence 
Many proposed solutions to breast screening conflict have focused on the evidence, and 
involve the presentation of a particular set of epistemological preferences or claims about 
how others should construct or use evidence.  For example, there have been calls to ignore 
certain swathes of the published literature on breast screening as being “faulty science”,21p107 
beset by epidemiological inadequacies such as “the use of incomplete data”,22 “grave 
errors”23p206 and “inappropriate analyses”.3p82  These strongly worded recommendations 
suggest that the authors have deeply held and opposing ideas about what evidence is 
acceptable evidence.  This was supported by my empirical research, which showed that 
experts gave very different accounts of what constituted sufficient and good quality evidence 
(Chapter 5).  A slightly different approach has been to encourage clearer communication of 
the results of research8, 24, 25 together with better education of experts, and subsequently the 
public, in topics relevant to the interpretation of breast screening evidence. This has included 
proposals to improve general numeracy, encourage understanding of epidemiological 
principles including uncertainties, limitations and harms in screening, and to raise and 
explain the concept of non-progressive breast lesions.16, 17, 26  Efforts to reduce the impact of 
wish or confirmation bias (as well as the influence of vested financial or professional 
interests) have resulted in greater emphasis on independence in analysis of the evidence.7, 9, 25, 
27
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Values  
Others who seek to resolve breast screening conflict have focused on addressing values, 
suggesting that at least one reason for disagreement about breast screening is that experts 
hold different perspectives on what is important.9,28  While acknowledging the role of 
evidence as discussed above, my study has concentrated predominantly on this latter 
approach, testing the ideas that values are important in breast screening decision making, and 
that differences in values might contribute to conflict.  My empirical findings confirmed the 
importance of values in decision making for breast screening policy and practice.  I found 
that breast screening experts do talk about values and describe their moral reasoning 
processes when discussing their views on breast screening (See Chapters 5 to 8), and that 
values appear to inform and underpin much of their thinking, including around contentious 
topics such as overdiagnosis and communication with consumers (See Chapters 6 and 7).  
Furthermore, my results confirmed that there is variation in the ways that breast screening 
experts conceptualise values.  For example, the concept of respecting autonomy was 
interpreted and actioned in a variety of ways by experts, ranging from breast screening 
support and advocacy, to endorsing a stronger focus on informed decision making in breast 
screening (Chapter 5). I also found differences in the sorts of values that were held to be 
most important. For example, some experts appeared to focus more firmly on delivering 
benefit, while others were particularly concerned about avoiding harm (Chapter 5).  The 
ways that experts conceptualised values and perceived their relative importance was linked to 
different views about breast screening.  There has been discussion in the literature about 
addressing conflict in breast screening by concentrating on the differences in people’s values.  
Suggestions have included: removal of values from decision making, promotion of one or 
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other value as a priority, and open discussion about values.  I will describe these ideas in turn, 
outlining their strengths and weaknesses, before describing my own recommendations. 
 
Some have proposed that since differences in the way people think about values allegedly lie 
at the heart of breast screening conflict, values should be excluded from decision making.  
They argue for a so-called “objective” interpretation of “raw evidence”,29p956 implying that 
this would yield a value-free view of breast screening, and would resolve disagreement.  
Others contend that it is unrealistic and unhelpful to suggest that values can be removed from 
decision making.18, 30  They see evidence as vital in answering questions about breast 
screening policy and practice but, since those questions are fundamentally driven by what it 
is that society considers to be important, it is values, rather than “massed files of scientific 
evidence”18p310 that lie at the heart of decision making. 
 
Other writers have suggested solutions that rest heavily upon one or more value that they 
appear to see as being particularly important, without discussing the strengths or weakness of 
competing values in any depth.  For example, some who write about overdiagnosis in breast 
screening allude to an apparent conflict between the ethical concepts of maximising benefit 
and respecting autonomy, and justify their recommendation to promote informed choice by 
simply assuming and stating that the latter is the dominant value .31-33 Those who continue to 
support opposing practices, such as strong guidance and recommendations in favour of 
screening, cite a different value to justify their position (maximising benefit), either ignoring 
the values prioritised by others or appearing to believe that their position self-evidently 
trumps alternatives.34  Arguably, presenting one particular value as an unassailable ‘trump 
card’ in this way leads to success for those with the loudest or most influential voice rather 
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than what is most ethically correct, or to a stalemate position with experts unwilling to be 
persuaded of alternative points of view. 
 
Less frequently, writers have attempted to approach contested issues in breast screening by 
identifying values that appear to be in conflict with each other within the given context, and 
encouraging debate about which value is more important, and why.28  It seems important and 
useful to promote deeper ethical reflection and discussion about an issue, as this may lead to 
decisions that are more ethically sound, and more in keeping with what we actually hold to be 
important in life than decisions made without such a considered moral foundation.35,36  
Disappointingly however, these efforts have generally stalled at the outset.  My empirical 
results provide some clues as to why this might be so (see Chapters 5 to 8).  Firstly, some 
experts may reject the idea that values are relevant or should be included in decision making.  
Secondly, experts may conceptualise values differently, which may result in people using the 
same terminology with quite different meanings, and thus failing to successfully 
communicate.  
My recommended approach 
My recommendation for addressing conflict is to include values-based discussions at all 
levels of breast screening policy debate and decision making, advice that is supported by my 
empirically derived explanations of how values may influence different positions and 
perspectives.  Thus I suggest that discussions about values should be included, along with 
discussions about evidence, at times of policy set-up, evaluation, and review, as well as 
during times of controversy and decisional conflict.  This would require the participation of 
all stakeholders in a clear endorsement of the role of values, nuanced understanding of the 
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plurality of views, and reflective discussion of different ways in which values are 
conceptualised and prioritised. 
 
My approach builds upon suggestions described above, and also upon more general 
discussions and guidance about incorporating values into evidence-based healthcare decision 
making.  This includes the GRADE framework for evaluating evidence as part of the process 
for producing evidence-based guidelines, which incorporates assessments of values regarding 
benefits and harms, in particular, the extent to which intervention outcomes are generally 
regarded as being desirable or undesirable.37  GRADE authors recommend that decision-
making panels should use the perspective of patients when thinking about benefits and 
harms,38 and should be transparent about their estimates or assumptions regarding these 
typical patient values.39, 40  The GRADE framework is widely endorsed, although the 
(limited) empirical evidence about its usability and effectiveness suggests there may be room 
for improvement,41-43 especially in the field of public health where benefits and harms may be 
both more complex, and an insufficient reflection of relevant ethical considerations.44  Other 
writers have encouraged those drafting or reviewing healthcare guidelines and policies to 
include discussion of a range of their own personal values in decision making processes, 
citing theoretical justifications such as the improvement of transparency, predictability, 
accountability, legitimacy and appropriateness of recommendations.45-47  These authors do 
more than simply promote a generic list of ethical principles for decision makers to consider, 
rather they call for those involved to discuss relevant ethical concepts and to be open about 
their values, explaining what ethical issues are most important and most influential for their 
decisions in the given context and why.  My approach builds on these ideas, and does so in a 
manner informed by my empirical findings.  In this way, it is specifically adapted to the 
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breast screening scenario.  Aspects of my approach have been described in Chapters 5 to 8, 
and I have collated and synthesised those discussions below. 
 
1: Acknowledge the role of values 
My empirical findings that some experts dismissed or ignored values leads me to recommend 
including explicit acknowledgement of the role of values at all levels of policy decision 
making.  In this way, my approach builds on the work of those who argue that the role of 
values in breast screening decision making should be acknowledged, and that the inevitable 
values differences should be anticipated.7, 11, 18, 20, 30, 48 Thus I agree with Ransohoff and 
colleagues, who call upon the key players in the breast screening debate to “agree at the 
outset that informed judgments are an essential part of decision making, whether by 
individuals or by society, and that differences in judgments should be expected and 
respected”.49p1033 Experts should be encouraged to see values as being relevant to breast 
screening decision making; achieving agreement on this point may require active support and 
further education for experts. 
 
2: Develop knowledge and skills in ethics: education and self-reflection 
Ethics education is common practice in clinical training programs, and increasingly 
advocated in public health training.35,50  Curiously, however, knowledge of relevant ethical 
issues is rarely a pre-requisite for participation in policymaking processes.  Given the 
centrality of values and ethical concepts to the policymaking process revealed in this study, it 
seems likely that training in ethics, including in vocabulary, basic concepts, and skills for 
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critical self-reflection, would assist those charged with designing programs to deal with the 
challenges of their task. 
 
I did not set out to test the extent to which experts possessed ethics knowledge, or skills in 
self-reflection, but my empirical results leads me to expect that ethics education for experts 
will be of benefit.  For example, my finding that experts held differing interpretations of 
values, and did not necessarily recognise this (see Chapter 5) indicates that experts who do 
mention ethical concepts may often be talking at cross-purposes.  Increasing experts’ 
awareness about the possibility of variation in the meanings that others may attach to 
particular values or concepts is an important step towards reducing misunderstandings.  
Similarly, my empirical observation that some experts openly rejected the notion of ethical 
consideration (see Chapter 5) suggests that at least some decision makers might have limited 
experience in self-contemplation of the range of factors that shape their own views about 
what is important in breast screening and why.  Encouragement and training in self-reflection 
is valuable because it seems probable that it will provide a more solid foundation for 
decision-making in a given context (e.g. breast screening policy and practice).  That is, while 
policy makers are certainly capable of making decisions about ethically-relevant issues 
without formal ethics training, arguably personal judgements made without the assistance of 
a developed capacity for careful moral reflection will be less enduring and less coherent than 
decisions made after deep consideration about one’s own values.36 
 
3: Regular discussions about values 
Considered discussions about ethical aspects of healthcare seem likely to deliver more 
ethically appropriate decisions.35  For example, group deliberation on moral aspects of a 
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given topic would arguably increase the likelihood that decision makers would identify a 
broader range of relevant viewpoints, and recognise possible biases in their own preliminary 
conclusions.  In addition, the process of discussing values regularly should provide more 
opportunity for those involved in decision making to address any values-based conflict that 
does emerge in the future. 
 
There are many possible ways to structure discussions about values. I have used my empirical 
findings to inform two possible models or frameworks for how this might occur, details of 
which are provided below.  These suggestions can be used together or separately.  They 
might benefit from fine-tuning after practical testing and evaluation, and are not necessarily 
the only processes for incorporating ethics discussions into breast screening decision making. 
 
Model 1 – Incorporating values into policy aims and evaluation 
In Chapter 7 I suggested that discussions about values in breast screening should include 
debate around a list of relevant values to develop an understanding of what each value means, 
and make decisions about which values are most important in the given context.  In this 
section I provide further detail on how this discussion model might be structured. 
 
In the early stages of my research I drafted a list of ethical values likely to be relevant for 
decision making in breast screening policy (Table 4.1, reproduced here and re-labelled as 
Table 9.1). 
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Table 9.1 Ethical considerations relevant to decision making for breast screening policy 
and practice. (Draft version)  
 
• Maximise health benefits 
• Minimise harms 
• Deliver more benefits than harms 
• Deliver the most benefit possible within the resources available 
• Respect autonomy 
• Maintain transparency, including communicating honestly 
• Distribute benefits and burdens justly 
• Uphold reciprocal obligations 
• Act in solidarity with others 
SOURCE: Reproduced from Chapter 2 
 
I have since drawn on my empirical work and theoretical analysis of the literature to make 
adjustments to the list categories and to include detailed annotations for each item (see Table 
9.2), developing what was a simple inventory of values into a decision-making tool with step-
by-step guidance in the form of specific triggers and questions for discussion (Table 9.2).  
Decision makers can use this annotated table by working through the four sets of discussion 
triggers.  The first trigger set encourages decision makers to consider the relevant values for 
their own particular breast screening context; a suggested list is provided and discussants can 
add any additional values as they wish.  The second set of triggers relates to the range of 
conceptualisations of each value in the context of breast screening: each discussant can 
describe their own conceptualisations and the group can draw on evidence such as the papers 
contained within this thesis to identify others.  The third set of triggers is intended to 
stimulate debate about the strengths and weakness of each conceptualisation, and to 
encourage consideration of which one or more might be the most relevant for the given breast 
screening context.  Again, the group may need to draw on epidemiological and other 
evidence to provide supporting information.  The fourth and final set of triggers is about the 
priority level of each value in the given context.  Decision makers are asked to consider 
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competing values and discuss the implications of this.  Discussants will need to draw heavily 
on the evidence for knowledge about processes and about the extent and certainty of specific 
outcomes from breast screening, in order to meaningfully compare things that are held to be 
important in this field. 
 
(see table on following pages) 
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Table 9.2 Framework to guide decision making in breast screening policy and practice (annotated version)  
 
Range of conceptualisations 
for each relevant value 
Notes on strengths or weaknesses of a given conceptualisation Questions (and evidence) to consider 
when debating the relative importance of 
each relevant value  
Maximising health benefits  (See Chapters 5, 7 and 8 for more detail) 
Reducing population mortality 
rate from breast cancer and/or 
all causes. 
It may be unreasonable to expect to obtain evidence of all-cause 
mortality reduction associated with breast cancer screening because 
of the large numbers of research participants that would be required. 
A disease-specific (i.e. breast cancer) mortality rate is more 
amenable to empirical study than an all-cause mortality rate, 
although arguably the former may not provide a complete picture: i.e. 
may miss mortality implications of overdiagnosis. 
 
 
How much, and what kind of health benefit 
accrues from breast screening, and how 
certain is the evidence about this? 
Reducing population breast 
cancer morbidity by enabling 
less aggressive breast cancer 
treatment for individuals. 
Any apparent reduction in treatment-related morbidity as a result of 
breast screening may be offset by the increased morbidity associated 
with overdiagnosis. 
Providing relief from breast 
cancer related anxiety. 
This apparent benefit may be artificial: reduced anxiety after a 
negative screen may partly derive from previously inflated anxiety 
due to screening promotion. 
To what extent is anxiety about breast 
cancer inflated by a breast screening 
program and related promotional activities? 
Improving the overall health 
of the entire population. 
While the availability of breast screening might offer benefits to a 
population, it also: delivers harms, is an expensive program with high 
opportunity costs, and arguably fails to address the main health needs 
of those with the poorest health outcomes. 
To what extent do efforts to maximise the 
health benefits of breast screening impinge 
on other relevant values, e.g. by delivering 
harms, consuming financial resources, 
maintaining or increasing health 
inequalities? 
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Minimising harms  (See Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 for more detail) 
Monitoring and/or ensuring a 
low occurrence rate in one or 
more of the following 
outcomes: overdiagnosis; 
overtreatment; false positive 
test; false negative test; 
radiation damage; personal 
financial burden. 
Measurement uncertainty in some conceptualisations of harm (e.g. 
overdiagnosis) is high in comparison to measurement uncertainty in 
common conceptualisations of benefit, making it difficult to interpret 
the significance of such harms.  In addition, the degree of personal 
suffering related to a given conceptualisation of harm (e.g. 
overdiagnosis, overtreatment) may be highly variable.  Despite this, 
ignoring certain harms because of measurement uncertainty or 
variability in suffering would seem to be an unreasonable exclusion 
of morally relevant considerations. 
How often do each of these outcomes occur 
in any given breast screening program and 
how certain is the evidence about this?  Who 
should decide how significant these harms 
are in comparison to benefits?  Given that 
breast screening is largely initiated by health 
services and offered to well women,51 and 
that harms may accrue to individuals who 
receive no benefit, to what extent are 
practitioners responsible for minimising 
harms in breast screening compared to, for 
example, clinical interventions provided in 
response to requests from those who are sick 
and where benefits and harms accrue to the 
same individual? 
Avoiding an excessive 
increase in societal and/or 
individual anxiety about breast 
cancer suffering and death. 
A certain level of health-related anxiety may be considered useful 
rather than detrimental to an individual and a society, acting as a 
stimulus to public health interventions and personal behaviour that 
lead towards better health.  Arguably however, anxiety about breast 
cancer is currently exaggerated well beyond what seems in keeping 
with what is known about its incidence, and impact on morbidity and 
mortality, and may be considered harmful. 
To what extent does the offer and promotion 
of breast screening result in breast cancer 
related anxiety? 
Avoiding an excessive burden 
of decision making for women 
in regard to the consideration 
of breast screening 
participation. 
Breast screening experts cannot agree about whether or not women 
should participate in breast screening, suggesting that there is no 
obviously correct decision for a consumer. 
To what extent, if any, do women consider 
decision making about participation in 
breast screening to be burdensome?  If so, 
how might this burden be reduced while still 
enabling and encouraging women to be 
informed and involved in making decisions 
about participating in breast screening? 
Paying close attention to 
quality control in breast 
screening services 
Arguably the cost of quality control programs must be reasonable. To what extent would efforts to maintain 
high quality services increase screening 
provider costs? 
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Delivering more benefits than harms  (See Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 for more detail) 
Ensuring that breast screening 
reflects experts’ considered 
decisions on how to design the 
program so that resulting 
population health benefits 
outweigh population harms. 
 
 
 
 
Where benefits and harms are finely balanced, as in breast screening, 
it seems reasonable to encourage greater individual consideration 
about participation than might normally be expected in public health 
interventions. 
 
 
 
 
To what extent are the views of individuals 
and the public important in determining the 
balance of benefits and harms in breast 
screening? 
Ensuring that women make an 
informed choice about breast 
screening participation, 
incorporating their personal 
views on benefits and harms. 
Ensuring, and regularly 
reassessing whether or not 
breast screening is, overall, in 
the public interest. 
Arguably a calculation about whether breast screening delivers more 
benefits than harms requires consideration of not only the direct 
outcomes of the program but also indirect factors that affect 
population health, such as: the financial and opportunity costs of the 
program, and its impact on health inequalities (see notes above on 
“delivering benefit”). 
How, and by whom, should calculations be 
made about whether or not breast screening 
is in the public interest?  
Maintaining cost-efficiency  (See Chapter 5 for more detail) 
Ensuring that the financial 
cost of avoiding one breast 
cancer death is comparable to 
the cost of other similarly 
effective healthcare 
interventions. 
Arguably the up-front cost of avoiding one death because of a public 
health intervention is not readily comparable to the up-front cost of 
saving one life from a clinical healthcare intervention: preventing ill 
health may deliver more benefits to society than treating sick 
individuals (because the latter may experience long periods of lower 
productivity prior to their healthcare intervention). 
How does the financial cost of avoiding one 
death or saving one life as a result of breast 
screening compare with other healthcare 
interventions? 
Maintaining a minimum breast 
screening participation rate of 
around 70% in order to keep 
the cost-per-screen as low as 
possible. 
The main financial costs associated with breast screening relate to 
running costs rather than fixed costs, and therefore the cost-per-
screen is relatively static once an initial (very low) base participation 
rate is reached. 
In what way are breast screening 
participation rates linked to cost-efficiency? 
Minimising administrative 
inefficiencies associated with 
the breast screening program. 
This would appear to be an important aspect of public health service 
delivery. 
Are there any unnecessary inefficiencies in 
the administrative aspects of breast 
screening? 
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Respecting, supporting or enhancing autonomy  (See Chapters 5, 6 and 7 for more detail) 
Ensuring that women are not 
coerced into participating in 
breast screening. 
There are strong drivers of breast screening that funnel a woman 
towards a particular “choice” in favour of participation. This may be 
exacerbated by promotional activities from sources such as providers 
and advocacy organisations.  Arguably however, participation in 
screening does not necessarily accord with what the woman would 
choose after considered, informed reflection. 
To what extent do promotional activities 
result in a woman’s breast screening choices 
differing from what they would be after a 
more contemplative and informed decision 
making process?  
 
 
 
Providing relevant information 
and opportunities for women 
to make an informed choice 
about participating in breast 
screening (including 
informing about harms). 
The possibility that an informed choice process will allow women to 
make an autonomous choice about breast screening might be limited 
by difficulties in consumer understanding of information that is 
complex and conflicts with long standing public health beliefs (such 
as the concept that early diagnosis is always important).  That is, 
achieving informed decision making might be time-consuming and 
expensive, resulting in heavy burdens for the individual and the 
community. 
How much would it cost to facilitate 
informed decision making for breast 
screening participation?  What is the best 
way to facilitate informed decision making 
amongst breast screening consumers with 
minimal burden? 
Notwithstanding the comments in the cell above, encouraging 
consumers to engage in informed decision making about breast 
screening might reduce participation rates, thereby possibly reducing 
benefits.  
Would the encouragement and facilitation of 
informed consumer decision making reduce 
breast screening participation rates?  If so, to 
what extent does this matter? 
Increasing available options 
for effective treatment (by 
providing the opportunity to 
access less aggressive, earlier 
treatment)  
While some women who participate in screening will have increased 
treatment options, many more women will have their lives 
constrained by the impact of outcomes such as false positive results 
and overdiagnosis. 
What are the likely outcomes for an 
individual woman from participating in 
breast screening? 
 
Providing ready access to 
breast screening for all 
women, including those 
younger and older than the 
target age range. 
The likelihood that a woman’s options will be constrained rather than 
enhanced by breast screening is even more likely for younger women 
and older women with significant co-morbidities, because the benefit 
to harm ratio of breast screening is reduced in these population sub-
groups. 
What are the likely outcomes for younger 
and older women?  To what extent is it 
reasonable for providers to limit access to 
breast screening, in order to protect the best 
interests of individuals? 
While healthcare choice is important it must arguably be balanced 
against cost-efficiency: allowing unrestricted access to breast 
screening might increase costs without improving population health. 
To what extent is it reasonable for providers 
to limit access to breast screening, in order 
to contain costs? 
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Distributing benefits and harms in a just manner  (See Chapter 5 for more detail) 
Ensuring that all women in the 
target screening population 
have an equal opportunity to 
participate in, and be informed 
about, breast screening. 
While equality of opportunity is important it must arguably be 
balanced against cost-efficiency. 
What are the financial costs of interventions 
to encourage breast screening in hard-to-
reach groups?  To what extent would it be 
reasonable to incur these costs in order to 
pursue fair distribution of breast screening 
access and information? 
Having an even distribution of 
breast screening participation 
rates across the population. 
Setting a target for equality of participation across different 
population groups might be an important tool to facilitate fairness, 
but has the potential to lead to coercive promotional techniques 
aimed at sub-groups with low rates of screening participation. 
See notes and questions above on whether 
or not promotional activities are coercive. 
Facilitating an even 
distribution of breast cancer 
mortality, or overall health, 
across the population. 
Including a population health focus that incorporates issues of health 
inequality may appear to be a very broad agenda, but arguably is 
within the remit of all public health interventions.  Breast cancer is 
relatively evenly spread across the population (slightly more 
common in women of higher socio-economic backgrounds) and 
arguably communities would be better served by interventions that 
concentrated on improving the health for those with the poorest 
health outcomes. 
To what extent, if any, will a population 
offer of breast screening affect health 
inequality across that population? 
Communicating honestly  (See Chapters 2, 5, 6 and 7 for more detail) 
 
 
Providing relevant information 
about the harms of breast 
screening to consumers and 
the general public. 
While providing information about the harms of breast screening 
might reduce participation rates, thereby possibly reducing benefits, 
honest communication between healthcare providers and the public 
would seem to be a central tenet of our healthcare system. 
What information needs to be provided to 
women in order to maintain honesty in 
communication? 
Notwithstanding the comments in the cell above, public disclosure 
about overdiagnosis will need to be managed carefully and 
sensitively: some people may become distressed upon receiving the 
information that they may have been overdiagnosed and there may be 
reduced public confidence in the healthcare system. 
How can information about overdiagnosis in 
the breast screening program be 
communicated to the public in such a way as 
to minimise individual distress and maintain 
public trust and confidence in the healthcare 
system. 
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Communicating honestly  (continued from previous) 
Using independent experts to 
provide information to women 
to assist them in making an 
informed choice about breast 
screening participation. 
The common practice of requesting breast screening units to meet 
high participation targets and also to write information pamphlets for 
consumers might well be, or be seen to be, a conflict of interest.  It 
would seem sensible to either remove participation targets, or use 
independent writers for consumer leaflets, or both. 
Are there any independent writers that can 
be called upon to provide information for 
women?  What would be the impact on 
breast screening rates of removing 
participation targets? 
Making policy decisions with a fair, honest, and transparent process  (See Chapters 2 and 5 for more detail) 
Using independent experts to 
review the evidence and/or 
make policy decisions. 
Those with professional or financial conflicts of interest in breast 
screening might be influenced, or be seen to be influenced, by 
matters other than the best interests of women and communities 
when involved in decision making for policy and practice. 
Are there any independent experts that can 
be called upon to make decisions about 
breast screening policy and practice and if 
so, how can independent experts ensure that 
their decisions about breast screening are 
sufficiently grounded in the realities of 
breast screening? 
Ensuring that policy decision-
makers disclose any conflicts 
of interest. 
The problems of conflict of interest described above might persist 
even if conflicts of interests are disclosed. 
Ensuring that all relevant 
stakeholders, including 
clinical experts, have an 
opportunity to participate in 
decisions about breast 
screening policy. 
Despite the above comments about conflict of interest, it would seem 
useful to allow stakeholders input into breast screening 
policymaking.  (Stakeholders may be a rich source of important and 
relevant information; allowing stakeholder input may help to build 
useful alliances and increase decision-making legitimacy) 
How should the views and relevant 
experiences of stakeholders be obtained and 
communicated to decision makers for breast 
screening policy and practice? 
Publicly disclosing the values 
used to guide breast screening 
policy and practice; possibly 
involving the public to decide 
on these values. 
Given that decisions about breast screening policy and practice 
present many ethical challenges and tensions, it seems important that 
the public are informed about the kinds of values that guide decision-
making bodies.  Arguably it is also important for policymakers to 
seek out the values and views of informed members of the public e.g. 
through deliberative democracy methods such as a citizens’ jury. 
How should the values and views of an 
informed public be obtained and 
communicated to decision makers?  To what 
extent would this information influence 
decision makers to select different breast 
screening policies? To what extent is this 
relevant? (i.e. To what extent do inclusive, 
democratic processes for policy making 
have intrinsic value independent of their 
outcomes?) 
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Upholding the reciprocal obligations (of government and public health providers to members of the public)  (See Chapter 8 for more detail) 
Maintaining efforts to measure 
and reduce population 
burdens, harms and costs 
associated with breast 
screening. 
The burdens, harms and costs of breast screening could possibly be 
reduced through modifications to the screening program (e.g. 
variable screening guidelines for specific target populations, and/or 
use of new technologies). 
What would be the outcomes and 
implications (e.g. for individual choice) of 
different breast screening guidelines and 
technologies?  To what extent should 
individuals be allowed to choose how and 
when to screen? 
Considering other, less 
burdensome and/or less 
expensive ways to reduce 
population breast cancer 
mortality and morbidity. 
Breast screening carries significant opportunity costs, and at least 
some of the expertise, time and money directed at breast screening 
could arguably be more effective if used elsewhere (e.g. on research 
to improve breast cancer prognosis and treatment). 
What is the likelihood of being better able to 
reduce the burden of breast cancer through 
means other than screening (e.g. prevention 
or treatment)? 
 
 
Supporting those who are 
most burdened by breast 
screening (e.g. those likely to 
have been overdiagnosed). 
The nature of overdiagnosis means that it is currently very difficult, 
or impossible, to identify those people who have been most heavily 
burdened by breast screening, although it still seems morally 
important to try. 
How could the individuals who have been 
most heavily burdened by breast screening 
be identified and what would be the best 
way to support those individuals? 
There may be concerns about the implications (e.g. legal and 
financial) of acknowledging and identifying those who carry 
particularly heavy burdens related to breast screening.  Arguably 
however, such concerns must be weighed against the importance of 
upholding reciprocal obligations. 
To what extent would the provision of 
support for these individuals reduce the 
cost-efficiency of breast screening, and how 
important is this? 
Respecting and facilitating solidaric connections  (See Chapter 8 for more detail) 
Including considerations of 
community interests when 
making decisions about breast 
screening policy and practice. 
Community interests and well-being appear to be less frequently 
discussed in the breast screening context than individual interests, but 
are arguably of considerable moral significance for this public health 
intervention. 
To what extent, if any, is the offer and 
promotion of breast screening in the public 
interest? 
Ensuring that women with 
breast cancer have similar 
healthcare access and support 
to women in screening. 
There may be good reasons for public health and clinical 
interventions to be funded separately, but it seems morally important 
that this does not create artificial divisions between people (e.g. 
breast screening consumers vs breast cancer patients). 
How can we ensure that women attending 
breast cancer treatment services are not 
disadvantaged compared with women 
attending breast cancer screening services? 
Table continued overleaf 
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Respecting and facilitating solidaric connections  (continued from previous) 
Encouraging women to see 
participation in breast 
screening as a moral 
obligation to others. 
A woman’s feeling of moral obligation to participate in screening in 
order to retain services for others seems morally problematic.  That 
is, notwithstanding the importance of community solidarity, it would 
seem an unreasonably large burden to expect individual women to 
carry. 
To what extent, if any, does a woman’s 
participation in breast screening benefit 
others?  If so, how much burden is it 
reasonable to expect her to carry in order to 
benefit others?  
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Descision makers who prefer a less prescriptive decision-making tool could use the following 
template version (Table 9.3), which presents the set of triggers without accompanying notes 
or specific questions. 
 
Table 9.3 Framework to guide decision making in breast screening policy and practice 
(template version)   Draft a list of the relevant ethical values  e.g. consider: maximising benefit; minimising harms; delivering more benefits than harms; maintaining cost-efficiency; respecting autonomy; distributing benefits and harms in a just manner; communicating honestly; making policy decisions with a fair, honest, and transparent process; upholding reciprocal obligations; respecting and facilitating solidaric connections List common conceptualisations of each value Consider the strengths and weaknesses of each conceptualisation Consider the relative importance of each value e.g. To what extent would interventions aimed at addressing any given value compromise other relevant values because of the required processes or the likely outcomes?  If significant conflict between values is likely, how should this be resolved? 
NOTE: Discussants might need to draw on or commission evidence to assist with these questions 
 
The framework does not proscribe an outcome or provide a neat solution for all breast 
screening controversies.  It does, however, act as a guide for how to discuss and identify 
important concepts in breast screening, and how to incorporate both values and evidence in 
decision making, in a cohesive manner.  It might also assist with identifying important 
unknowns: areas of research need in the context of breast screening.  
Model 2 – Structured discussions around frames to address contentious issues 
In Chapter 6, I described a model that might be used to guide values based discussions in the 
context of a particularly contentious topic such as overdiagnosis.  In this model, experts were 
guided to use framing theory to explore a range of ways that a given problematic issue might 
be viewed.  As described in Chapter 6, a frame consists of the set of ideas around the issue, 
incorporating factors such as: what the problem is, what the relevant information consists of, 
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and a related moral judgement.  Together these factors point towards a particular solution.  
There can be several different frames for a given issue, and any individual might use one or 
more frame, often unconsciously, when thinking and talking about that topic. 
 
Decision makers in breast screening policy and practice might find that some issues remain 
contentious and difficult to resolve, despite receiving support and training in the use of 
values, and despite regular discussions about values aided by the framework presented above.  
In such a situation, it might be useful for decision makers to bolster the more abstract 
discussion about values that the framework encourages with a very contextual, situated 
discussion about the different ways that are used to frame a contentious issue, and the extent 
to which any one of these frames with its internal moral judgement is reasonable and 
acceptable.  As described in Chapter 6, this kind of discussion might allow decision makers 
to achieve deeper understanding for the positions and values of others, and may enable 
greater appreciation of commonalities or similarities in thinking.  In addition, talking through 
a range of solutions and where they stem from might facilitate problem solving, including 
identification of likely areas for negotiation and compromise.  Thus I suggest Model 2, 
structured discussions around frames, as a method for addressing aspects of breast screening 
where ethical concerns appear particularly prominent and are seemingly irresolvable.  I 
would recommend that decision makers incorporate the guidance from Model 1 into their 
regular decision making processes, and use Model 2 as an adjunct for particular issues, as and 
when necessary.  Model 2 can also be used on its own for those decision-making bodies who 
are unable or unwilling to follow the guidance of Model 1. 
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The process of structuring discussions around frames begins with achieving a general 
appreciation of what frames are; decision makers may benefit from support and training in 
this.  Decision makers are then encouraged to draw on their own views and, if necessary, 
evidence about the views of others, to complete a tabled set of frames about the topic under 
review.  An example of such a set is provided in Chapter 6 (Table 2), where the topic in 
question is overdiagnosis.  A second example is provided in this chapter (see Table 9.4) and 
relates to the contentious issue of communication with breast screening consumers.  (I have 
used the data from Chapter 7 along with information on social pressures from Chapter 3 to 
inform Table 9.4.  I have annotated the table with notes to assist decision makers in this 
topic.)  The final step is for decision makers to use their completed table to stimulate 
discussion, considering whether or not they agree with each of the various factors 
underpinning each frame and why, and contemplating the range of solutions. 
 
(see table overleaf) 
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Table 9.4 Possible frames relating to communicating with consumers 
Frame Defining the 
problem 
The reasons for the 
problem 
Value judgement Proposed or implied 
solution 
Notes (strength or 
weakness of this 
frame) 
Informed decision 
making is vital. 
Women are currently 
unable to make an 
informed decision 
about breast 
screening 
participation. 
Breast screening 
providers do not 
provide adequate 
information about 
harms. Providers are 
conflicted because 
of participation 
targets.  
Women should have the 
opportunity to make an 
informed choice about 
breast screening 
participation and this 
requires a realistic 
understanding of breast 
screening harms.  
Information should be 
written by independent 
bodies and/or participation 
targets should be scrapped. 
Provide more 
information about 
screening harms; use 
independent bodies to 
provide information to 
consumers about 
breast screening; 
encourage informed 
decision making e.g. 
through distribution of 
decision aids or 
training of primary 
care practitioners. 
Informed decision 
making might be very 
difficult to achieve, 
given the complexity 
of the evidence and 
the long history of 
alternative messages 
(such as “early 
diagnosis is vital”). 
Guidance is 
important. 
All this talk of harms 
is putting women’s 
lives and breasts at 
risk. 
Detailed 
information about 
harms is likely to 
deter women from 
breast screening. 
Public health programs 
should provide guidance to 
women about breast 
screening participation 
according to what they 
consider is likely to be in 
the best interests of all 
women. A woman’s 
interests are best served by 
keeping her alive, and be 
increasing her options for 
effective breast cancer 
treatments (i.e. through 
earlier diagnosis). 
Continue to guide 
women towards 
participating in breast 
screening. 
Screening 
participation may not 
be in the best interests 
of an individual 
woman.  This may be 
particularly relevant 
for women whose 
chances of benefit are 
smaller than others 
(e.g. younger women, 
older women with co-
morbidities). 
Table continued overleaf 
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Frame Defining the 
problem 
The reasons for the 
problem 
Value judgement Proposed or implied 
solution 
Notes (strength or 
weakness of this 
frame) 
The communication 
preferences of 
individual women 
are important. 
Women’s breast 
screening 
communication 
preferences are not 
being met. 
Some women prefer 
to make informed, 
independent 
decisions about 
breast screening 
participation, others 
prefer experts to 
guide them, and 
some women prefer 
both information 
and guidance. 
Breast screening providers 
should cater to women’s 
preferences about how 
much information and 
guidance they wish, and 
how much involvement 
they want in decision 
making about participation. 
Provide basic 
information and 
guidance to all women 
and make more 
detailed information 
about harms and 
benefits of breast 
screening available 
upon request 
Women may be 
unaware of the harms 
of breast screening, 
and hence not seek out 
the information or 
informed decision 
making opportunities 
that they would 
otherwise appreciate. 
Communication to 
facilitate informed 
decision making is 
not a substitute for 
responsible policies 
about screening. 
Facilitating informed 
decision making will 
not necessarily result 
in women making 
decision about breast 
screening 
participation that are 
in their own best 
interests.  
Women are more 
enthusiastic about 
screening than is 
warranted because 
of strong social and 
institutional 
pressures to screen. 
While choices about breast 
screening are important, 
public health providers 
also have a responsibility 
to protect the health of 
women. 
Experts should 
facilitate informed 
decision making, but 
also set clear limits 
around screening 
opportunities in 
accordance with the 
best interests of 
individual women. 
Screening providers 
should also consider 
the interests of the 
community when 
setting limits around 
screening 
opportunities. 
Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusion 
Involving the public 
Throughout my published papers, and in Table 9.2, I have noted that experts’ discussions and 
decisions may be guided to a greater or lesser extent by the values of the public.  I am not 
suggesting that the values of the public should necessarily drive policy in a direct manner:  
this may not be possible for cost reasons, and it may not be desirable - for example, the 
public may be ill-informed about the topic, or the values of the majority may fail to 
accommodate minority interests.  However, it would seem important to ascertain the values 
of the public when making decisions about public health interventions that use public 
finances and reasonable to at least consider taking them into account to some degree, because 
the public perspective provides additional and relevant information, and because involving 
the public improves decision-making legitimacy. 
One way to include the values of the public is to facilitate or promote individual informed 
decision making about breast screening participation.  This approach involves enabling or 
encouraging women to consider the benefits and harms of participating in screening, and to 
make personal decisions about their actions based upon how strongly they value the various 
possible outcomes, rather than expecting women to unthinkingly follow population-based 
guidance from public health providers.  This has the advantage of getting individual input 
about breast screening from the women who are most immediately affected by it, but there is 
limited scope for input from women or the broader public into how and to whom breast 
screening might be offered. 
There are several ways of facilitating public input at the level of policy.  Consumer 
representation on decision-making bodies is one widely used method and individual 
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consumers can build up expertise and knowledge about breast screening through personal or 
professional experience and through long participation in the field.  A limitation of this 
method is that individual representatives may not necessarily present a view that matches the 
ideas of the broader public.  For example, it may be that many people who participate as 
formal consumer representatives are also consumer advocates for a particular policy; for 
example, most consumer representatives in breast screening may be motivated by personal 
enthusiasm towards breast screening and therefore tend to present just one partisan set of 
views and values about the program.52 My empirical results suggested this possibility, since 
all (three) consumer experts that I interviewed expressed remarkably similar views and 
values in relation to breast screening (Chapter 5).  It may be, however, that the consumers 
who agreed to take part in my research were more strongly committed to advocacy than other 
consumer representatives. 
 
Another option is to garner the views of the public through direct polling.  This method may 
also be problematic: breast screening is a complex topic and not always accurately presented 
in the media or other information sources commonly used by the public.53, 54 Moreover, 
people’s views about breast screening are subject to possible vested interests of corporations, 
and may not necessarily receive a balanced picture of the available evidence.54-56 As such, the 
public may be incompletely informed about breast screening and their views might not 
accurately reflect their values (see Chapter 2). 
 
An alternative approach to gaining the views of the public is via a deliberative democracy 
process, something that has been gaining increasing attention in recent years.  This involves 
working with a small group of people from the public, providing them with relevant 
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information and education, and then seeking their (informed) opinions.  Several types of 
deliberative techniques have been developed; citizens’ juries are one of the most popular 
methods52 and have been convened to consider controversial topics in screening including 
breast screening.57, 58  While such an approach is expensive, and its usefulness is somewhat 
dependent on the skill of the convenors, if done well it can provide rich information from a 
broad cross section of the informed public.8, 52, 58  There is ample scope for further research 
into how best to ascertain the values of the public, and how to facilitate public input into 
decision making for breast screening policy and practice. 
 
9.4 Limitations of the research 
I have discussed the limitations of my research in my empirical papers (Chapters 5 to 8), and 
I expand upon that information here.  The qualitative methods used in my empirical study 
provided rich detail relating to my research aims, but as with all qualitative work, my 
findings were contextually bounded, and I cannot be sure that I have described a complete 
picture of all the potential ways that values may influence experts’ views on breast screening.  
It is possible that some breast screening experts conceive and use values differently from the 
range that I have presented in this thesis.  However, I adopted strategies to seek and identify 
all of the most relevant and important ways of thinking.  I deliberately selected participants 
with a range of professional experience and geographic locations, and I continued sampling 
until I was certain that I was no longer hearing new information.59 I have already noted my 
difficulty with recruiting participants from the group of breast screening consumer advocates, 
and discussed how this was overcome (see Chapter 4). 
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This study was conceived and carried out in the Australian breast screening context, and as 
such, has direct relevance to that context.  It may not be as relevant to decision making for 
breast screening practices and policies elsewhere. However, the breast screening debates and 
disagreements are conducted in an international setting, and there are many reasons for my 
work to resonate with other developed countries. The impact of breast cancer on population 
mortality and morbidity in other developed countries, especially those adopting a Western 
diet and lifestyle, is similar to that in Australia.60, 61  Breast screening programs in developed 
countries have comparable aims and protocols to BreastScreen Australia,61, 62 and many have 
analogous government endorsement and funding for breast screening.63  Experts in other 
developed and Westernised countries are likely to consider and reason about values in a 
comparable manner to their Australian counterparts. 
 
9.5 How this thesis meets its aims  
As reported in Chapter Four, my research aims were to: 
1. Identify and analyse the values held by Australian decision makers in relation to 
breast screening policy and practice. 
2. Identify the aspects of the breast screening program that are particularly ethically 
salient and analyse those in detail. 
3. Describe how to incorporate ethical considerations in order to make the best 
decisions for future breast screening policy and practice. 
These aims are addressed in detail below. 
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Aim 1: Identify and analyse the values held by Australian decision makers in relation to 
breast screening policy and practice. 
Very few participants discussed values in explicit terms but my analysis of their talk revealed 
that experts used ethically relevant concepts to underpin their views and reasoning about 
breast screening.  In Chapters 5 to 8, I presented the range of values that experts used and 
noted those that were frequently endorsed or discussed.  I described a plurality of ways that 
experts conceptualise the same values.  Some values, including “delivering benefits”, 
“avoiding harms”, and “respecting autonomy”, appeared particularly vulnerable to divergent 
conceptualisations.  I also described variation in how experts prioritised values, and provided 
a model explaining how an expert’s perception of the relative importance of values might be 
linked with their views about breast screening.  For example, I explained in Chapter 6 that 
an expert who prioritises “avoiding harm” over “delivering benefit” is more likely to view 
overdiagnosis as a problem requiring an urgent solution than an expert who holds “delivering 
benefit” to be the most important value for the breast screening program. 
 
Aim 2: Identify the aspects of the breast screening program that are particularly ethically 
salient and analyse those in detail. 
From my empirical work and my reading of the literature I identified overdiagnosis, 
communication with consumers, and the public health vs individual clinical service nature of 
breast screening as aspects of the program that contain particularly visible ethical concerns.   
I looked for combinations and patterns amongst experts’ expressed views about these issues, 
and presented multi-faceted but cohesive analyses of the role of ethical considerations.  For 
example, in Chapter 6 I discussed six different ways that Australian experts framed 
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overdiagnosis, and described the sorts of values that were prioritised.  In Chapter 7 I 
discussed and explained three different ways that Australian experts viewed communication 
with breast screening consumers, describing and explaining the ethical elements within each 
view in detail.  In Chapter 8 I identified the ways in which experts appeared to view and 
judge breast screening as if at least part of its role was the pursuit of population health and 
community interests.  I drew on theoretical arguments to analyse the extent to which the 
kinds of socially embedded concepts that experts used were applicable to breast screening. 
 
Aim 3: Describe how to incorporate ethical considerations in order to make the best 
decisions for future breast screening policy and practice. 
I used my empirical research and theoretical reading to identify potential problems with the 
ways that ethical considerations are currently used – or not used – in decision making for 
breast screening policy and practice.  For example, earlier in this chapter I described the 
limitations of using a narrowly evidence-based approach to decision making, and the need for 
widespread engagement and endorsement of values-based discussions and decisions.  
However I also acknowledged the apparent difficulties with incorporating values based 
reasoning into decision making: in my empirical papers (Chapters 5 to 8) I described the 
potential misunderstandings that may occur when experts have different interpretations of a 
given value, and reported on the seeming impossibility of achieving progress with decision 
making when experts held strongly divergent views about which values were more important 
than others.  The material in this chapter represents my efforts to determine how best to 
incorporate ethical considerations into future breast screening decisions about policy and 
practice.  I end with a call for further research: to explore the usefulness of the different 
decision making models that I have presented; to identify the values of an informed public: 
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and to consider how and to what extent these values should be incorporated into breast 
screening policymaking. 
 
9.6 Conclusions 
Breast screening is a major public health intervention practiced throughout much of the 
developed world.  After several decades of organised breast screening, experts continue to 
disagree about aspects of breast screening policy and practice.  There is particularly strong 
debate about issues such as: how much benefit, if any, breast screening delivers, and to 
whom; the extent of overdiagnosis; and the meaning and importance of informed consent.  
Disputes over these and other contested areas of breast screening feature regularly in the 
academic literature, frequently involving renowned and respected experts with strongly 
opposing views.  Conflicts spill over into the public domain, including politicians and the 
media, and leaving many consumers angry and confused.  This research is the first 
comprehensive, empirical study into the role that values play in experts’ views about breast 
screening.  By analysing the ways that experts use values when they talk about breast 
screening, I have been able to develop tools to help identify and address any underlying 
differences in the ways that experts reason, and hence assist with resulting conflict over 
breast screening.  I have used my empirical findings to recommend acknowledgement and 
respect for the fundamental importance of values in decision making relating to breast 
screening policies and practices, and to develop methods for how they might be formally 
incorporated into decision making procedures.  Decision makers should be encouraged to 
receive training in ethics and to adopt dedicated tools, such as the frameworks presented here, 
to support and guide the incorporation of ethical considerations in deliberations about breast 
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screening.  Reflection and discussion about values will assist decision makers to address 
values-based conflict and to develop ethically sound breast screening for the future. 
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Appendix 1:  Normal breast anatomy and physiology 
Each breast contains several ductolobular structures that open at the nipple.  These structures 
are composed of branching ducts that decrease in size and terminate in lobules via terminal 
duct lobular unit.  They are somewhat interwoven with each other such that the glandular part 
of the breast resembles a head of broccoli sitting on the chest with the cut stalk pointing out 
towards the nipple. The glands are cushioned in fibro-fatty tissue. 
 
The terminal duct lobular unit is the functional part of the breast, proliferating and preparing 
for milk production in response to hormonal stimulation such as occurs during pregnancy 
and, to a much lesser extent, during each menstrual cycle. The interglandular stroma, the 
tissue that lies between the breast glands, is also responsive to hormones.  The amount of 
breast tissue in a given woman is variable, but usually the glands and the interglandular 
stroma gradually decrease in size once hormonal stimulation ceases (i.e. in the years after 
menopause) and are replaced by fatty tissue. 
 
Bibliography and further reading 
1. Kumar V, Abbas AK, Fausto N. Robbins and Cotran: Pathologic basis of disease. 7th 
ed. Pennsylvania: Elsevier Saunders; 2005. 
2. Lakhani SR, Ellis IO, Schnitt SJ, Hoon Tan P, van de Vijver MJ, editors. WHO 
classification of tumours of the breast. 4th ed. Lyon: IARC; 2012. 
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Appendix 2:  Breast cancer pathology 
Breast cancers are neoplastic growths of cells that have similar characteristics to the cells that 
line the terminal duct lobular unit.  These neoplasms appear to originate in an epithelial cell 
which accumulates a series of genetic mutations such that cell division becomes increasingly 
unregulated, with architecturally disorganised growth.  If the abnormal cell growth is 
confined to the duct-lobular system, the cancer is termed carcinoma in situ   Ultimately the 
abnormal cells invade the basement membrane of the duct-lobular system, and at this stage 
the tumour is classified as invasive carcinoma.  Once cancerous cells have invaded the 
basement membrane, they can spread into surrounding tissues, including lymphatic and blood 
vessels.  Some cell clusters travel throughout the body in these vessels, seeding distant body 
sites such as lymph nodes, lung, brain and bones (termed metastases). 
 
This description of neoplastic growth suggests that breast tumours progress through a series 
of steps, starting out as epithelial cells in the duct system that look slightly abnormal (various 
types of abnormal, but not obviously cancerous, breast lesions have been described and 
labelled), eventually become cancerous (“carcinoma in situ”), and ultimately invade into   
adjacent tissues (“invasive cancer”) where they can potentially metastasise throughout the 
body.  Each stage in this model is identifiable using diagnostic criteria including microscopic, 
radiologic and clinical appearance. The rate of progression is highly variable and, in many 
cases, unpredictable. 
 
It is possible that some cases do not conform to this linear progression: for example, some 
types of abnormal clusters and in situ cancers will only rarely progress to invasion; they are 
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described by the term “non-obligate precursors to malignancy”.  The identification of some 
of these non-obligate precursors may still be significant however, as they may indicate a 
general increase in the woman’s likelihood of developing an invasive cancer somewhere else 
within either breast.  Women diagnosed with such lesions may wish to have more frequent 
screening, or may seek to reduce their breast cancer risk through hormonal treatment or 
surgical intervention.  It may also be that some invasive cancers do not conform to the growth 
pattern described above; some arise with no identifiable precursor, others never grow, and a 
few may involute or regress. 
 
This is a simplified discussion of the pathology of breast cancer.  I have concentrated on the 
most common type of breast cancer, and my comments about natural history do not 
necessarily apply to the rarer sub-types of breast cancer.  There is ongoing discussion about 
how best to usefully categorise different types of epithelial breast changes, particularly the 
various intraduct changes; I have limited my comments to general observations and ideas 
about natural history.  More detail is available from the texts in the reference list  
 
The natural history of breast cancer has important ramifications for treatment, but also for the 
usefulness of a program of early detection by screening.  For example, if a cancer is destined 
to grow and invade over a period of years, and if the woman is young enough to be unlikely 
to die of anything else during that time, early detection by screening will be of benefit, 
because treatment for localised cancer is likely to be more bearable and successful than 
treatment for metastatic breast cancer.  If, however, the breast cancer was destined to show a 
different growth pattern, screening may not be of any benefit.  That is, screening is unlikely 
to be helpful for women whose breast lesions are destined to: involute, never change, grow 
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slowly over tens of decades, or grow rapidly over weeks or months.  Screening will also be of 
limited or no value for woman who are very elderly or otherwise unwell such that they likely 
to die of other causes.  Similarly, screening may or may not be helpful for women who are 
diagnosed through screening with a type of non-obligate precursor to malignancy, 
particularly if the implication of the diagnosis is very uncertain, or indicates a real, but small 
increase in the woman’s likelihood of developing cancer, not much beyond what would 
generally be accepted as the normal (female) level.  There is much interest in improving 
knowledge and understanding about the prognostic significance of these kinds of changes in 
the breast.  
 
Bibliography and further reading 
1. Kumar V, Abbas AK, Fausto N. Robbins and Cotran: Pathologic basis of disease. 7th 
ed. Pennsylvania: Elsevier Saunders; 2005. 
2. Lakhani SR, Ellis IO, Schnitt SJ, Hoon Tan P, van de Vijver MJ, editors. WHO 
classification of tumours of the breast. 4th ed. Lyon: IARC; 2012. 
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Appendix 3:  Australian breast cancer screening policy and practice 
A3.1 Breast screening policy 
The publically funded breast screening program in Australia offers biennial screening by 
mammography to all women over the age of 40 years.  This program is particularly targeted 
towards women between the ages of 50 to 74 years of age.  The program is funded and 
organised through the federal government via its organisation BreastScreen Australia, in 
conjunction with each of the eight state/territory governments via their organisations: 
BreastScreen ACT, BreastScreen NSW, BreastScreen SA, BreastScreen WA, BreastScreen 
NT, BreastScreen Tasmania, BreastScreen Queensland, BreastScreen Victoria.1, 2 
 
The program’s aims relate directly and indirectly to the improvement of population health.  
Aims directly linked with population health improvement are: the reduction of breast cancer 
morbidity and mortality.  Aims that are indirectly linked focus on specific service delivery 
targets, including: maximising early detection of breast cancer in the target population; 
ensuring screening is provided in dedicated and accredited units that operate with high 
standards; and ensuring screening access and performance is equitable and acceptable to 
women across the target population.3  These targets are operationalised through specific 
performance objectives including, for example, a participation rate of 70% amongst the target 
age range; identified maximum rates of false positive and false negative results; and the 
provision of comprehensible and appropriate information to women.  A recent formal 
evaluation of BreastScreen Australia3 by the Australian Government Department of Health 
and Ageing recommended several changes to the operation of the program, including: 
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extending the target age range to include women aged 45-49 years and 70-74 years, and 
removing access for women under 45 years and over 75 years.  Some of these have been 
acted upon, notably an extension of the target age range to 50-74 years.  This is in the process 
of being rolled out across the country and is expected to be completed by 2017.4 
 
A3.2 Breast screening practice 
The practice of breast screening in Australia is described by focusing in turn on key aspects 
of the process. 
 
Individual woman: considering mammography screening 
A woman becomes aware of the existence of breast cancer screening in a variety of ways. At 
the age of 50 years, if she is on the electoral roll and her contact details are correct, she will 
receive a personalised letter in the mail from a local breast screening provider telling her that 
she should attend screening.  This will include a brochure explaining that breast cancer is 
common and that screening might save her life.5  The letter will provide information on how 
to make an appointment for breast screening.  These letters will continue every 2 years until 
she reaches 69 or 74 years of age, depending on where she lives.4 
 
She might also be told that she should attend screening by friends and relatives, by her 
general practitioner, and by public advertising on the TV, radio, and outdoor advertising (for 
example at sports fields or bus stops).6  Some women will have been already attending 
screening from the age of 40, particularly if they have a strong family history of breast cancer 
or if they have a general practitioner who is enthusiastic about screening.  If a woman has had 
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a screening mammogram prior to the age of 50 years, she may already have been receiving 
recall letters every two years, depending in which state or territory she resides.3  
 
Individual woman: having a screening mammogram 
A woman wanting to attend screening may have a choice of where to go, depending on where 
she lives. Dedicated screening services may be available within public or private hospitals, 
mobile vans, private centres, shopping centres or department stores such as David Jones.  
Public services are free; private services may have a charge for the initial mammogram and 
any follow-up services.  When attending her appointment, the woman may be provided with 
more information about breast screening outcomes, including the possibility of false positive 
tests and overdiagnosis.  The screening test is performed by a radiographer.  It includes two 
mammograms: one with the breast flattened top to bottom (providing the cranio-caudal or cc 
view), the other with the breast flattened at an oblique angle from the armpit towards the 
navel (the oblique view).  The two-view screening maximises the likelihood that all the breast 
tissue is visualised in the image.  More x-rays may be required if there are any obvious 
problems with positioning the breast or any technical difficulties.  Results will not be 
available for several weeks. 
 
Mammography reader: interpreting the images 
The mammograms may be taken using analogue or, more recently, digital technology.  The 
images will be collated into batches for reading by a radiologist or other trained screening 
mammogram reader.  The reader will spend hours at a time looking at numerous sets of 
images in a darkened room, spending minutes on each set.  If a woman has had 
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mammograms before, and if they were done at the same clinic, or are otherwise available to 
the clinic, the reader will compare current mammograms with the previous images.  This may 
help to reassure the reader that any small oddity that has caught their eye has been unchanged 
for several years, and is therefore not significant.   
 
X-rays pass straight through fatty tissue: that is, fat is radiolucent, and looks black on a 
mammogram.  X-rays get absorbed by, and therefore do not pass through, glandular tissue 
(which is therefore described as being radio-opaque).  These look like white streaks or white 
shapes on a mammogram, depending on how much glandular tissue is present.  Neoplastic 
glandular cells tend to be tightly clumped together, and show up as densely white, although 
can be obscured by overlying normal breast glands.  Some breast cancers, particularly some 
types of DCIS, contain calcium, which shows up on a mammogram as a bright white dot, and 
may sit alongside other calcium dots in a characteristic pattern. 
 
The vast majority of mammograms are normal.  If the reader is concerned that a 
mammogram looks unusual, or is technically inadequate (for example if it does not show all 
of the breast tissue, or blurred) then they will flag it and the woman will be recalled for repeat 
mammography.  All mammograms are read by two independent readers.  If both agree that 
the mammogram is normal, a letter is issued to the woman, and she is told to return in two 
years for another screen.   If both readers agree that the mammogram is abnormal, she is 
recalled for further testing.  If there is a discrepancy between results, a third reader may 
review the case, and a final decision will be made about whether or not the woman is 
recalled. 
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In a given screening session the radiologist may have to make many decisions about whether 
or not a mammogram contains abnormal areas.  Years of training and experience will enable 
them to make these decisions.  Expertise will be regularly monitored, for example by 
reviewing the false positive results in a screening unit, to make sure that there are not too 
many women being recalled and later found to have no abnormalities.  If a woman is 
diagnosed with a cancer on a screening mammogram, or via symptomatic presentation, any 
previous screening mammograms are reviewed to assess whether or not a radiographic 
abnormality has been missed (false negative). 
 
Individual woman: Being recalled 
A woman who receives a letter recalling her for further testing will be reassured that she is 
unlikely to be diagnosed with cancer.  Normally she will be asked to attend the screening unit 
at a time when radiologists are present.  At this clinic she will have a repeat mammogram, 
which will be immediately reviewed and compared with the previous images.  Often the 
abnormality is due to an odd shape formed by the overlap of normal glands, which disappears 
when the glands sit in a slightly different arrangement at this second mammogram.  If the 
abnormality persists then further investigation may be required, and this might include a 
physical examination, an ultrasound and a biopsy.  Depending on the type of biopsy, the 
woman may have to wait days or weeks for a final result.  
Pathologist: interpreting the biopsy 
The biopsy may be either a fine needle aspiration (FNA) or a core biopsy.  An FNA is taken 
with a tiny needle, of similar size to those used for blood tests, which removes cells from the 
area of concern.  These can be quickly stained and examined under a microscope; some 
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clinics might have pathologists available to do this immediately, providing prompt results; 
other clinics send the specimen to a separate laboratory.  Many clinics (and pathologists) 
prefer a core biopsy, which takes a sliver of intact tissue with a wide bore needle, and needs 
to be processed for several hours before it can be stained and viewed.   
 
If the pathologist sees neoplastic cells, they begin looking for clues that might indicate what 
the prognosis of the lesion is likely to be.  That is, they are interested in what its natural 
history might be if left undisturbed and also in how it might respond to the various treatment 
options that are available.  There are many items that are considered, including: whether or 
not the neoplastic cells are confined to the ducts of the gland or have invaded into the 
adjacent tissue; the physical appearance of the cells (degree of differentiation in comparison 
to normal tissue); how the cells are arranged in relationship with each other; and what sorts of 
receptors are expressed on the surface membrane of the neoplastic cells.  Although this is all 
useful information, it is not conclusive: there is currently no definite way to tell whether or 
not this neoplasm will continue growing, or if it does, how quickly it might grow, and what 
the impact of that growth might be. 
 
Individual woman: follow up after biopsy 
The woman will return to the clinic for her results.  If she is found to have cancer, she may 
see a surgeon at the clinic, who will discuss some treatment options with her.  She may be 
referred on for treatment at the local hospital, or can ask her general practitioner for a referral 
to a specific surgeon.   
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Appendix 4:  Literature search for Chapters 1 and 2 
My review topics included: [1] the history of breast screening by mammography, with a 
particular focus on Australia; and [2] the social and ethical aspects of breast screening by 
mammography.  I wanted to obtain a broad range of perspectives, and thus sought out a mix 
of sources, including: academic journal articles, scholarly texts, theses, articles and texts from 
the commercial lay press, and grey literature from government and non-government 
organisations.  The list provided below describes my searching process.  My literature 
searching was systematic and extensive, but not intended to be complete: these were not 
formal systematic reviews. 
 
1. Electronic database search using the following terms: BREAST and SCREENING; 
MAMMOGRAPHY and SCREENING; BREAST and CANCER and HISTORY; 
BREAST and CANCER and SOCIOLOGY. 
• Medline 
• History of science, technology and medicine 
• The philosopher’s index 
2. Library catalogue search using the following terms: BREAST CANCER; 
MAMMOGRAPHY; CANCER SCREENING; BREAST SCREENING. 
• National Library Australia  
• University of New South Wales (UNSW) library 
• Sydney University library 
• State Library of New South Wales 
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3. Hand searching of library shelves adjacent to texts located through library catalogue. 
• UNSW library 
• Sydney University library 
4. Catalogue search through large booksellers using the following terms:  BREAST 
SCREENING; BREAST CANCER HISTORY; BREAST CANCER POLITICS; 
BREAST CANCER SOCIOLOGY; MAMMOGRAPHY. 
• www.amazon.com 
• www.amazon.co.uk 
• www.fishpond.com.au 
• www.bookdepository.co.uk 
5. Google Scholar search using the following terms: BREAST SCREENING 
AUSTRALIA; MAMMOGRAPHY AUSTRALIA (limited to first 200 entries for 
each term). 
6. Index search in the Medical Journal of Australia from 1940-present. 
7. Australian national and state breast screening organisations, both government and non 
government. 
• Cancer Australia, accessed at: www.canceraustralia.gov.au 
• BreastScreen Australia, accessed at: 
www.cancerscreening.gov.au/internet/screening/publishing.nsf/Content/breast
-screening-1 
• BreastScreen NSW, accessed at: accessed at www.breastscreen.nsw.gov.au 
• BreastScreen Victoria, accessed at: www.breastscreen.org.au 
• BreastScreen WA, accessed at: www.breastscreen.health.wa.gov.au/ 
• BreastScreen Queensland, accessed at: www.health.qld.gov.au/breastscreen/ 
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• BreastScreen Tasmania, accessed at:  
http://www.dhhs.tas.gov.au/cancerscreening/information_about_breast_screen
ing 
• BreastScreen SA, accessed at:  
http://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/public+content/sa+health+in
ternet/healthy+living/recommended+health+checks/breast+screening 
• BreastScreen NT, accessed at: 
www.health.nt.gov.au/Womens_Health/Breast_Screen_NT/index.aspx 
• BreastScreen ACT, accessed at: www.health.act.gov.au/our-services/women-
youth-and-children/breastscreen 
• Cancer Council Australia, accessed at: www.cancer.org.au 
• Breast Cancer Network Australia, accessed at: www.bcna.org.aur 
• National Breast Cancer Foundation, accessed at: www.nbcf.org.au 
• McGrath Foundation, accessed at: www.mcgrathfoundation.com.au 
8. Searching of reference lists in relevant journal articles and books obtained through 
steps 1-7. 
 
I scanned titles and, if necessary, abstracts or summaries, for likely relevance, rejecting those 
that did not appear to address my review topics.  I concentrated on English language sources 
that were focused on high-income countries.  I assessed the quality of my sources by 
considering factors such as: type and aim of writing (e.g. opinion piece, empirical research, 
commercial writing, promotional material); publication process (e.g. presence or not of peer 
review); quality of empirical research (e.g. transparency of reporting, appropriateness of 
methods to aims, methodological rigour, whether or not the data justify the conclusions); and 
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possible conflicts of interest.  I relied on good quality sources where relevant (e.g. for 
information on health outcomes such as cancer incidence, screening rates, mortality figures), 
and included other sources where appropriate (e.g. to provide information on the range of 
opinions about breast screening, or methods of breast screening promotion.)  My searching 
was conducted throughout 2012 and 2013, and updated with relevant, high profile sources in 
2015. 
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Appendix 5:  Interpreting the evidence on cancer screening 
This Appendix contains a published paper that provides further detail on the current 
controversies associated with interpreting the evidence on cancer screening, including breast 
screening.  A statement outlining contributions to this paper is also provided. 
 
Carter S, Williams J, Parker L, Pickles K, Jacklyn G, Rychetnik L, Barratt A.  (2015) 
Screening for cervical, prostate, and breast cancer: interpreting the evidence.  
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 49(2):274-285. 
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Screening for Cervical, Prostate, and
Breast Cancer
Interpreting the Evidence
Stacy M. Carter, PhD, Jane Williams, MDevStud, Lisa Parker, MA, Kristen Pickles, MPH,
Gemma Jacklyn, MPH(Hons), Lucie Rychetnik, PhD, Alexandra Barratt, PhD
Cancer screening is an important component of prevention and early detection in public health
and clinical medicine. The evidence for cancer screening, however, is often contentious. A
description and explanation of disagreements over the evidence for cervical, breast, and prostate
screening may assist physicians, policymakers, and citizens faced with screening decisions and
suggest directions for future screening research. There are particular issues to be aware of in the
evidence base for each form of screening, which are summarized in this paper. Five tensions
explain existing conﬂicts over the evidence: (1) data from differing contexts may not be
comparable; (2) screening technologies affect evidence quality, and thus evidence must evolve
with changing technologies; (3) the quality of evidence of beneﬁt varies, and the implications are
contested; (4) evidence about harm is relatively new, there are gaps in that evidence, and there is
disagreement over what it means; and (5) evidence about outcomes is often poorly communi-
cated. The following principles will assist people to evaluate and use the evidence: (1) attend
closely to transferability; (2) consider the inﬂuence of technologies on the evidence base; (3)
query the design of meta-analyses; (4) ensure harms are deﬁned and measured; and (5) improve
risk communication practices. More fundamentally, there is a need to question the purpose of
cancer screening and the values that inform that purpose, recognizing that different stakeholders
may value different things. If implemented, these strategies will improve the production and
interpretation of the methodologically challenging and always-growing evidence for and against
cancer screening.
(Am J Prev Med 2015;](]):]]]–]]]) & 2015 American Journal of Preventive Medicine
Introduction
Cancer screening is well established in high-income countries, but its evidence base is con-stantly evolving and often contentious. This
leaves physicians and policymakers in a difﬁcult position,
forced to act in the context of methodological complexity
and substantive disagreement.1,2 Three cases of screening
for cancer or cancer risk are considered: cervical,
prostate, and breast screening. The unique characteristics
of the disease, test, and program in each case are outlined
in Table 1. Tables 2–4 catalogue sources of controversy in
each case; these are discussed in more depth below. The
concluding section presents ﬁve common themes that
may help explain the ongoing controversies.
The aim is not to synthesize the evidence but to
provide the “backroom” story of the evidence on cancer
screening and better illuminate why experts so often
disagree.
Cervical Screening
Cervical screening is one of the best-supported and least
controversial forms of cancer screening. Nonetheless,
there are potentially contentious features of the cervical
screening evidence base. These are as follows: (1)
dependence on observational data; (2) understanding,
communicating, and managing the balance of beneﬁt and
harm; and (3) the uncertain future impact of new
technologies.
The ﬁrst challenge in the cervical screening evidence
base is the status of the existing evidence. Screening was
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established in parts of Europe and North America
between the late 1940s and early 1960s, and data from
those programs, rather than from controlled trials,
provide the evidence base for cervical screening effective-
ness. Observational studies compared screened and
unscreened populations and showed reduced cervical
cancer incidence and mortality in the former.5,30,31 This
evidence base clearly shows that cervical screening
reduces morbidity and mortality: what is less clear is
who to screen, when, and how to optimize beneﬁt and
minimize harm.
The cervical screening evidence base is susceptible to the
well-known biases of any observational study.1 It is not clear
how these biases should be taken into account. In addition,
the observational data about cervical screening cross juris-
dictions in which there are substantially different programs
Table 1. Disease, Test, and Program Characteristics in Each Case
Cervical cancer Prostate cancer Breast cancer
Tests used Pap smear using conventional
and/or liquid based cytology !
computer-assisted reading; HPV
DNA testing increasing !
cytology; visual inspection with
acetic acid/liquid iodine (VIA/
VILI) in LMICs
PSA test; new testing methods,
including use of biomarkers, are
being developed; DRE also used
Mammogram; ﬁxed or mobile
mammogram unit; recently
widely upgraded to digital
technology
When test was invented Pap test developed late 1930s First commercial PSA test
released in 1986
X-ray used for breast disease
1910s; ﬁrst screening RCT
1963–1975
When test was ﬁrst
used for screening
Used to screen asymptomatic
women from the 1940s
USFDA approved PSA test for
prostate cancer screening in
1994
Ad hoc screening from mid-20th
century3; population screening
programs 1980s onwards (based
on publication of results from
early RCTs)
What test is designed to
detect
Abnormal cells on the cervix
(cytology, VIA/VILI) or presence of
oncogenic HPV strains (HPV test)
Raised serum PSA levels Variations in soft tissue
radiolucency; originally
diagnostic
Relationship between
test and target disease
HPV-caused lesions are potential
precursors for cervical cancer
Poor; test not developed to
screen for cancer; elevated PSA
may not indicate cancer risk
Cancers have characteristic
(often subtle) soft tissue
appearances on x-ray
What results of
screening are reported
Lesions: nature and severity
(grade) of changes; reporting
standards differ; HPV reported by
type
PSA levels, expressed as
nanograms of PSA per milliliter
(ng/mL) of blood
Apparent presence of masses
and lesions suspicious for
invasive and/or in situ cancer
Contention over test
itself
Cytology is prone to human error;
terminology and reporting
standards vary; sensitivity and
speciﬁcity estimates vary widely4
There is no meaningful “normal
range” for the PSA test in
screening
There is variation in what degree
of suspicion constitutes a
positive screen
Variations between
jurisdictions that may
change the evidence
base regarding beneﬁt
and/or harm
IARC recommends 3-yearly
cytology screening from 25 years;
evidence base pools data from
widely varied programs:5 start-
age ranges from 18–30 years,
interval 1–5 years; reporting
standards, terminology and
treatment vary
Differences in target age,
recommended ﬁnishing ages,
screening intervals, deﬁnition of
“abnormal,” biopsy thresholds
Differences in target age,
screening intervals, thresholds
for recall and biopsy; service
studies may differ in participant
population age (and therefore
underlying cancer risk), follow-up,
out-of-study screening
Developments in the
test
Tests that detect oncogenic-type
HPV may supersede cytology as
primary screening test
New test rules in development;
variations proposed (free:total
PSA ratio, PSA density, velocity,
doubling time, prostate health
index) for clinical signiﬁcance; no
evidence these improve health
outcomes2
Increasing use of tomosynthesis
(integrated 2/3D mammography)
and MRI, which may contribute to
both beneﬁt and harm
DRE, digital rectal examination; HPV, human papillomavirus; IARC, International Agency for Research on Cancer; LMICs, low- and middle-income
countries; MRI, magnetic resonance imaging; PSA, prostate-speciﬁc antigen; USFDA, U.S. Food and Drug Administration; VIA, visual inspection of the
cervix using acetic acid to highlight precancerous lesions; VILI, visual inspection of the cervix using Lugol’s iodine to highlight precancerous lesions.
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and reporting standards. This means that these observatio-
nal data from different settings may not be as easily
comparable as is often assumed (Table 1). To minimize
bias, meta-analysis of RCT evidence is the preferred method
for estimating beneﬁt and harm in screening. RCT evidence
of different screening technologies, and combinations of
technologies, is emerging. This may add more certainty to
the cervical screening evidence base, although some of the
ﬁndings from RCTs in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) may not be transferable to other settings.32–35
The second challenge in this evidence base concerns
understanding, communicating, and managing the bal-
ance of beneﬁt and harm; this problem has several
dimensions. It is easy to inadvertently overstate the
Table 2. Main Issues in Cervical Cancer Screening
Issue Explanation
Incidence and mortality of cervical cancer is low in
high-income countries
The incidence of cervical cancer is much lower than, e.g., breast or
prostate cancer, so number needed to screen over many years to avoid
one death is high.6
Cervical screening reduces morbidity and mortality from
cervical cancer
Early Nordic observational studies suggest a mortality beneﬁt from
screening using the Pap test.
Organized programs confer greater beneﬁt than opportunistic screening.5
There is no RCT evidence from high-income countries Because Pap test screening for cervical cancer was introduced so early, it
was not possible or ethical to conduct an RCT of its effectiveness.
RCTs are being conducted in LMICs These will be a useful evidence base for LMICs.
It is easy to overstate the beneﬁts of cervical cancer
screening because the underlying mortality rate is low
Because incidence is low, number needed to screen is high and absolute
risk reduction low.
Statements of beneﬁt may obscure the relatively small absolute number
of people affected. E.g., mortality is often said to have halved in the
decade following commencement of organized screening in Australia: this
is accurate, but the absolute change was from only 4/100,000 to
2/100,000 women.
Most cervical lesions regress It has been recognized since the 1970s that most cervical lesions will not
progress to cervical cancer.
It is not clear what proportion of lesions regress, or which
lesions will regress
It may never become clear which lesions will regress or what proportion of
them will regress.
CIN3 progression to cancer has been estimated at 12%,7 20%,6 and 30%8
in different studies.
Overtreatment is difﬁcult to measure and to manage The majority of treatment is overtreatment, but as it is not possible to
identify which lesions will regress, this may not be resolvable with the
technology currently available.
There are vastly more abnormal results than there are invasive cancers,
especially in women aged o25 years; e.g., in Australia in 2010 the
incidence of invasive cancer in women aged o25 years was 1.5/
100,000, but 40,000 of the 250,000 screens in women agedo25 years
returned an abnormal result.9
Perinatal morbidity in treated women is the main iatrogenic harm of
concern.10
The evidence base is affected by differences in program
design between countries
Evidence about cervical screening comes mostly from monitoring data
from screening programs. However, different countries run their programs
differently. They use different tests, screening ages, and screening
intervals. They classify and report on their programs using different
terminology and standards. Then the data from these very different
contexts are combined. This has implications for the evidence base.
Screening technology is changing Because of HPV vaccination, a move away from cytology seems likely; an
alternative future might be mass HPV screening with cytological
examination of those with positive HPV tests.
It is unclear what the incremental beneﬁts and costs of these new
technologies over existing screening programs will be. This is a rapidly
evolving part of the evidence base in cervical screening.
CIN3, Cervical intra-epithelial neoplasia; HPV, human papilloma virus; LMICs, low- and middle-income countries.
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mortality beneﬁt of cervical screening, particularly in
high-income countries. This is because mortality from
cervical cancer in high-income countries is considerably
lower than for cancers such as breast and prostate. This
was true even prior to widespread Pap testing. For
example, the age-standardized mortality rate from cer-
vical cancer in the United Kingdom was approximately
8/100,000 in 1971, compared to 37.5/100,000 for breast
cancer and 20/100,000 for prostate cancer.36 Thus, even
substantial proportional (or relative risk) reductions in
Table 3. Main Issues in Prostate Cancer Screening
Issue Explanation
Most prostate cancer is not life threatening Although prostate cancer can be life threatening, the vast majority of cases are
indolent.
Early trials of PSA screening were of poor quality Early trials—which reported very positive ﬁndings—had serious methodological
problems, including low participation in screening, failure to randomize, and
failure to analyze by intention to screen.
Large RCTs are currently underway The ERSPC trial11 and the USA PLCO12 trial have made interim reports but are
ongoing. These are the only large, methodologically sound trials of PSA
screening conducted to date.
There is controversy over the design of the current
large RCTs
ERSPC included different countries using different screening tests and
procedures. Those screened in the trial were more likely to be treated in a
University hospital. The Swedish subset of ERSPC compared volunteer
screenees (probably a healthier group) to whole-population controls
(particularly signiﬁcant because Sweden was one of only two, out of seven,
subgroups to report statistically signiﬁcant reductions in prostate cancer
mortality after 11 years). These patterns are likely to bias results in favor of
screening.
In PLCO,450% of controls were screened during the trial, and 44% of
participants had previously been screened.
Methodologists disagree on whether these biases are fatal to the results of the
trials.
PSA screening may decrease prostate cancer death Some trials suggest reductions in incidence of prostate cancer death.
Observational studies in highly screened populations suggest lower prostate
cancer mortality.
PSA screening is unlikely to decrease all-cause
mortality
Only ERSPC has reported a mortality beneﬁt, which was very small in absolute
terms. 1,055 men would have to be screened to prevent one death from
prostate cancer over 11 years.13
The PSA test is not prostate cancer-speciﬁc PSA test has poor sensitivity and speciﬁcity for detecting prostate cancer.
A PSA44.0 ng/mL produces a 6.2% false positive rate but detects only 20.5%
of cancer cases.14
PSA test cannot distinguish increased cancer risk from other common
conditions, e.g., benign prostatic hyperplasia, prostatitis.
Certain medications (e.g., ﬁnasteride), ejaculation, and prostate manipulation
can also increase PSA levels.
PSA test manufacturers and PSA thresholds vary
between studies, laboratories, and clinicians
Studies and laboratories employ more than one kind of PSA test and different
abnormal thresholds.
The evidence base is thus hard to interpret because of lack of comparability.
Conventional threshold for further investigation is 4 ng/mL, but men with PSA
levels 4–10 ng/mL may not have prostate cancer,15 and men with resultso4
ng/mL can show histological evidence of prostate cancer.16,17
Lowering the threshold below 4 ng/mL would increase overdiagnosis and
overtreatment of clinically unimportant disease.18,19
A meaningful threshold for screening may not exist because of the test’s poor
sensitivity and speciﬁcity; i.e., the PSA test has little utility as a screening tool
for prostate cancer. There is currently no alternative test available.
PSA screening can increase the likelihood of receiving
treatment
In the U.S., e.g., up to 90% of men with prostate cancer diagnosed as a result
of PSA testing receive treatment.20
Prostate cancer treatment can produce considerable
negative consequences
Treatment can result in erectile dysfunction or impotence, anxiety, urinary
incontinence, bowel dysfunction, or death.
ERSPC, European Randomized Study of Screening for Prostate Cancer; PLCO, Prostate Lung Colorectal and Ovarian Cancer trial; PSA, prostate-speciﬁc
antigen.
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mortality attributed to screening may represent only
small reductions in the absolute number of deaths
prevented in well-resourced countries (Table 2). Cervical
cancer, however, remains a signiﬁcant burden and
leading cause of cancer mortality in some low-income
regions.37
In addition, the treatments triggered by screening may
be unnecessary and harmful in some cases. Cervical
screening reduces cancer incidence as well as mortality.
This is because it detects cellular abnormalities on the
cervix, or pre-cancerous lesions, caused by human
papillomavirus (HPV) (Table 1). Cervical cancer is a
Table 4. Main Issues in Breast Cancer Screening
Issue Explanation
Mortality beneﬁt exists Most studies show mortality beneﬁt from organized mammographic screening—
especially for women aged 50–70 years—of approximately 20%.21–24
The extent of mortality beneﬁt is contentious Estimates of beneﬁt vary considerably.
Different study types are used, including RCTs, observational studies, and
modelling.
Meta-analysis of RCTs is widely regarded as the best way to identify population
beneﬁts, but different meta-analyses include or exclude different RCTs because
of differing judgments about study quality.21–24
Mortality beneﬁt is less than originally thought Recent meta-analyses of RCTs suggest that beneﬁt is lower than suggested by
the earliest studies.
This can be partly attributed to problems in quality with some of the RCTs.
It has been hypothesized that treatment improvements in recent decades may
leave less room for screening to have an effect and make older trial data less
relevant.21–24
The harm from false positive screening tests varies
between programs and populations
The rate of false positives varies as a result of factors such as the following:
! Test factors, e.g., equipment quality; skill of the clinicians reading the
mammograms
! Differing policies and standards regarding acceptable levels of false positives
and false negatives
! Frequency of screening in the program (increased frequency tends to
increase the absolute number of false positives)
! Individual participant factors (e.g., greater breast density in some women,
including pre-menopausal women and women taking hormone replacement
therapy [HRT]) that can make mammogram interpretation more challenging
(and false positives more common)
! Population factors: the frequency of false positives in part depends on the
positive predictive value of the test, which depends on the prevalence of
disease in the screened population. This depends on population risk proﬁle
(e.g., younger women have lower incidence).25
The extent of overdiagnosis is contentious Estimates of overdiagnosis vary as a result of factors including the population
studied; research questions asked (e.g., total cancer or invasive cancer only);
methods used (e.g., comparing incidence in intervention and control arms of
RCTs, comparing observational annual incidence data, comparing observational
cumulative incidence data, using simulated population models); correction for
possible biases such as lead time; and fundamental assumptions when
estimating overdiagnosis in models.1,10,26,27
Biological consequences of in situ disease is
unclear
Before the onset of screening, in situ disease was mostly diagnosed in
conjunction with an invasive cancer. It was not anticipated to be a common
isolated ﬁnding on screening.
It is unclear what the right response to increased diagnosis of in situ disease
should be.
Knowledge of the natural history of in situ breast diseases is improving but still
incomplete.
Diagnosis and management are controversial, especially for less aggressive
diseases (e.g., low-grade DCIS), where risk of death is only slightly increased but
surgery to negate the risk may be extensive.21–24
There are small radiation harms of screening Harm from radiation during mammography is generally agreed to be real and
may be greater in women screened more often (e.g., those identiﬁed as carrying
potentially harmful mutations in the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes).28,29 However, in
screening of the general population, these risks are extremely small and likely to
be further reduced by the implementation of digital mammography.
BRCA1/BRCA2, BReast CAncer susceptibility gene 1 and 2; DCIS, ductal carcinoma in situ.
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rare outcome of persistent infection over a long time.
However, cellular abnormalities are common: there is an
estimated lifetime incidence of 40% in women born since
1960.6 Also, progression appears to be less linear than
originally thought,38 and most HPV infections regress
spontaneously. This means that four of ﬁve women with
dysplasia may be treated unnecessarily,6 but at present it
is not possible to identify which individual high-grade
lesions will regress, and can be left untreated, or will
progress, and require treatment (Table 2).
The evidence does suggest a solution, however: to focus
on minimizing harm, particularly in women aged o25
years. The evidence shows that (1) HPV infection is most
likely to spontaneously regress in this group; (2) paradoxi-
cally, these women also experience more abnormal cytol-
ogy, treatment, and cervical incompetence and perinatal
morbidity as a result of treatment; and (3) crucially, there is
no mortality beneﬁt in screening this age group. 10,39 As a
result, many countries are delaying commencement of
screening until age 25 years (Table 1), recommending
screening thereafter only every 3–5 years, or both.40,41
Although this change is supported by the evidence, in
many jurisdictions women continue to be screened earlier
and more often than these guidelines would support.5,42,43
Finally, it is important to anticipate the future impact of
new technologies on the evidence base and on practice.44,45
Research increasingly supports screening women aged
Z30 years using an oncogenic-type HPV test instead of
or in addition to cytology.32 The U.S. Preventive Services
Taskforce (USPSTF), for example, now recommends that
women aged 30–65 years can screen with a combination of
cytology and HPV testing every 5 years if they wish, rather
than with cytology alone every 3 years.33 The U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently approved the
use of HPV testing alone as a primary screening test,46
which seems likely to result in further revision of recom-
mendations. The recommendations are somewhat ahead of
the evidence—with the exception of an Indian cluster
RCT,34 primary HPV testing has not yet shown mortality
beneﬁt. Similarly, comparative beneﬁts and harms of
different sequential combinations of HPV and cytology
testing are not yet clear. However, RCTs of newer screening
technologies (e.g., HPV tests, including self-testing and
testing in vaccinated populations, and computer-assisted
cytology reading) are underway. HPV vaccination will
further reduce underlying risk in the population and
thereby potentially reduce the relevance of the existing
evidence on cervical screening.
Screening for Prostate Cancer
Unlike cervical screening, prostate-speciﬁc antigen (PSA)
testing for prostate cancer risk is intensely contested47;
this includes contention over the relationship between
evidence and practice. Important issues include (1)
inconsistency between the ﬁndings of different trials
(and tension over the interpretation of observational
ﬁndings); (2) variation in tests and thresholds for
abnormality within and between studies; and (3) evi-
dence suggesting that the PSA test performs poorly for
screening purposes.
The ﬁrst challenge is the quality and interpretation of
research about the efﬁcacy and effectiveness of PSA
testing. Observational data from highly-screened com-
munities are sometimes used to argue that testing reduces
prostate cancer mortality.16,48,49 However, as noted ear-
lier, ﬁndings from observational studies may be mislead-
ing because of characteristic biases such as lead time,
length time, and selection bias.2,18 Early RCTs were of
poor quality (Table 3).2,18 Since then, two ongoing RCTs
have reported results: the European Randomized Study
of Screening for Prostate Cancer (ERSPC) and the U.S.
Prostate, Lung, Colorectal, and Ovarian Cancer (PLCO)
Screening Trial. PLCO has shown no effect on prostate
cancer–speciﬁc or all-cause mortality.50 ERSPC reported
reduced prostate cancer mortality in screened men but
no change in all-cause mortality.11 There is considerable
controversy over trial design (Table 3). Although difﬁcult
to quantify, frequency of testing and follow-up and type
of treatment provided after diagnosis are likely to affect
outcomes reported from trials.12,13,51
Expert bodies increasingly advise against PSA screen-
ing. The USPSTF concluded that the mortality beneﬁt is
very small and outweighed by risk of harm.52 The
American College of Preventive Medicine has similarly
concluded that populations should not be routinely
screened with the PSA test, owing to insufﬁcient evi-
dence.53 The Australian National Health and Medical
Research Council evidence guideline on PSA testing in
asymptomatic men has recently concluded that there is
no effect of PSA testing on all-cause mortality and that
no conclusions can be drawn about prostate cancer
mortality.54 These decisions are consistent with the
evidence, which suggests that PSA testing may reduce
the short-term risk of dying from prostate cancer by a
very small amount, at the cost of a much greater risk of
harm, including from false positive results, overdiagnosis,
and overtreatment. The question this raises is: If a
screened man will not die any later than an unscreened
man, is it meaningful to prevent him from dying of
prostate cancer in particular? And at what cost (harms to
the man as well as expense to the man and the health
system) should this goal be pursued? This question seems
to divide experts, not least according to whether they care
for men with the disease or have experienced it
themselves.
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The second problem in the PSA testing evidence is
interpretability and comparability of PSA results. This is
an issue for many screening tests (Table 1), but especially
for the PSA test. Manufacturers and laboratories employ
divergent PSA calibrations, producing different readings
from the same sample.55 Even when identical methods
are used, thresholds set to separate “normal” from “high-
risk” PSA levels often differ. Within and between studies,
different standards are often combined, potentially
invalidating conclusions.16,56 Tests and thresholds used
by different countries participating in large trials often
vary (Table 3), and trial study groups have been unable to
identify acceptable PSA cut offs for prostate cancer
screening. This makes it difﬁcult to compare study results
and apply them to real-life settings.
The ﬁnal problem with interpreting the evidence about
PSA testing is addressing the potential for harm. The
evidence suggests that sensitivity and speciﬁcity of the
test are poor (Tables 1 and 3), which means cancers are
missed (poor sensitivity) and false positives are common
(poor speciﬁcity). The evidence suggests that PSA testing
increases diagnosis of indolent disease, frequently cas-
cades to diagnostic biopsies and follow-up treatments,
and produces physical and psychological harms and
costs: for every life saved by the PSA test, up to 48 men
may be overtreated (Table 3).57 Determining whether
this is acceptable requires difﬁcult debate over the nature
of a good outcome, and what harm or expense that
outcome might justify.
Screening for Breast Cancer
Like the evidence for PSA testing, the evidence for breast
screening has been controversial. Important features of
this evidence base include (1) uncertainty regarding the
extent of breast cancer mortality reduction beneﬁt; (2)
uncertainty regarding the extent of harm; and (3)
disagreement about managing in situ disease.
The ﬁrst challenge for the evidence on breast screen-
ing is that despite a considerable body of research, the
degree to which breast screening reduces breast cancer
mortality remains unclear. The evidence base includes
11 RCTs (1971–2006), numerous observational studies,
and mathematical models. It is probable that an invita-
tional program of breast screening by mammography
offers a population breast cancer mortality beneﬁt,
particularly for women aged 50–70 years. If poorer-
quality RCTs are removed from meta-analyses, this
beneﬁt is reduced, but by how much is unclear
(Table 4). Absolute and relative beneﬁts are lower in
women aged o50 years.58 Also, treatment has greatly
improved in recent decades, so including RCTs from the
1970s–1990s may overstate the beneﬁt of screening
(Table 4).1,21–24,26 The degree to which widely observed
declines in breast cancer mortality are attributable to
improvements in treatment remains contested.59 It is
unclear how this can be resolved. Incremental changes in
technology—from ﬁlm mammography to digital mam-
mography, tomosynthesis (integrated two-/three-
dimensional [2/3D] mammography) and magnetic res-
onance imaging (MRI) to screen high-risk women—may
also affect the balance of screening beneﬁts and
harms.60,61
The second concern is the extent of harm that is
caused. Invitational mammography programs cause
harm, including false positives and overdiagnosis. The
absolute rate of false positives can vary according to the
equipment used, skill and experience of ﬁlm readers, test
thresholds, and screening frequency (Table 4).25
Although the rate of false positives per screen may be
low, they accumulate; thus the chance of false positive
recall or biopsy over a lifetime is much higher. Increas-
ingly, evidence suggests that breast screening produces
overdiagnosis of both invasive and in situ breast cancer.
Although experts agree that mammography screening
causes overdiagnosis, there is disagreement on its extent.
A recent meta-analysis suggests that, in women invited
to screening, there is an 11% lifetime risk of over-
diagnosis as a proportion of cancers that are diagnosed,
and a 19% risk during the active screening period.21,24
Harms, especially overdiagnosis, may tend to outweigh
beneﬁts in women aged 470 years as they age.62
However, the relevant evidence is highly contentious
for methodological and other reasons explained in
Table 4.26,27
The ﬁnal challenge in this evidence base concerns
ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS), which represents
approximately 17%–34% of screen-detected cases and
20%–25% of all newly diagnosed cases of breast cancer in
the U.S.63 Women are rarely diagnosed with DCIS
because they experience symptoms: DCIS is diagnosed
almost entirely as a result of screening. Overdiagnosis of
DCIS is widely considered an important harm of
mammographic screening. However, the evidence is
not clear on either the natural history of DCIS or how
aggressively DCIS should be treated. More research is
needed to evaluate treatments for in situ disease.21,26
What Characteristics of the Screening
Evidence Base Could Explain Expert
Disagreement?
In high-income countries, cancer screening is a familiar
feature of preventive medical care. Screening is expected—
with good reason—to be informed by evidence. Across these
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three cases, there are two less-often discussed tensions and
three more explicit tensions that help to explain why
interpreting the evidence is such a difﬁcult task.
Tensions in the Evidence Base That Are
Discussed Less Often
Two tensions in the evidence base are under-examined: the
comparability of data between studies and contexts, and
the impact of technological developments. These tensions
are also difﬁcult to resolve and potentially destabilizing.
Data from different contexts may not be comparable,
particularly for observational data from monitoring
studies. As shown, the evidence base contains data from
different times, countries, and programs, and from
populations with varying event rates (Table 1). Trans-
ferability of this evidence is difﬁcult for several reasons.
Because screening trials are particularly large and need
long follow-up to show effects, they can be especially
susceptible to the passage of time. When early trials were
conducted, screening techniques were less developed,
treatments less effective, cancer incidence lower, and
cancer mortality often higher. Breast screening evidence,
for example, includes decades-old trials; treatment has
progressed substantially since they were conducted.
Evidence from screening trials is also susceptible to local
variation (e.g., in disease biology, event rates, and age
distribution), not least because screening is applied to
whole populations, not just people who are ill. As HPV
vaccination is implemented differently around the world,
for example, the underlying event rate for cervical cancer
will change dramatically. The resource intensiveness of
cancer screening trials also means that (1) few trials are
done (leaving less evidence to interpret); (2) trials are
often funded by industry (changing the research ques-
tions); and (3) trials are somewhat dependent on local
screening and treatment practices (e.g., target age,
screening intervals, testing techniques, follow-up time,
available treatment). The variability and transferability of
screening evidence is a challenge for methodologists, and
even more so for clinicians and policymakers, as the
characteristics on which the evidence depends are not
always made clear in reporting.
The second under-examined tension is that screening
technologies affect evidence quality; thus, evidence must
evolve with changing technologies. Cancer screening
relies on complex cascades of technology for collecting,
imaging, analyzing, and interpreting possible changes in
human bodies. Without the technology, there is no
screening, but as technology evolves, it potentially makes
existing evidence obsolete.64
The evidence on PSA is hampered by poor technology.
The PSA test has limited sensitivity and speciﬁcity,
studies and laboratories use multiple test types and
different thresholds, there is no meaningful “normal
range,” and new test rules do not appear to change
patient outcomes. Some propose using test results only
within, rather than between, patients, but the poor test
characteristics of PSA make even this problematic. It is
understandable that clinicians want to retain some tool to
measure prostate cancer risk.65 However, given the test
characteristics of the PSA, it may not be possible to
generate a meaningful evidence base about its use in
populations.
The cervical screening evidence base is shifting
because of changing technology; tests that detect
oncogenic-type HPV may become the primary form of
screening in vaccinated populations. Mammography
remained relatively constant in the 20th century, chang-
ing only incrementally from ﬁlm to digital mammog-
raphy. In the 21st century, we face substantial
technological change, with moves to tomosynthesis
(integrated 2/3D mammography) and MRI screening of
high-risk women. Although tomosynthesis is receiving
considerable attention in the lay press and peer-reviewed
literature, attempts to estimate its effects have been based
on opaque assumptions and limited evidence. It seems
possible that both MRI and tomosynthesis will enhance
both the beneﬁts and harms of screening, but at present
this is unknown.60,61
Acknowledged Tensions in the Evidence Base
Three other, more explicit, tensions are over the quality
of evidence of beneﬁt, the relatively new evidence
regarding screening harm, and risk communication.
The quality of the evidence of beneﬁt from screening
varies, and the implications of this evidence are con-
tested. When one expert says to another, “You are wrong
about the evidence on screening,” she is likely to mean
this: “I disagree with the criteria that you have used to
separate good-quality studies, which should be included,
from poor-quality studies, which should be excluded.
I therefore disagree with your conclusion.”
The cancer screening evidence base contains observa-
tional studies, RCTs, and modeling of widely varying
quality and with disparate results. Early studies of
screening generally suggested greater beneﬁt, and later
studies less beneﬁt, which may be because early trials
were poorly designed (e.g., PSA) or because recent
treatment improvements leave less room for screening
to provide beneﬁt (e.g., breast screening). Even new trials
contain methodological ﬂaws (e.g., PLCO, ERSPC), and
methodologists often disagree about study design, par-
ticularly over whether screened and unscreened groups
are comparable.
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New RCTs are expensive and logistically challenging,
and so are rare. Thus, new conclusions generally arise
from re-analyses of existing research ﬁndings rather
than from new trials. Researchers performing meta-
analyses must decide on criteria for including and
excluding studies. The recent Marmot review of the
evidence on breast screening demonstrates that this is
possible,21 even in high-proﬁle situations, but disagree-
ment over criteria is likely to remain. And when new
analyses produce new ﬁndings, those whose settled
beliefs are challenged may perceive the chosen criteria
as arbitrary or incorrect. This highlights the importance
of transparency regarding how and why meta-analyses
are conducted.
The second acknowledged tension is that evidence
about harm is relatively new, and there are gaps in that
evidence and disagreement about what it means. Initially,
cancer screening researchers focused on measuring
screening beneﬁts; they have only recently turned to
potential harm. For all three cases—cervical, prostate,
and breast cancer (including DCIS)—there is limited
evidence about which instances of disease or pre-disease
are aggressive and require treatment, and which will be
indolent or regress. Because of this, many people will be
overtreated and may be harmed. Researchers are trying
to address this gap by studying the mortality beneﬁt of
treatment for small, Grade 1, node-negative breast
cancers, for example, or the genetic proﬁle of aggressive
versus indolent prostate cancers. This work may assist in
the future. In the meantime, existing knowledge suggests
opportunities to reduce harm. For example, there is
currently no way to determine which cervical lesions will
regress or progress. However, epidemiological data
demonstrate that women aged 18–25 years are most
likely to have unnecessary treatment, experience harm
from treatment, and fail to beneﬁt from treatment. This
has led some jurisdictions to restrict cervical screening to
women aged425 years.
Even when evidence about screening harm emerges,
experts often disagree about what it means and how to
respond. This may be in part because public health and
medical professionals have learned to think in a
particular way, and have taught citizens to think
similarly, of cancer and pre-cancer as progressive and
life-threatening, and screening as one of few defenses
against this threat. For the ﬁrst several decades of
screening research, harm was rarely measured.
Although later research suggested that screening may
harm, it may be difﬁcult for this evidence to reach public
attention given the powerful cultural meaning of cancer
death.66,67 New facts about screening harm are hotly
contested, with regard both to their accuracy and their
implications. And screening programs continue to be
evaluated primarily against increasing participation
targets, rather on the likely balance achieved between
beneﬁt and harm.
For example, it is generally accepted that prostate
biopsies and prostate cancer treatments are likely to
produce harm. This is taken as a fact, but that fact is
interpreted very differently. Some argue that most
screen-detected prostate cancers are indolent, so most
diagnosis is overdiagnosis, and most harm done is
unnecessary. They conclude that insurers or policy-
makers should constrain clinicians who test healthy
men, thus preventing harm. Others take a different view,
that without PSA testing, clinicians have no way of
diagnosing tumors that would develop or metastasize.
These experts tend to take the view that insurers or
policymakers should leave testing open to clinicians and
allow the possibility of harm to be dealt with via more
judicious decisions about treatment. Their opponents
might counter with studies showing that men diagnosed
with prostate cancer generally proceed to treatment
rather than “watching and waiting.”20 Although each
party can present data of some kind to support their
claims, it is worth remembering that data become
evidence only through interpretation and that experts
are susceptible to biases in this interpretive process.68,69
The ﬁnal acknowledged tension is that evidence
about outcomes is often poorly communicated, despite
the evidence about communication. Researchers and
programs tend to express outcomes using relative risks,
which incorporate baseline risk and are easier to
generalize across contexts. However, research shows
that relative risks encourage lay people and clinicians to
overemphasize beneﬁts and minimize harms. This has
been acknowledged as ethically problematic, poten-
tially biasing or manipulating people’s perceptions,
misleading them, and undermining their autonomy.70
If experts are obliged to communicate honestly with
citizens—an obligation that seems supportable—this
becomes an urgent issue to address for all forms of
cancer screening.
Conclusions
The beneﬁts and harms of screening are often ﬁnely
balanced—more than anticipated when screening was
established. There are both unique and shared character-
istics of cervical, prostate, and breast screening that help
to explain the challenge of balancing beneﬁt and harm.
These include the incomparability of data from different
times, places, and programs; the instability of the very
technology on which screening is based; disagreement on
which studies are sufﬁciently well designed to be taken
seriously; gaps in knowledge; and disagreement about
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how to understand newly emerging evidence of harm.
This suggests ﬁve principles for evaluating and using the
evidence:
1. attend closely to transferability;
2. consider the inﬂuence of technologies on the
evidence base;
3. query the design of meta-analyses;
4. ensure harms are deﬁned and measured; and
5. improve risk communication practices.
However, even more fundamental are questions about
the purpose of screening and who should make decisions
about screening. Should insurers or policymakers leave
screening options open for clinicians and patients to
choose? Or should they be directive, promoting some
forms of screening and limiting others to minimize
harm? Should community engagement and deliberation
guide screening policy and practice? And what should the
purpose of screening be? There are many potential aims
of cancer screening, including preventing cancer death,
reducing all-cause mortality, minimizing anxiety, max-
imizing cost efﬁciency, and minimizing avoidable harm.
These different aims reﬂect different values, which may
differ between patients, clinicians, funders, and policy-
makers. Questions about the evidence base need reso-
lution. This should be complemented with clear thinking
about the aims of screening. Only when the aims of
screening are clear will researchers be able to generate an
evidence base sufﬁcient to assist decision making, and
clinicians be able to best support their patients to make
good screening decisions.
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Search string 
An example of the search string for literature review of empirical studies on what influences 
people’s views about breast screening by mammography. 
 
Medline via OvidSP, August 2015 
 
1. breast  [30115] 
2. mammography [29766] 
3. 1 or 2 [55364] 
4. mass screening [86238] 
5. 3 and 4 [7130] 
6. attitude [166454] 
7. perception [22747] 
8. 6 or 7 [186346] 
9. 5 and 8 [586] 
10. limit 9 to (English language and year=”1990-Current”) [555] 
 
Inclusion criteria 
• Empirical research article published in a peer-reviewed journal 
• Research performed on a developed country 
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• Research performed on a country with established (organised or opportunistic) 
mammography screening procedures 
• Research on cancer screening more generally if and only if breast screening is 
specifically addressed 
 
Exclusion criteria 
• Research focused only on women at high risk of breast cancer  
• Research focused only on second or subsequent breast screening visits 
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Table A8.1. Data analysis for Chapter 3 (worked examples) 
 
Study Country Sample Study design Aim of study 
Achat et al., 2005 Australia Women Quantitative Increase screening 
attendance 
Bortoff et al., 
1998 
Canada South Asian 
women 
Qualitative Increase screening 
attendance 
Ahmad et al., 
2001 
Canada Primary care 
practitioners 
Quantitative Increase screening 
attendance 
Alcarez et al., 
2002 
Spain Women Quantitative Increase screening 
attendance 
Avis-Williams et 
al., 2009 
USA Underserved 
women 
Qualitative Increase screening 
attendance 
Banks et al., 1995 USA Women Quantitative Increase screening 
attendance 
Black et al., 1995 USA Women under 50 
years 
Quantitative Increase informed 
decision making 
Bryant et al., 
1992 
Canada Rural and 
disadvantaged 
women 
Quantitative Increase screening 
attendance 
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Appendix 9:  Ethics committee documents for empirical study 
(Chapters 4 to 8) 
This Appendix contains the documents confirming ethics committee approval for my 
research including approvals for various amendments to my participant recruitment and 
materials.  The initial letter of approval, dated 7 August 2012, contains an error in the AUD 
RED Reference for the Cancer Institute of New South Wales Population & Health Services 
Research Ethics Committee.  It reads HREC/12/CIPHS/399 but should read 
HREC/12/CIPHS/46 (my italics).  The correct reference is provided in subsequent letters 
from the Cancer Institute of New South Wales. 
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Dr Stacy Carter 
Centre for Values, Ethics & the Law 
The University of Sydney 
Level 1, Medical Foundation Bldg (K25) 
92-94 Parramatta Road 
Camperdown NSW 2006 
 
 
7 August 2012 
 
 
Dear Dr Carter, 
 
NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee 
 
AU RED Reference: HREC/12/CIPHS/399 
 
Cancer Institute NSW reference number: 2012/06/399 
 
Project Title:  Evaluating cancer screening: context, evidence, values and ethics 
 
Thank you for your correspondence dated 16 July 2012 responding to a request for further 
information/clarification of the above referenced study, submitted to the NSW Population & 
Health Services Research Ethics Committee (Executive) for single ethical and scientific 
review. The Committee reviewed your response at its meeting held on 1 August 2012 and I 
am pleased to inform you that full ethical approval has been granted. 
 
The Committee approved the following documents: 
x Researcher response letter, dated 16 July 2012 
x NSW National Ethics Application Form, v2, submission code AU/1/9D2D06, dated 2 
May 2012 
x Protocol, Version 1, dated 2 May 2012 
x Information for Participants – Units, Version 2, dated 11 July 2012 
x Information for Participants – Workshop, Version 2, dated 11 July 2012 
x Participant Consent Form – Units, Version 2, dated 11 July 2012 
x Participant Consent Form – Workshop, Version 2, dated 11 July 2012 
x Survey Tool, Version 1, dated 2 May 2012 
x CV of Stacy M. Carter, PhD 
x APP1023197 GRP Assessment Summary 
x NSW Privacy Form 
 
The NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee (Executive) has been 
accredited by the NSW Department of Health to provide single ethical and scientific review 
of research proposals conducted within the NSW public health system.  
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The Committee is a joint initiative of the Cancer Institute NSW and NSW Department of 
Health. The Committee has been constituted and operates in accordance with the National 
Health and Medical Research Council’s National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research (2007) and relevant legislation and guidelines. 
  
Please note that ethical approval is valid for 5 years, conditional on the following: 
 
x Principal investigators will immediately report anything which might warrant a review of 
ethical approval of the research, including unforeseen events that might affect continued 
ethical acceptability. 
x Proposed amendments to the research proposal or conduct of the research which may 
affect the ethical acceptability of the research are to be provided to the NSW Population 
& Health Services Research Ethics Committee for review. 
x The NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee will be notified 
giving reasons, if the research is discontinued before the expected date of completion. 
x The Principal Investigator will provide an annual progress report to the NSW Population 
& Health Services Research Ethics Committee and at the completion of the study. 
 
You are reminded that this letter constitutes ‘ethical approval’ only. This research project 
must not commence at a site until separate authorisation from the Chief Executive or 
delegate of that site has been obtained. It is your responsibility to forward a copy of this letter 
together with any approved documents as enumerated above, to all site investigators for 
submission to the site’s Research Governance Officer. Where relevant, copies will also need 
to be provided to the CHeReL and the data custodian. 
 
For further information about the NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics 
Committee, please refer to our website www.cancerinstitute.org.au/research. 
 
Should you have any queries about the ethical review of your research proposal, please 
contact Kate Lowrie, Admin Support Officer – Ethics on 02 8374 5616 or email 
ethics@cancerinstitute.org.au.  
 
The NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee wishes you well in your 
research endeavours. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Sharon Falleiro 
Ethics Coordinator 
Cancer Institute NSW  
Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee 
 
RESEARCH INTEGRITY 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Web: http://sydney.edu.au/research_support/ethics/human/ 
Email: ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au 
Address for all correspondence: 
Level 6, Jane Foss Russell Building - G02 
The University of Sydney 
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
 
 
Manager Human Ethics 
Dr Margaret Faedo 
T: +61 2 8627 8176 
E: margaret.faedo@sydney.edu.au 
 
Human Ethics Secretariat: 
Ms Karen Greer   T: +61 2  8627 8171 E: karen.greer@sydney.edu.au 
Ms Patricia Engelmann T: +61 2  8627 8172 E: patricia.engelmann@sydney.edu.au 
Ms Kala Retnam T: +61 2  8627 8173 E: kala.retnam@sydney.edu.au 
 
 
 ABN 15 211 513 464 CRICOS 00026A 
 
Ref:  [SA/KFG] 
 
7 September 2012 
 
 
Dr Stacy Carter 
Centre for Values, Ethics & Law in Medicine (VELIM) 
The University of Sydney 
Email: stacy.carter@sydney.edu.au  
 
 
Dear Dr Carter 
 
Title: Evaluating cancer screening: context, evidence, values and ethics [Ref. 15245] 
PhD Students: Jane Williams, Kristen Pickles, Gemma Jacklyn & Lisa Parker 
 
The Executive of the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) has reviewed your study to include 
the above PhD students. The Committee acknowledges your right to proceed under the authority of 
the NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee. 
 
The Human Research Ethics Committee advises that you consult with The University of Sydney 
Audit and Risk Management Office (http://sydney.edu.au/audit_risk/) to ensure that University of 
Sydney staff/students and premises are adequately covered for the purpose of conducting this 
research project. 
 
Any modifications to the study must be approved by the NSW Population & Health Services Research 
Ethics Committee. A copy of any approved modification, approved progress report and any new 
approved documents must be provided to The University of Sydney HREC for our records. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact Research Integrity (Human Ethics) should you require further 
information or clarification. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Dr Stephen Assinder 
Chair 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
 
cc: jane.h.williams@sydney.edu.au  
 gemma.jacklyn@sydney.edu.au  
 lisa.parker@sydney.edu.au 
 kristen.pickles@sydney.edu.au  
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Dr Stacy Carter 
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine 
School of Public Health 
Room 162 
K25 
University of Sydney 
NSW 2006 
 
 
 
07 May 2013 
 
 
Dear Dr Carter, 
 
NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee 
 
AU RED Reference: HREC/12/CIPHS/46 
 
Cancer Institute NSW reference number: 2012/06/399 
       
Study Title: Evaluating cancer screening: context, evidence, values and ethics 
 
Thank you for your correspondence of 1 May 2013 responding to a request for further 
information from the NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee.  
 
I am pleased to advise that the following documents have been approved: 
• CI NSW Request for Amendment form, dated 4 March 2013  
• Breast screening recruitment email, Version 2, dated March 2013 
• Focus Group recruitment, Version 1 dated March 2013   
• Participant Information Sheet (Breast Screening), Version 4, dated April 2013  
• Participant Information Sheet Prostate screening, Version 4, dated April 2013 
• Participant Information Sheet Cervical Screening Interviews, Version 4, dated April 
2013 
• Participant Information Sheet Cervical Screening Focus Groups, Version 4, dated 
April 2013 
• Prostate screening recruitment wording, Version 3, dated April 2013 
• Protocol for verbal consent, Version 1, dated March 2013  
 
The NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee has been accredited by 
the NSW Ministry of Health to provide single ethical and scientific review of research 
proposals conducted within the NSW public health system.  
 
The Committee is a joint initiative of the Cancer Institute NSW and NSW Ministry of Health. 
The Committee has been constituted and operates in accordance with the National Health 
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and Medical Research Council’s National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 
(2007) and relevant legislation and guidelines. 
  
For further information about the NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics 
Committee, please refer to our website www.cancerinstitute.org.au/research.  
 
Should you have any queries about the ethical review of your research proposal, please 
contact me on 02 8374 3562 or email ethics@cancerinstitute.org.au. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Virginia Turner 
Ethics Coordinator 
Cancer Institute NSW 
 
 Level 9, 8 Central Avenue, Australian Technology Park, Eveleigh, NSW 2015  
•
 PO Box 41, Alexandria, NSW 1435 • 
T 02 8374 5600 • F 02 8374 5700 • www.cancerinstitute.org.au • ABN 48 538 442 594 
 
TRIM Record: E13/23524   In Confidence     Page 1 of 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Stacy Carter 
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine 
School of Public Health 
Room 162 
K25 
University of Sydney 
NSW 2006 
 
 
13 September 2013 
 
 
Dear Dr Carter, 
 
NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee 
 
AU RED Reference: HREC/12/CIPHS/46 
 
Cancer Institute NSW reference number: 2012/06/399 
       
Study Title: Evaluating cancer screening: context, evidence, values and ethics 
 
Thank you for your recent correspondence notifying of changes to the above referenced 
study, submitted for single ethical review to the NSW Population & Health Services 
Research Ethics Committee (Executive). The Committee reviewed your amendments at its 
meeting held on 3 September 2013, and I am pleased to advise that ongoing ethical 
approval has been granted. 
 
The Committee approved the following documentation: 
• Cover Letter, dated 26 August 2013 
• CI NSW Request for Amendment form, dated 26 August 2013 
o Request to add to the existing recruitment protocols and wording. 
• Breast Screen Participant Information Sheet Interviews,  Version 5, dated August 
2013 
• Breast Screening Recruitment email, Version3, dated August 2013 
• Additions to general recruitment protocol.   
 
The NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee has been accredited by 
the NSW Ministry of Health to provide single ethical and scientific review of research 
proposals conducted within the NSW public health system.  
 
The Committee is a joint initiative of the Cancer Institute NSW and NSW Department of 
Health. The Committee has been constituted and operates in accordance with the National 
Health and Medical Research Council’s National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research (2007) and relevant legislation and guidelines. 
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You are reminded that this letter constitutes ‘ethical approval’ only. This research project 
must not commence at a site until separate authorisation from the Chief Executive or 
delegate of that site has been obtained. It is your responsibility to forward a copy of this letter 
together with any approved documents as enumerated above, to all site investigators for 
submission to the site’s Research Governance Officer. Where relevant, copies will also need 
to be provided to the CHeReL and the data custodian. 
 
For further information about the NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics 
Committee, please refer to our website www.cancerinstitute.org.au/research. 
 
Should you have any queries about the ethical review of your research proposal, please 
contact me on 02 8374 5615 or email ethics@cancerinstitute.org.au.  
 
The NSW Population & Health Services Research Ethics Committee wishes you well in your 
research endeavours. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Samantha Dawes 
Administration Support Officer 
Cancer Institute NSW 
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Appendix 10: Recruitment for empirical study (Chapters 4 to 8) 
This Appendix contains a version of the recruitment email and participant information sheet 
(see Chapter 4). 
Recruitment email 
Re: Mammographic screening study  
 
Dear xxx 
I am writing to request an interview with you as part of a large NHMRC-funded research 
project about cancer screening policy and practice in Australia.  I am undertaking the breast 
cancer screening case study within this project. I aim to explore the evolution of 
mammographic breast cancer screening in Australia, with particular attention to scientific, 
social and ethical factors, and to look closely at how we might best make decisions about 
the future of breast cancer screening.  To do this I plan to speak with a wide range of people 
who work or research in the field, and I am seeking your participation in this capacity.  I am 
particularly interested in your opinion because … 
 
If you choose to be involved I would like to conduct an hour-long interview with you.  Your 
contribution will remain completely confidential.  I will not disclose who participated in the 
study, and will completely de-identify the data so that no participants can be recognised.  
 
A detailed Participant Information Statement is attached to this email. The Chief 
Investigators for the project are Stacy Carter, Lucie Rychetnik, Alexandra Barratt and Ian 
Kerridge.  The Associate Investigators are Vikki Entwistle, Les Irwig, Ian Olver, Sally 
Redman and Glenn Salkeld. 
 
I know that you are very busy but I would be most grateful if you could manage to spare an 
hour of your time and share your knowledge with me.  I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Kind Regards,  
 
Lisa Parker MBBS (Hons), MBioethics PhD Candidate | Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine (VELiM)  Sydney School of Public Health THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY Medical Foundation Building K25|The University of Sydney | NSW| 2006  M: 0406 758998  F: 02 9036 3436 lisa.parker@sydney.edu.au  
****** Attach the participant information sheet ****** 
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Dr Stacy Carter 
NHMRC Career Development Fellow 
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine 
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UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS AND DEBATES WITHIN 
MAMMOGRAPHY SCREENING IN AUSTRALIA 
 
INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS - INTERVIEWS 
Introduction 
You are invited to participate in an important research project about breast cancer screening. This 
study is part of a larger project examining cancer screening policy and practice within Australia.   
You are invited to participate in the breast cancer screening arm of the study.  As you know, opinions 
about breast cancer screening vary. For example, people disagree about whether some women 
receive unnecessary treatment as a result of screening, and if they do, how we should respond. In 
this project we aim to understand such disagreements and what should be done about them. We 
are using well-established qualitative methods to gather the widest possible range of views about 
breast cancer screening. We do not have preconceived notions about what is right and wrong: 
instead we are trying to understand why people and organisations take contrasting positions, and 
what we might do to resolve differences. We are analysing data from in-depth interviews and focus 
groups with consumer advocates, clinicians, epidemiologists, people involved in screening service 
provision, and other stakeholder groups.  
 
 
The purpose of this project is to answer the following research questions: 
x What are the range of factors that influence thinking on breast screening policy and 
practice? 
x What contributes to the controversies around mammographic breast cancer screening? 
x What common ground exists between breast screening stakeholders?  
x How might we best make decisions about future directions within breast screening? 
 
This project is administered through the University of Sydney. The investigators are: 
Name Main area of expertise Affiliation 
Stacy Carter (Chief 
Investigator (CI)) 
Public health ethics and 
qualitative health research 
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in 
Medicine and Sydney School of Public 
Health, The University of Sydney  
Lucie Rychetnik (CI) Evidence in public health and 
qualitative health research  
Sydney School of Public Health and 
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in 
Medicine, The University of Sydney  
Alexandra Barratt (CI) Screening epidemiology Sydney School of Public Health, The 
University of Sydney 
Ian Kerridge (CI) Bioethics  Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in 
Medicine, The University of Sydney  
Vikki Entwistle 
(Associate Investigator 
(AI)) 
Ethical and social research   University of Aberdeen 
Les Irwig (AI) Epidemiology Sydney School of Public Health, The 
University of Sydney 
Breast Screening Participant Information Sheet v5 Aug2013 
Ian Olver (AI) Oncology, bioethics Cancer Council Australia, The 
University of Sydney 
Sally Redman (AI) Knowledge translation in health SAX Institute 
Glenn Salkeld (AI) Health economics Sydney School of Public Health, The 
University of Sydney 
The field work on this study will be done by Lisa Parker, a PhD student from the University of Sydney. 
This project is funded entirely by the National Health and Medical Research Council (APP1023197). 
Interviews 
You are invited to participate in an interview. This will be an opportunity to talk about your own 
experience and how you think about cancer screening policy and/or practice. We will canvass your 
general opinions on breast screening as well as specific stories from your experience within the field 
of breast screening.. Some of the questions that we will be asking you include what you think of the 
current screening program, what you think would be an ideal breast cancer screening program, and 
how you think breast screening will change in future.  Interviews will last around 60 minutes 
depending on how much you want to say. If you agree, the interview will be digitally recorded. 
Feedback 
If you wish, we can provide you with a transcript of your interview. When analysis of the interview 
data is complete, we will provide you with a summary of the findings.  This will occur approximately 
in the second half of 2014.   
Data retention  
In all studies coordinated through the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, we give 
participants the option to consent to having their information retained in a de-identified form for 
further research and teaching.  Alternatively you can opt to have the data destroyed 7 years after 
the project ceases.  This will be entirely up to you. 
Risks 
This is a low-risk project.  The most significant risk is unwanted identification in reporting.  To 
minimise this risk, we will substitute a code for your name in all transcripts as soon as they are 
prepared, and we will remove any details that might reveal your identity.  Code sheets will be kept in 
a locked filing cabinet.  Digital audio files will be kept on password protected servers at all times.   
Benefits 
This research study is designed to further knowledge about the range of views on cancer screening 
and to support decisions about cancer screening in the future. It may not be of direct or immediate 
benefit to you, but will provide you with opportunities to contribute your thoughts and experiences.  
For the study to be useful, it is critical that we gather the widest possible range of views on breast 
cancer screening. We hope very much that you will take part as it will strengthen the quality of our 
final analysis.  
Voluntary Participation 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to take part.  If you do take part, you 
can withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.  There will be no consequence to you if 
you do not wish to take part, or wish to withdraw. 
Withdrawal from the study can be organised by contacting Lisa Parker on 0406 758998 or the lead 
Chief Investigator Stacy Carter on 02 9036 3407, whichever you would prefer. 
Confidentiality 
 Breast Screening Participant Information Sheet v5 Aug2013 
All the information collected from you for the study will be treated confidentially.  The interview will 
be digitally recorded. The digital audio file will only be accessible to the chief investigators, project 
coordinator and participating PhD students. It will be kept on a password protected server.  Field 
notes and interview transcripts will be available only to the Chief Investigator team, project 
coordinator and participating PhD students who will meet weekly to analyse the data.   
 
The Associate Investigator (AI) team will meet with the Chief Investigator team twice a year to 
discuss the analysis.  The AI team will not have access to the raw transcripts or field notes.  The study 
results will be presented at conference and in scientific publications, including the workshops 
planned for the end of the project.  However your contribution will remain completely confidential.  
We will not disclose who participated in the study, and will completely de-identify any observations 
and quotations used so that no participants can be recognised. 
Further Information 
If you would like any further information please do not hesitate to discuss this with Lisa Parker who 
will answer any questions you may have.  If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel 
free to contact Lisa Parker (0406 758998) or Dr Stacy Carter (02 9036 3407), the lead Chief 
Investigator for the project, at any time. 
This information sheet is for you to keep. 
Ethics Approval and Complaints 
This study has been approved the Cancer Institute NSW Population & Health Services Research 
Ethics Committee. Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study should 
contact the Ethics Coordinator who is the person nominated to receive complaints from research 
participants. You should contact them on 02 8374 5600 and quote HREC/12/CIPHS/46. 
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Appendix 11:  Interviews for empirical study (Chapters 4 to 8) 
This Appendix contains information about how I conducted interviews for my empirical 
study. 
 
A11.1 Introductory discussion with participants 
Interviewer: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.  I came to be interested in 
this area when I was working as a breast physician in the UK, and I noticed that some of my 
colleagues were really enthusiastic about the screening program, and others were less so.  
And there has been quite a bit written in the literature and also in the media about breast 
screening, and what the program should look like.  Plenty of people are happy with things the 
way they are, but others are not.  Given that we all have access to the same evidence, this 
made me wonder what was behind these differences, what else people are thinking about, 
what else is important to people.  So I’m interested in exploring that range of opinion, 
particularly amongst people who work in the field, either in clinical practice or research, or 
policy or people who play an important public role in promotion or fundraising for breast 
cancer screening and listening to the kinds of things that contribute to those different 
opinions.  So this study is an effort to try and explore the issue of screening in more detail 
and enlisting the help of people such as yourself to try and explain and understand what is 
behind different views. 
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A11.2 Obtaining consent 
Consent for interview 
Give participant the consent form to read through, or read out to participant over the phone. 
Consent for recording 
Ask participant if they consent to this interview on breast cancer screening being recorded 
and used to inform the project that I have previously outlined with them. 
(See consent form overleaf) 
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      ABN 15 211 513 464 
   
EVALUATING CANCER SCREENING: 
CONTEXT, EVIDENCE, VALUES AND ETHICS 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
Level 1, Medical Foundation Building, K25 
University of Sydney NSW 2006  
AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9036 3405 
Facsimi le:     +61 2 9036 3436 
Email: stacy.carter@sydney.edu.au 
 
I, ___________________________________________________________________ 
[name] 
Of ___________________________________________________________________ 
[address] 
have read and understood the Information for Participants on the above named research 
study and have discussed the study with ________________________________________. 
I have been made aware of the procedures involved in the study, including any known or 
expected inconvenience, risk, discomfort or potential side effect and of their implications as 
far as they are currently known by the researchers. 
I freely choose to participate in the following elements of this study and understand that I can 
withdraw at any time. I also understand that the research study is strictly confidential.  
[please respond to all questions] 
I agree to be included in unidentified field notes made 
about the daily work of my organisation related to cancer 
screening policy or practice  
NO  YES  
     
I agree to participate in an interview (I understand that 
the interview will be digitally audiotaped, and I agree to 
this). 
NO  YES  
     
Would you like your data retained in an un-identified 
form for further research and teaching, or destroyed 7 
years after the project ceases? 
Destroyed  Retained  
 
I hereby agree to participate in this research study as detailed above. 
 
NAME:     _________________________________. 
SIGNATURE:    _________________________________. 
DATE:     _________________________________. 
NAME OF WITNESS:    _________________________________. 
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS:  _________________________________. 
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A11.3 Interview questions 
Do not need to follow precisely; tailor questions to participant’s responses and to their areas 
of expertise. 
 
1. Can you tell me the story of your involvement in breast cancer screening, starting 
from when you first got involved and taking us up to the present?  
2. And now: describe what you do in a typical working week, and maybe touch on the 
scope of any other professional activities that involve breast screening such as 
committee meetings and so on. 
• Including, but not restricted to work that involves breast screening – just to give 
me a clearer idea of the scope of your involvement in the program 
3. Think back to the late 1980s – early 1990s when breast cancer screening was being 
introduced in Australia.  Did you have any particular views on it then? How have they 
changed? 
4. Views on the current Australian breast cancer screening program? 
• I know you have written about breast cancer screening in … Can you expand on 
that? 
(If interviewees seem to be repeating the ‘party’ line of the institution that they work 
for, you could remind them that the interview is confidential and say, ‘you don’t have 
to answer this question, but I wonder how your personal views compare with the 
institutional policies and practices, and whether there might be any points of 
difference?’) 
5. Would you like to see any changes to the current program? 
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• What would your ideal program be?   
• Reasons for why the current program is different from your ideal? e.g. 
logistical/financial issues, or deeper differences about the place of screening? 
• Feed in what others have suggested and ask for comments; e.g. 
o Begin at 45 or 40 and continue indefinitely 
o 3 yearly screening 
o Decrease funding for screening, spend on treatment including better access 
o More information 
6. What would it take to make such changes happen? 
• What might be the barriers to change? 
• What process would you like to see Australia follow?  Feed in what others said:  
o Methodologists only 
o Independent people 
o Community involvement 
7. There are many different ideas, about breast cancer screening.  Can you comment on 
these?   
• There are some who hold very extreme views about breast cancer screening.  
How do you respond to these ideas?  
• What do you think drives those views? If ignorance –would they have a different 
point of view if they were more informed? 
• If you could talk to – the public / Gotzsche etc, what would you say? 
• Can you see any good in their position?  Is there anything about what you think 
such people are trying to achieve that might lead to some common ground with 
yourself? 
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8. (If the topic hasn’t yet surfaced) Ask specifically about overdiagnosis  
• Evidence suggests some cancers found at screening would never have come to 
clinical attention in that person’s lifetime.  
• What are your thoughts on this? What level of overdiagnosis do you work with - 
e.g. is it: non-existent; exists but not a problem; a problem 
• How much responsibility should screening programs take for reducing 
overdiagnosis; how much should we tailor the program to minimize 
overdiagnosis? 
9. (If the topic hasn’t yet surfaced) as about communicating with women. 
• You may know that some places are looking at re-doing the breast screening 
leaflet.  What are your thoughts on what should be said to women? 
10. Future Obviously you can’t read the future, but given your expertise and experience, 
what do you think will happen?  (NB: I am trying to write about what should happen, 
so it is useful to start with what could happen). 
 
(Version: June 2013) 
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Appendix 12:  Data analysis for empirical study (Chapters 4 to 8) 
This Appendix contains personal notes that I wrote and used to guide my data analysis, along 
with examples and excerpts from the various tools that I used to assist with organising and 
synthesising my data. 
A12.1 Coding index 
Use the following table to code interview transcripts. 
(see table overleaf) 
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Table A12.1. Index for coding interview transcripts  
  
List of topics and concepts Shorthand used for coding transcripts 
Chronology   
Of breast cancer   bc hx 
Chronology of screening including influences on 
screening program in Australia  
screening hx 
Current Australian program screening now 
Future in breast cancer including screening  future 
Views on screening   
Overall thoughts on breast cancer screening on bcs 
What is important about bcs   what is important 
How own views are formed how decides 
Harms, including how to balance harms and benefits b&h 
Changes would like to see / ideal program   changes 
Justification for suggesting those changes or having 
stated views   
reasons 
Why own view is right  why right 
Evidence & more  
What evidence is accepted or used as right (numbers, 
names) 
evidence 
Why that evidence is used e.g. what are the influences 
on self regarding interpretation of evidence 
infl on ev (overlap with how decides – see 
above) 
General ideas about evidence about evidence 
Views of other people  
Comments on different / contradictory evidence diff ev 
Comments on possible influences on other people / 
why they think the way they do   
influences on others 
Engaging with others   
What would there have to be in place to have a 
dialogue with others, especially those who hold 
contradictory views 
moving forward 
Views on how to ‘move forward’, how future policy 
decisions should be made 
process 
Other  
Way of talking about women as participants / patients talks about women 
  Personal breast screening or breast cancer story e.g. 
self, family, friend 
personal 
 
 
(Version: May 2013) 
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A12.2 Memo 1 
Notes on writing Memo 1 
After each interview, immediately write a short memo addressing the following points: 
• Biographical data 
• What sort of person is s/he? 
• Immediate response / impression about the interview 
• What did I learn? 
• How was this interview similar/different to others? 
• What are the main points (what must I not forget)? 
• How does the interview help me answer my research questions? 
Include the memo with the transcript. 
Memo 1 example 
Memo 1 
(Date and identifying information removed) 
 
Prompt interview – just the following week after email.  Happy to talk.  Embarked 
immediately on a discussion about overdiagnosis, and was surprised later in the interview 
when I suggested that others had told me that breast screening was not controversial in 
general medical and public circles. 
 
Essential points: [1] overdiagnosis nowhere near as big an issue in breast screening as in 
prostate screening [2] benefits of breast screening probably bigger than suggested, because 
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most studies include data from the very beginning of screening, when in fact there were 
mistakes / incomplete roll out – studies of benefit should only look at the program when in 
steady state / fully functioning / problems ironed out, e.g. 10 yrs into it [3] ecological studies 
are problematic, because too many assumptions; most people who are concerned about a high 
level of overdiagnosis rely on ecological studies. 
 
Suggested – for breast cancer it’s a judgement call, about balancing benefits and harms 
(unless, as in the case with prostate cancer, the harms are really very significant).  Doesn’t 
think the public should be asked to make judgements about treatment – people like … are 
paid to give advice and so that’s what they should do.  People might think they feel strongly 
about valuing something (e.g. not losing their hair) – but in fact, when in a certain situation 
and faced with limited options, that might turn out not to be so important after all, so even 
asking the public to make decisions based on what they value can be problematic. 
 
A12.3 Memo 2  
Notes and template for Memo 2  
After reading and coding the transcript, write Memo 2: i.e. summarise the participant’s views 
using the following template.  Include relevant quotes from the transcript.  Include line 
references for summarised views and for quotes.  
• Chronology of breast cancer 
• History of breast cancer screening in Australia 
• Current breast cancer screening in Australia 
• Overall view of breast cancer screening 
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• Suggested changes 
• Reasons for change 
• Views on harms 
• How own views are formed – evidence used 
• How own views are formed – other 
• What is important about evidence? 
• What is important overall? 
• Other people’s views – evidence; other 
• Future - best process for moving forward? 
 
(Version: September 2013)  
Memo 2 example 
Memo 2 
Italics indicate direct quotations from interview transcript. (Numbers in brackets indicate 
line reference from transcript). 
 
Chronology of breast cancer 
Currently – a very breast aware society, therefore few women are presenting late – this was 
occurring even before screening started because of: 1. Early presentation and 2. Modern 
treatment, prognosis for breast cancer is good even without screening (721). 
 
Hx of bcs in Australia 
 325 
Appendix 12: Data analysis for empirical study (Chapters 4 to 8) 
 
Current bcs in Australia 
 
Overall view of bcs 
Crude approach (394) 
This is an issue that is obviously very active on the international stage (975). 
 
Suggested changes 
Stop inviting (754) -  women assume invitation = encouragement (880) = means Someone 
somewhere has weighed up the pros and cons and decided … on balance – that screening is a 
good thing (343; 355); if you stop inviting then many women will stop coming (which will 
be appropriate) I think if women weren’t invited, I really think that would have a big impact 
on what women actually do … I think if that letter never arrived, there’d be a lot of people 
who – who it would just not – it wouldn’t happen (943; 954). 
 
Continue to allow screening, and give women info that it is an option (756; 912; 878) I 
wouldn’t like to ban it in the sense that I think those [very high risk] women should have the 
option, but I do not think we should be encouraging women at average risk to be screened the 
way they currently are. 
 
At least – invitation should not come from service provider because they are judged on their 
success in terms of participation rates and thus cannot be expected to provide appropriately 
balanced info about pros and cons (344; 355) invitation from a separate body (e.g. Cancer 
Australia) and with lots of thought about type and format of info re: pros and cons (764; 773). 
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Remove the KPI (Key Performance Indicators) for BreastScreen to identify a certain % of 
small cancers – because that changes the spectrum of disease that we are diagnosing and 
increases overdiagnosis (797; 842). 
 
Don’t include women over 70 - retrograde step (964) because that increases overdiagnosis 
(because of co-morbidities) I just think it’s terrible to think that women aged in their 
seventies will be having, you know, surgery with or without radiotherapy and going on to five 
to 10 years of endocrine therapy for a condition which they would otherwise have never 
known they had (813). 
 
Screening should be individualised (392; 880); only screen those at high risk (e.g. very strong 
family history or BRCA or past history of chest irradiation (333) not those at average risk – 
because currently we cannot say that the benefits of screening definitely outweigh the harms 
(418) this is because: 1. Treatment so much better 2. Overdiagnosis is a big harm. 
 
Reasons for change 
 
Views on harms 
 
How own views are formed – evidence used 
the figures cannot lie (randomised trial data) (267); clear evidence of overdiagnosis from the 
RCT data (640); overdiagnosis ?10% (269). 
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RCT evidence – 20% mortality reduction – but these are pre-treatment revolution and so not 
likely to be true (609; 617) the estimate of benefit from the trials no longer really applies. 
(623). 
 
Marmot:  very conservative estimate was that for every life saved, there would be at least 
three cases of overdiagnosis (674). 
 
A12.4 Chart 
Transfer a summarised version of Memo 2 into the Chart. 
 
(See table overleaf) 
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Table A12.2. Excerpt from the Chart  
Participant 
details 
#23, male, researcher, (location 
removed to preserve anonymity) 
#25, female, consumer advocate, 
(location removed to preserve 
anonymity) 
Hx of br ca   
Hx of bcs in 
Aust 
data suggested benefit; debate about 
parameters; seemingly good value 
(little data); feasible program, well 
scrutinised; political driver; 
previously: screening committee 
made decisions, abolished by 
Howard; 70% particip aim is “made 
up”; 2 yearly screening - easier to 
remember  
 
Bcs in Aust 
today 
no defined process of decision 
making; widely seen as sacrosanct; 
assumption about high particip rate is 
a myth 
advocacy groups get contacted by media 
after new evidence released; advocacy 
groups involved in advisory working 
parties; in Vic - no screening within BS 
after bc dx; in WA can get screening in 
BS still; 50% funding from c’wealth & 
state; funding on 3 yearly basis; 
frustration about set up – c’wealth & 
state input - hard to make changes 
Overall view of 
bcs 
prob beneficial; an empire in own 
right, much like other health 
interventions; living - should respond 
to changes 
good; early detection leads to less radical 
treatment; contributes to dec mortality 
Suggested 
changes 
 consistency across states e.g. about 
access after bc dx 
Reasons   
Views on harms  overdx - about DCIS; problem is about 
whether to treat or watch; need more 
research & info to women about this; no 
real concept of this as a 'harm' - only 
harm from participation in bcs is 10 min 
of your life 
How views are 
formed: 
evidence 
 hard to understand; 40% of Aus bc are 
picked up through bcs  
How views are 
formed: other 
 meets a lot of women who were pleased 
to be dx through bcs; bc is common; 
belief in the value of screening 
What is 
important 
(evidence) 
  
Table continues overleaf 
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Participant 
details 
#23, male, researcher, (location 
removed to preserve anonymity) 
#25, female, consumer advocate, 
(location removed to preserve 
anonymity) 
What is 
important 
(overall) 
accountability for public health 
program (evaluate benefit & safety); 
autonomy - information & views of 
public; cost; having a framework to 
decide about public health 
interventions; having experts justify 
their values 
having people attend screening; 
informing women about risks of 
treatment vs watching; reducing the 
impact of bc on Aus community; having 
info about bcs available for those who 
want it; economic considerations; public 
debate (tho not at expense of deterring 
screening) 
How other’s 
views are 
formed: 
evidence  
 same data - diff interpretation, hard to 
know why; looking for evidence to back 
up theory rather than just looking at data 
How other’s 
views are 
formed: other 
politics; economics (oft used to 
support pre-existing convictions); 
values 
 
Infl on women   
How to proceed committee with defined TOR 
relevant to public health (i.e. values); 
advisory committee to review 
evidence 
consensus amongst clinicians before 
public debate; research into how to target 
screening and direct treatment 
Who to have   
Prediction    
A12.5 Rolling Memo 
Reflect on the recent interview and on previous interviews, and add relevant information into 
Rolling Memo. 
Rolling memo excerpt 
[Numbers in square brackets indicate aliases for interviews] 
 
How own views are formed – what evidence is used 
Many experts named individuals or particular trials as being influential, esp their own; others 
talked about types of evidence. 
• XX was initially very influential [1,3,4]. 
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• Own evidence used [2,3,4,5,6,13,14,17,20,24]. 
• International evidence is good [17]. Important to use objective / impartial evidence 
(Marmot paper) [5,6,25] . 
• Canadian trials seem well conducted [11]. 
• YY ‘writes well’ [9]. 
• Research from Cas Dickson: 50% benefit from those who get screened is good study 
[17]. 
• Marmot paper – 20% benefit are pre-treatment figures so unlikely to be correct; 
although RCTs are gold standard, they are out of date [24,25]; estimate of overdx 
‘conservative’ [14]; incredible that he didn’t use observational data – what does that 
say about those studies that were all approved by ethics committees [16]; wouldn’t 
rely on someone who has no experience in the area [17]; relies on the Marmot paper 
[26] because independent [21,25]; Marmot’s view of overdx was that it can’t be 
determined at an individual level – until we can do that, we can’t call it a harm [30]. 
• Trials, level 1 evidence [18,21]. 
• Evidence as converted into guidelines [18]. 
• Only use (the 5) RCTs without Clinical Breast Examination in the intervention arm 
[20]. 
• Modelling studies that explain 50% mortality reduction due to treatment [13]. 
• Important to use service studies, RCTs are hypothesis generating, but not proving of 
effectiveness in the real world [4,24]. 
• Due to lack of alternatives (insufficient good quality local recent evidence) we are 
forced to rely on outdated RCTs and less than ideal observational studies, which 
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entail us to make assumptions that are easily challenged by those who don’t like the 
conclusions [16]. 
• Population studies can tell us that incidence of later stage cancer has not decreased as 
expected if the increase in diagnosis of small (early) cancers is effective (i.e. probably 
most of the small cancer diagnoses are overdiagnosis) [20]. 
• Focus groups about how to give info [21]. 
 
Most experts thought evidence was a major influence on their views, though some thought it 
was uncertain or difficult to interpret: 
• Evidence is crucial e.g. for ensuring program quality [24]. 
• Lots of evidence compared to other health interventions [25], though still evidence is 
not clear cut [25]. 
• Evidence underpins everything; keeps up with new literature; but evidence is 
uncertain and open to different interpretations [26]. 
• Evidence is crucial [28] but statistics very hard to understand [28]. 
• Doesn’t understand the evidence, i.e. unable to personally evaluate the evidence base 
[31]. 
• Evidence controversy very confusing for a self confessed ‘failed’ epidemiologist [9] 
or anyone because of so many possible biases [24]. 
• All the published literature seems credible; impossible to know what to believe so no 
specific figures used, just general concepts – including acceptance that over-detection 
occurs [10]. 
 
Others talked more explicitly about evidence being important but unavailable: 
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• Main issue is lack of evidence of benefit [11], still in stage of evaluating, no clear 
conclusions yet [29]. 
• Aware of uncertainty around evidence of benefit [6] or harms [24]; evidence not clear 
cut [25]. 
• The literature has shown mortality benefit so we have to believe it; but not completely 
convincing as concurrent treatment improvement – would like more proof [23]. 
 
Different ideas about the evidence and what it shows: 
• Clearly proven that screening saves lives [27]; clear that screening enables early 
diagnosis and early diagnosis works [29]. 
• Long studies of low grade DCIS show that 60% progress @ 30 years [7,13]. 
• The increased proportion of small/early stage cancer diagnoses together with reduced 
population breast cancer mortality is evidence of success [7]. 
• Low participation rates explain limited population mortality benefit [8]. 
• Doesn’t believe stated evidence relating to likely individual benefit [8]. 
• No evidence of benefit for <50 ; marginal evidence of benefit for >50 [11]. 
 
? Maybe different interpretations of evidence is partly because people use different types of 
evidence: [4] thinks that breast cancer screening produces a dramatic benefit, of the scale 
rarely seen in public health research (because [4] looking at relative figures?); [6] thinks that 
the benefit is modest, measured in days rather than in years as seen with smoking cessation 
(because [6] is looking at absolute figures?). 
 
 333 
Appendix 12: Data analysis for empirical study (Chapters 4 to 8) 
Some people talk about evidence in relation to harms: 
• Evidence about benefit – but not population evidence about so-called ‘harms’ because 
the interpretation of outcomes being a harm is a personal, value judgement (and not 
something that the epidemiology people should take on) [12]. 
• Should look for evidence about harms as well as benefits [24]. 
• Hard to know how much incidence is due to overdiagnosis and how much due to 
lifestyle changes, but we do know that there have been lifestyle changes and these 
must have had an effect [17]. 
 
How own views are formed – other 
Professional experience – clinical: 
• Clinical bias to avoid death [1], ‘life before limb’ attitude [18]; exposure to patients - 
focus on individuals [5,13]. 
• Observation bias - seeing women with small screen detected cancers who are able to 
be cured [21,23], though recognises anecdotes cannot be used to set up population 
screening [21]; seeing older women present symptomatically after exiting screening 
program [22]; seeing small tumours with metastases, large tumours that do well, [22]; 
we have all seen seemingly low risk cases with metastases/multifocal lesions [19,23]; 
seeing low grade lesions that recur as nasty cancers [23]; regular clinical exposure to 
patients in whom screening has not benefited [8], anecdotes, clinical experience [25]. 
• Clinical knowledge of what breast cancer patients were like pre screening era [1,13] 
or in countries without education and screening [17]. 
• Pathologists can’t find all positive margins – better to treat [13]. 
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Professional experience – research: 
• Public health bias - population focus and responsibility [4]. 
• Epidemiology training on how to think quantitatively [6] rather than qualitatively. 
• Epidemiology background – influences ideas on importance of research, need to 
basing public health decisions on evidence, the way we look at & weigh evidence 
[16]. 
 
Professional experience – other: 
• Meeting a lot of women who were pleased to have their cancer diagnosed early 
through BreastScreen (advocacy group person) [31]. 
 
Intuition/common sense: 
• Partly based on knowledge of changes since RCTs, e.g. life expectancy,[23,24] 
changes in treatment, changes in imaging [8]. 
• Nothing magic about 50 year olds re: incidence, risk [11]. 
• Should try to minimise use of intuition and judgement [16]. 
• Breast screening picks up 40% of the breast cancer in Australia, so it must be a good 
tool [31]. 
• Breast cancer is common and kills thousands of women every year so screening is 
important [31]. 
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Appendix 13:  Returning results to participants 
This Appendix contains information about how I returned results to the participants of my 
empirical study. 
Individual email to participants 
Dear xxx 
Re: mammographic screening study 
In 2013 you were kind enough to participate in a project as part of my doctoral studies, and 
gave me an hour of your time for an interview regarding your ideas and views on breast 
screening in Australia.  Together with my supervisors, we have spent the last year analysing 
the data from 33 interviews that I undertook, and have submitted our findings in several 
papers to peer-reviewed journals.  The first of these papers has now been published, and 
since many participants expressed an interest in hearing about the outcome of the project, I 
have great pleasure in providing the link for the following publication: 
Parker L, Rychetnik L, Carter S.  Values in breast cancer screening: an empirical 
study with Australian experts.  BMJ Open 2015;5:e006333 
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/bmjopen-2014-
006333?ijkey=4fede9Ou6qJVa7y&keytype=ref 
We hope to have our other papers published over the course of this year, and will forward 
these to you when they become available.  If you do not wish to receive any more emails 
from me about this, please let me know. 
I would like to thank you again for your generosity in participating in this study.  We very 
much hope that our findings will be useful resources for those who continue to be involved in 
breast screening policy and practice in the future. 
Kind Regards, 
Lisa Parker 
DR LISA PARKER 
MBBS (Hons), MBioethics  | PhD Candidate  
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine (VELiM)  
Sydney School of Public Health 
Medical Foundation Building| K 25 (92-94 Parramatta Road) 
THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY | NSW  2006 AUSTRALIA 
M: 0406 758998 
lisa.parker@sydney.edu.au
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